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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
  
INHERITING ILLEGALITY:  
RACE, STATELESSNESS, AND DOMINICO-HAITIAN ACTIVISM 
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
by 
 
Jacqueline Lyon 
 
Florida International University, 2018 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Jorge Duany, Major Professor 
 
 
In 2013, the Dominican Republic’s highest court ruled to revoke birthright 
citizenship for over 200,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent. Ruling TC 168-13 prompted 
dialogue about race and racism in the country, breaking the racial silence that accompanies 
mestizaje (racial mixture). Scholars viewed this ruling through the lens of “Black denial” 
whereby Dominicans’ failure to adopt Black identities, despite being largely 
afrodescendant, fuels the racialization of Haitians as Black. Less evident in examinations 
of Dominican racial politics are anti-racist and anti-xenophobic organizing. Addressing the 
gap in scholarship on Dominican blackness, this dissertation project adopts an 
ethnographic approach to examine how Domicans of Haitian descent, most notably through 
Reconoci.do, a movement of denationalized youth, as well as the natural hair movement, 
engage with race.  As one of the few well-articulated areas of Dominican society engaged 
with blackness, the natural hair movement provides a useful counterpoint for examining 
the intersections between blackness and Haitianess. In this work, I propose that natural hair 
 vii 
has the potential to destabilize Haitian racialization yet, concurrently threatens to decouple 
the anti-racist movement from Dominico-Haitian struggles. These intersections illuminate 
the complex relationships within the heterogenous anti-racist movement. 
Through a historically rooted examination of constructions of race and nation in 
immigration policies, censuses, and national identity cards, this dissertation asserts that 
immigration policies were designed to benefit the dominant sugarcane economy at the 
expense of migrants and thus state efforts in 2014 to address indocumentation continued 
earlier discriminatory patterns, disproportionately impacting the Haitian diaspora.  These 
practices are best understood as spectacles (De Genova 2013) that produce migrant 
illegality and, in particular, an inherited illegality for Dominican-born children that violates 
their constitutional rights to citizenship. Furthermore, the state constructs the population as 
non-black while publicly undermining anti-racist organizing and this research finds that 
activists draw on transnational images of blackness to challenge national representations 
of a modern blackness. Identifying mestizaje and the color continuum as obstacles to 
organizing, many activists conceptualize blackness as hypodescent, whereby any African 
ancestry engenders a Black identity. I argue that, while essentialist, this strategy broadens 
identification with Dominico-Haitians.  
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 One night in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, I finally made it to La Espiral, 
a partially open-air club popular with locals and tourists for its live, underground shows. I 
was there to see the band of one of my first friends on the island, La Gran Mawon, The 
Great Maroon. When I arrived, La Gran Mawon, had already begun to lull the crowd with 
its reggae set. El Caminante, “The Wanderer,” as José liked to be called, had been an 
essential resource throughout my exploratory research on Dominico-Haitian struggles for 
nationality after a September 2013 ruling (168-13) by the Dominican Republic’s highest 
court declared an estimated 200,000 people stateless. At odds with the prevailing discourse 
of universal anti-Haitian and anti-Black sentiment in the Dominican Republic, El 
Caminante, and others, drew on various representations in the global Black diaspora in 
their music, style, and self-presentation. Superseding the limits of the available nationalist 
discourse, the crowd that night shared in a space thoroughly imbued with representations 
of global blackness. Afros and dreadlocks swayed to music played by a band whose name 
combines Spanish and Haitian Kreyol in its reference to the island’s runaway slave 
communities. When the group played Bob Marley’s “Buffalo Soldier,” the crowd sang 
along to the lyrics, “Stolen from Africa, Brought to America.” It became clear throughout 
 CHAPTER 1
RE-INTRODUCTION  TO DOMINICAN  BLACKNESS
[A]nti-haitianismo ideology has prevented Dominicans from recognizing
their trueracial identity and has perpetuated their racial Ò confusionÓ or
denial.
 2 
my time in the Dominican Republic that the America resonant with the crowd was not only 
the United States, but Latin America and the Caribbean too. 
In the Dominican Republic, blackness is often expressed in nationalist discourse 
vis-à-vis Haiti. Founded in the historical memory of successive Haitian occupations during 
the colonial period, especially between 1822 and 1844, and perpetuated in the trope of 
invasive Haitian immigration, Haitians are often portrayed as the Dominican Republic’s 
cultural and racial others. While Haitians are racialized as Black, the scene at La Espiral 
demonstrates how Dominicans draw on multiple meanings of blackness that cannot be 
captured through references to Haiti alone. Much of the literature that examines race has 
failed to consider Black cultural production beyond the Haitian question as it is expressed 
in music, film, and self-presentation, such as natural hair.  
Given the context where Haitian exclusion, exemplified in ruling 168-13, is 
expressed through racialized difference, it is crucial to study the intersections between 
expressions of blackness and the politics of citizenship and belonging in the Dominican 
Republic. My dissertation examines the diverse engagements with blackness in the 
Dominican Republic with attention to the ways that its performatives and articulations 
exceed, challenge, and reinforce the ability of the Haitian metaphor to capture the range of 
Dominican entanglements with blackness. Particularly, this project situates Dominicans 
within the global Black diaspora. Based in Santo Domingo, the capital, largest city, and 
center of organizing against ruling TC 168-13,1 which revoked the citizenship of the 
                                            
1 Ruling TC 168-13 was issued September 23, 2013 in response to Juliana Deguis’s petition for the renewal 
of her documents by the Junta Central Electoral. The court’s argument is founded on the 1929 constitution 
which excluded the children of those en transito (“in transit”) from accessing birthright citizenship. The 
court argued that irregular migrants, regardless of their time in the country, are in transit.  
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children of irregular migrants, this research examines the potential for re-signifying the 
national imaginary in ways that open spaces for blackness and the possibilities for the 
inclusion of Haitian immigrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent. This dissertation 
argues that the coproduction of race and nation vis-à-vis ideologies of mestizaje has 
engendered the exclusion of Dominicans of Haitian descent represented in the current 
citizenship crisis. Moreover, as anti-racist activists organize to challenge the mapping of 
blackness onto Haitianess, they risk the production of either exclusionary middle-class or 
broad, but potentially essentialist representations of blackness.  
 
Blackness, Haitianess, and Dominicanidad: A Literature Review 
In a June 2015 panel with activists, journalists, and artists responding to the crisis 
in citizenship, a representative from Acción Afrodominicana (Afro-Dominican Action) 
said, Cuando yo alejo del haitiano, yo alejo de mi propio yo, (“When I distance myself 
from Haitians, I create difference from my own self.”) Although the speaker, Carmen, a 
self-identified Afro-Dominican is not of Haitian descent, her comments evidence and 
understanding that interlaces Haitianess with blackness. Her views are representative of 
the how Haitianess and blackness are frequently co-articulated in Dominican Republic. 
Although most Dominicans have African ancestry (Torres-Saillant 2010[1995]), in official 
discourse and statistics, most are constructed as indios. While literally meaning “Indian,” 
in practice, indio refers to Dominicans’ mixed indigenous, European, and African 
ancestries. Ideologies of mestizaje (racial mixture) in the Dominican Republic and 
elsewhere have been critiqued by social movements and academics who have characterized 
them for being “all-inclusive ideology of exclusion” (Stutzman 1981). A major issue is that 
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the contributions of the “third root,” Africa, are often marginalized in nationalist 
representations, exacerbated by the historical intertwining of mestizaje with eugenicist 
science in the early to mid-20th century. In this vein, racial mixture has been articulated as 
a racial improvement paradigm whereby blackness would be washed out through selective 
reproduction—whitening, or blanqueamiento. Racial mixture in Latin America provides 
what Carl Degler refers to as the “mulatto escape hatch” (1986[1971]), whereby an appeal 
to racial mixture removes one from the Black category, and some have argued that 
Dominicans utilized an “indio escape hatch” (see Sagás 2000; Tavernier 2008). Where 
most Dominicans construct themselves as indios, blackness is almost exclusively utilized 
in reference to the country’s Haitian minority.  
Silvio Torres-Saillant, in Introduction to Dominican Blackness (2010[1995]), 
laments the failure of scholars in anthropology, Black cultural studies, and Latino studies 
to center the Dominican Republic as a site of blackness. Several collections that explore 
blackness in the Dominican Republic published in the 1990s elide Dominican engagements 
with blackness, despite its status as the “cradle of blackness in the Americas” (Torres-
Saillant 2010[1995], 110). Torres-Sailliant’s call was answered by a growing interest 
Dominican racial studies that has accompanied the increase in Dominican immigrants to 
the United States. Accordingly, many studies examine how Dominican arrivals and the 
second generation become Black vis-à-vis their encounters with a US racial system that 
invalidates the mixed-race identities Dominican migrants bring from their homelands. 
Studies in Providence, R.I. (Bailey 2002; Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000; Itzigsohn 
2009), Boston (Levitt 2001), Washington, D.C. (Candelario 2007), and New York City 
(Candelario 2007; Duany 2008[1994]; Hoffnung-Garskof 2008; Roth 2012) illuminate the 
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ways Dominicans negotiate their racialization as Black. This racialization not only causes 
a “cognitive shift” (Duany 1998) in the ways individual Dominican emigrants think about 
race but has arguably resulted in the acceptance of blackness on the island, attributed to 
“the behavior of returning migrants who go back to their communities transformed into 
new agents of modernity, capitalism, and racial emancipation” (Moya Pons 1981, 32-33). 
More broadly, these individual circulations contribute to a “transnational social field” 
(Levitt and Schiller 2004) in which Dominican racial identity is simultaneously negotiated 
by migrants and non-migrants (Roth 2012). The present work examines how blackness and 
its articulations with Haitianess are shaped not only through patterns of migration between 
the US and the Dominican Republic, but through the transnational activist movements that 
help sustain the fight for Dominico-Haitian citizenship. Despite the strong connections 
scholars have made between blackness and Haitianess (Howard 2001; Sagás 2000; 
Tavernier 2008), none of these scholars addresses the implications these negotiations of 
blackness might have for transforming the relationship between the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti.   
Scholars of race in the Dominican Republic highlight several historical moments 
when anti-Haitianism was consolidated in the Dominican Republic. Many locate the origin 
of the Dominican rejection of blackness in the events of the 1822-1844 Haitian unification 
of the island. In this narrative, Dominicans’ successful war of independence from Haiti—
not from Spain—consolidated Dominican political and cultural opposition to their western 
neighbors. Haitians had organized themselves as a post-colonial black nation in opposition 
to their colonial oppressors, codified in the 1805 constitution, which proclaimed all 
Haitians no matter what their shade of skin, were to be considered “Black” (Nicholls 1996, 
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35). Therefore, scholars of race in the Dominican Republic argue that it is no surprise that 
Dominicans fashioned themselves as patently non-black (Derby 2003; Ferguson 1992; 
Torres-Saillant and Hernández 1998; Sagás 2000). In contrast to the legal mandate of 
blackness institutionalized in Haiti, post-independence Dominican Republic “privileged 
European ancestry and Hispanic cultural norms” based on whiteness, Catholicism, and the 
Spanish language (Mayes 2014, 1-2). Arguably, this Dominican criollo identity began to 
develop earlier in the colonial period due to the colony’s poverty and the less-profitable 
plantation economy (Derby 1994; 2003; Sagás and Inoa 2003). 
However, Samuel Martínez (2003), responding to Michele Wucker’s book Why the 
Cocks Fight (1999), argues that scholars have over-emphasized anti-Haitian ideology by 
failing to consider “instances of cooperation and evidence of converging interests among 
Haitian and Dominican people and their governments” (2003, 81). Martínez admits that 
Dominicans construct themselves as fundamentally distinct from Haitians; however, he 
emphasizes that close daily contact between Haitians and Dominicans greatly reduces 
negative sentiments (Martínez 2003, 89). Similar studies of Haitians and Dominicans who 
live along the island’s border confirm the existence of shared social and cultural spaces 
between these communities (Derby 1994; 2003; Paulino 2016; Turits 2003). These findings 
suggest that anti-Haitianism is evident in national ideology but is not universally shared. 
Martínez and others (Franco 2003; Paulino 2016; Sagás 2000) point to the need to examine 
how and when anti-Haitian discourse and politics emerge. In this vein, most scholars of 
Dominican-Haitian relations examine the promotion of anti-Haitian ideology and practices 
after the Haitian Revolution, during the US occupation (1916-1924) of the island, and the 
subsequent dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1960).  
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The first of these key historical events shaping contemporary Dominican-Haitian 
relations is the 1791 Haitian Revolution. The revolution reverberated throughout the 
region, both inspiring rebellion throughout the colonial world and the fear of vanishing 
empires (Geggus 2003). Attesting to the ideological and political challenges that Haiti 
posed Western powers as the first independent black republic, in the aftermath of the 
revolution, the US and other Western powers went to great lengths to prevent further 
uprisings. Intervention was justified through discourses of racial and sexual difference. For 
example, President Ulises Heureaux, President of the Dominican Republic (1886-1899), 
of Haitian and West Indian parentage, was described by one US state official as having the 
“weaknesses ‘of the savage—his domination by his sexual passions, which were never 
satiated, and his lust for blood’” (Torres-Saillant and Hernández 1998, 23).  
In this context, leaders in the Dominican Republic “struggled with the problem of 
black political leadership in a historical moment saturated with antiblack racism and fear 
of black political power” (Mayes 2014, 7). Ginetta Candelario (2007) traces how the 
discourses of difference shaped the nation-making process in the nascent Dominican state. 
Overlapping occupations of the western (1915-1934) and eastern (1916-1924) parts of the 
island of Hispaniola had a lasting impact on Dominican understandings of global racial 
hierarchies. In the accounts of US travelers and emissaries who sought justification for US 
colonization of the island, the Dominican Republic was racialized as white vis-à-vis 
Haitian blackness. Henceforth, “despite the country's African heritage, Dominican identity 
formations negotiated the fraught space between US-dominant notions of white supremacy 
that defined mixture as degeneration and the geopolitical positioning of Dominicans as ‘los 
blancos de la tierra [whites of the land]’ relative to Haitians” (Candelario 2007, 38). 
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US authorities and foreign plantation owners encouraged the immigration of 
Haitian labor in the early 20th century to meet the sugar industry’s demand. Henceforth, 
Haitian workers became associated with the US occupation of the Dominican Republic. In 
practice, Haitians experienced harsher treatment from military officials during the extended 
occupation, “[t]he racial difference between Haitians and Dominicans, in which some 
Dominicans were perceived as racially mixed and thus closer to Europeans, justified, for 
many US authorities, continued military governance in Haiti and an end of occupation for 
the Dominican Republic” (Mayes 2014, 108). US policy in this case sharply differed from 
domestic US framings of race relations based on the principle of hypodescent, in which 
“one drop” of black blood categorized one as Black. Further, these examples place the 
Dominican Republic’s national formation within the imperial context where adopting a 
mixed, rather than a black identity, had practical consequences for sovereignty. 
Shortly after the end of US occupation, Rafael Trujillo seized power and attempted 
to exemplify the modern status of the Dominican nation which had been denied in the 
discourse of racial, sexual, and gendered inferiority that accompanied the country's 
annexation. Trained by the US Marines during their occupation of the Dominican Republic, 
Trujillo maintained a brutal dictatorship (1930-1961) which witnessed the 
institutionalization of violent and discriminatory practices against Haitians and Afro-
Dominicans. Trujillo consolidated his power in large measure through racial discourse and 
violence. Of Haitian descent himself, Trujillo is famously known for powdering his face to 
appear lighter-skinned and encouraging the “Dominicanization” of the border region, 
paradoxically through European and Japanese migration (Horst and Asagiri 2010). These 
practices illustrate how “Dominican” was defined in contradistinction to Haitianess and 
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blackness. The dictator also regulated cultural forms of blackness in the Dominican 
Republic such as vodou and the use of drums in merengue (Austerlitz 1997; Torres-Saillant 
2010[1995], 21). This was part of a process whereby “[a]s frontier Dominicans became 
part of the nation as citizens, the Haitian community came to be labeled as foreigners 
threatening the body politic” (Derby 1994, 489).  
As part of the process of “Dominicanization” in 1937, Trujillo orchestrated a brutal 
massacre of Haitians and Black Dominicans in the border region. Attesting to the 
uncertainty with which Dominicans identify Haitian racial difference, the slaughter is also 
known as the “Parsley Massacre” for a test perpetrators devised to distinguish Haitians 
from Dominicans using the Spanish word perejil, which Kreyol speakers often pronounce 
as pelehil (Ferreras 1981).2 An estimated 17,000 Haitians were killed in these events, which 
Trujillo attempted to frame as a popular uprising by ordering guards to wear civilian clothes 
and to use machetes in place of guns (Turits 2003). Until 2014, similar discourses of a 
Haitian invasion emanating from the pre-independence occupations and the border conflict 
continue to justify the “state of exception” (Agamben 2005) to suspend the legal 
protections previously granted to the children of undocumented migrants.  
Further, Trujillo instituted the use of the indio category on the cédula de identidad 
nacional (national identity card). In the shadow of the massacre, “Dominicans of Haitian 
descent and black Dominicans … were further disappeared by fiat under the state's 
classificatory system … ‘Indio’ has come to be an affirmation of Dominican whiteness as 
well as non-blackness” (Candelario 2007, 19). To this day, the Junta Central Electoral 
                                            
2 Ramón Alberto, Ferreras, “¿Cómo fue la masacre haitiana?”, El Sol, 15 may 1981, Colección Bernardo  
Vega, Archivo General de la Nación No. 145-038,  http://200.26.174.77/cbvnode/app.html#/details.  
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(Central Electoral Board or JCE) classifies the skin color of citizens as blanco (white), 
indio (Indian), amarillo (yellow), or negro (black). Although the agency does not report 
racial statistics, indio is disproportionately assigned despite the overwhelming population 
of blacks and mulattos (Simmons 2009; Torres-Saillant 1998). 
In the Dominican Republic, blackness and foreignness became forged through 
these historical events. Colloquially, “Haitian” and “Black” are used interchangeably and 
calling someone either is considered an insult (Derby 1994). However, an increasing 
number of scholars have called to challenge work which, “[i]n addition to exacerbating the 
unjust treatment of Haitian migrants and their descendants … exaggerated claims of 
irreconcilable differences between Haitians and Dominicans have negatively affected 
intellectual, cultural, and artistic exchange between the two countries” (Mayes et al. 2013, 
27). This claim points to research which elides alternative engagements of blackness and 
Haitianess within the Dominican Republic. Torres-Saillant (1998) shows how the 
reproduction of the anti-Haitian narrative fails to explain the popular support for 
presidential candidate José Francisco Peña Gómez in the 1994 and 1996 elections, although 
the opposition emphasized his Haitian parentage to discredit his candidacy. Further, while 
this historical outline demonstrates the indisputable connections between Haitians and 
blackness in Dominican racial ideology, it elides other prominent references for blackness. 
For instance, Samaná, Puerto Plata, and San Pedro de Macorís were centers of Black 
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migration from the United States and the West Indies that have been relatively 
unexamined.3  
Although mestizaje provides for the investment in a future whiteness for those who 
are unable to fully exercise its benefits, it also projects an image of all nationals as racially 
homogenous. Through the ideology of mestizaje, all nationals are considered racially 
mixed and to be Dominican is to be indio. Therefore, anyone who is not mixed is perceived 
as outside the boundaries of the Dominican nation, engendering the relationship between 
race and nation that intertwines anti-Black racism and xenophobia. This relationship is key 
to understanding how Dominico-Haitians are framed as ineligible for citizenship, and the 
production of their “illegality.” The current citizenship crisis and the state’s response 
frequently serve as a “spectacle … displacing ‘illegality’ from its point of production (in 
the law) to the proverbial ‘scene of the crime,’ which is of course also the scene of 
ostensible crime-fighting” (De Genova 2013, 1189). In the Dominican case, the scene of 
“crime-fighting” is less the border, than the internal registries, which authorities have 
                                            
3 Pedro R. Rivera (2015, 107) describes San Pedro de Macorís as the “blackest city in the country” due to 
the large Antillean migration to the city during the sugar boom the city experienced in the early 20th 
century. Moreover, one of the first chapters of the United Negro Improvement Alliance was founded in San 
Pedro de Macorís, and later, Samaná (García Muñoz and Giovannetti 2003, 154). Harry Hoetink (1962, 3) 
noted “a quite numerous group of English-speaking Negroes, descendants of North American feedmen who 
came to this country nearly 140 years ago” living in the Samaná on the northern coast of the Dominican 
Republic. Although both Haitians and cocolos were classified en el polo más oscuro del continuo racial, el 
negro ... los haitianos ocupaban la posición más extrema. Las cualidades consideradas positivas de los 
cocolos–educación, destrezas, dedicación al trabajo, disciplina, religiosidad, dominio del inglés ... les 
ubicó en una posición distinta en la percepción de sectores de la sociedad dominicana (in the darkest pole 
of the racial continuum, black, Haitians occupied the most extreme position. Qualities considered positive 
of the cocolos–education, skills, dedication to work, discipline, religiosity, English dominance ... located 
them in a distinct position in the perception of sectors of Dominican society (García Muñoz and 
Giovannetti 2003, 170). Despite the racialization of cocolos, the majority of scholarship on blackness in the 
Dominican Republic has focused on the racialization of Haitians with almost no anthropological 
scholarship on the contemporary experiences of Dominican cocolos. 
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argued need to be cleaned of fraud due to the “deceptive” practices through which Haitians 
have historically accessed citizenship.  
A group of scholars known as the Transnational Hispaniola Working Group has 
produced scholarship aimed at offering more complex renderings of Dominican-Haitian 
relations and Dominican racial formation. These works begin to address the implicit bias 
of the existing scholarship on Dominican blackness, arguing that “even when investigators 
find a recognizable (to them) embrace of African origins and black identity, there is 
nevertheless a strange inability to let go of narratives emphasizing Dominican self-hatred, 
negrophobia, and anti-Haitianism” (Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 2). Other works 
associated with this group by Lorgia García Peña (2016), Edward Paulino (2016), Amelia 
Hintzen (2016), and Anne Eller (2016) have all bridged the Dominican-Haitian divide in 
their focus on challenging the univocal narrative of antagonism, while not losing sight of 
worrisome inequalities. A further goal of these projects is to situate their readings within 
global imperial and racial projects (Sawyer and Paschel 2007) to “illuminate rather than 
obfuscate” (Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 2) these problematics. The present project is 
situated in these efforts. To date, these works have focused largely on historical and literary 
examinations and no grounded ethnographic study of the entanglements among blackness, 
Haitianess, and dominicanidad exists.  
Even more so, Dominican racial identity is premised on the racial mixture of 
African, European, and Indian ancestries. Few Dominicans deny the “fact of their 
blackness” by virtue of this foundational myth. However, blackness is embraced mainly in 
terms of the folkloric past. Many of the works on the African heritage on the island focus 
on the slave period, African religions, and musical forms in ways that relegate Dominican 
 13 
blackness to the past rather than as a modern racial identity (Austerlitz 2006). More often, 
although “black cultural practices—such as Dominican Vodú—are important components 
of national culture, these practices are not recognized within official versions of Dominican 
uniqueness that affirm the nationalist myth that Dominican culture is exclusively white, 
Spanish, and Catholic” (Baker 2006, 57). The lack of positive historical or contemporary 
accounts was seen as a particular deficit to promoting Black identity as, Alicia the 
Reconoci.do said, ¿Quien quisiera ser negro si ser negro solo significa ser esclavo? (“Who 
would want to be Black if being Black only means being a slave?”) Therefore, articulations 
of modern Black subjectivities in the Dominican Republic are limited by the national 
imaginary which places blackness as outside the modern nation-state through the 
racialization of Haitians and the relegation of black culture to the memorialized past (see 
Thomas 2004).  
This present study enriches our understanding of mestizaje as a distinctively Latin 
American racial ideology as it is applied in the Dominican Republic. It does so, primarily, 
by examining the connections between race and nation and putting these into conversation 
with examinations of citizenship and illegality, topics almost exclusively discussed in 
relation to the United States and Europe. Moreover, by examining the multiple ways 
Dominicans engage with blackness, this work contributes to the goals established by the 
Transnational Hispaniola Working Group of challenging the simplistic and negative 
rhetoric of Dominican self-hatred and highlighting how Dominicans engage with both local 
and transnational racial formations in ways that are productive to their struggle.  
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The Research Project  
This work draws on over 12 non-consecutive months of ethnographic research 
between May 2014-October 2016 in Santo Domingo. This project is guided by three central 
research questions: What is the relationship between blackness and anti-Haitianism in the 
Dominican Republic? What transnational and diasporic racial ideologies do Dominicans 
have access to, and how might these present opportunities to reimagine the relationship 
with Haiti? How is the opposition to exclusionary policies toward Haitians utilizing racial 
representations in their efforts? 
Much of this research was undertaken in partnership with Reconoci.do, an 
organized movement founded in 2010 to address the issue of denationalization of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent. The organization is described on its website as a 
Movimiento de Jóvenes Dominicanos de Ascendencia Haitiana que luchan por la 
reivindicación de sus derechos y el derecho a la nacionalidad (Movement of Dominican 
of Haitian descent youth who fight for the revindication of their rights and the rights to 
nationality). Reconoci.do began as a campaign sponsored by the Servicio Jesuita de 
Migrantes (Jesuit Service for Migrants or SJM) and housed in Centro Bonó, a Jesuit-funded 
educational and social service foundation that offers a wide range of programming 
including a library, certificate programs, Haitian Kreyol courses, assistance to migrants, 
public panels, and presentations. Unlike older organizations that work around issues of 
documentation, leaders of Reconoci.do are careful to distinguish their work from that of 
the hanful of non-profits that focus on Dominico-Haitian social issues. As one leader, 
Alicia, explains: these organizations work with the affected population, but “el factor 
empoderamiento no está marcadamente visible en el componente del trabajo de ellos” (the 
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empowerment factor is not markedly visible in the composition of their work).4 In contrast, 
the model envisioned by the Jesuit Service was aimed at accompanying and empowering 
those affected so that ese mismo grupo pudiera seguir de manera independiente la 
revindicación de su causa … yo pienso que en gran medida se ha logrado (“that same 
group could continue in an independent manner the revindication of their cause … I think 
to a great deal that’s been achieved.”) Although at the time of this research, Reconoci.do 
remained financially dependent on Centro Bonó, one of the primary goals of the movement 
was to be self-funded through membership dues and thereby retain more control over their 
mission and projects. Dependency on external funding sources and their attendant priorities 
was one of the major critiques Reconoci.do’s leaders had of the non-profit model. 
Moreover, as a movement, Reconoci.do leaders embrace direct political action and protest 
in constrast to what they see as the more accommodationist stance adopted by non-profits 
and, until recently, the sugarcane worker’s union.  
Although Reconoci.do has núcleos (nuclei) in five regions throughout the island 
(El Seibo, La Romana, San Pedro de Macorís, Santo Domingo and the southern zone 
[Barahona, and Barahuco]), many of the organized activities take place in Santo Domingo 
(see Figure 1). Each núcleo is represented by one or two coordinators who convoke 
meetings, communicate with the national leadership in monthly meetings, and accompany 
individuals through the process of restoring their documentation. The movement began 
with four original members of the SJM campaign; at the time of my fieldwork, each 
                                            
4 Interview in Santo Domingo March 16, 2016.  
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convocation of núcleos drew 20-30 members and the 2016 National Assembly drew over 
70 of the group’s most active members.   
 
Figure 1 "Zonas de Intervención" (Zones of Intervention) Source: reconoci.do/contactos 
 
Despite acting independently from Centro Bonó, Reconoci.do continues to rely on 
the center for office space, institutional support, and fundraising. Santo Domingo is also 
home to the central government, making it a necessary stop for many in the pursuit of their 
documents. For the same reason, the capital has served as the backdrop for most of the 
public protests organized by the organization. During my time with the organization, it 
organized protests in front of the Palacio Nacional, home of the president, the headquarters 
of the Junta Central Electoral (JCE), the Central Electoral Board, and Parque 
Independencia, Independence Park. Therefore, the movement’s claims were largely 
directed at these institutions of government, which failed to guarantee the citizenship rights 
of Dominicans of Haitian descent.  
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In addition to participating in these protests, where I took photographs and 
fieldnotes regarding the ways protesters framed their demands, I participated in regular 
meetings in all the organization’s five núcleos and the annual asamblea attended by all 
members. These meetings offered important gathering places where members could share 
their successes and pitfalls in pursuit of their documentation and where the organization’s 
vice-president along with one or more local representatives would facilitate a process 
whereby the impacted community learned how to connect their personal struggles with 
broader anti-racist, democratic, and feminist movements. The organization also 
increasingly sought to sponsor social events, providing opportunities to form community 
and gain some reprieve from the difficult political, emotional, social, and economic 
problems in which members were constantly embroiled. Moreover, I followed activists as 
they accompanied members to government offices to request their documentation.  
My main contribution to the organization was as a photographer/videographer 
charged with documenting meetings, personal stories, and protests for the group’s social 
media and other promotional materials. Additionally, at one point I was tasked with visiting 
communities to identify persons who fell into Group B, a population that the organization 
wanted to serve (explained later in this chapter). Throughout, I engaged in both informal 
and formal conversations with 11 members at all levels of the organization, including 
recent recruits, upper and middle leaders, and former members. These interviews were with 
youth, ages 21 to 30 who, except for one, had been personally impacted by the 
denationalization policies.  
Semi-formal interviews included questions about individuals’ experiences with 
racism and xenophobia throughout their life history, their involvement in activism, and the 
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impact of denationalization on their lives. In response to the circumstances of each 
individual’s status and history, interview protocols adapted to fit each interviewee. These 
interviews lasted from between 45 minutes to over two hours. In addition to events 
sponsored by Reconoci.do, I attended meetings and public protests of an organization that 
arose during my fieldwork, the Colectivo Isleño (Island Collective), a small group of 
friends, students, and intellectuals based in the US and Santo Domingo that was founded 
to bridge a divide they recognized between efforts to support Dominico-Haitians and 
Haitian migrants as the latter were not fully integrated into Reconoci.do. I interviewed key 
informants and attended meetings, protests, and events of this organization. Additionally, 
I interviewed key members of Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas (Movement of 
Dominico-Haitian Women, or MUDHA), Justicia Migratoria, the Movimiento de 
Trabajadores Domínico-Haitianos (Movement of Dominico-Haitian workers, or 
MOSCTHA), Centro para la Observación Migratoria y el Desarrollo en el Caribe 
(OBMICA), and the Centro Cultural Domínico-Haitiano (Dominico-Haitian Cultural 
Center, or CCDH), numbering 10 interviews. These interviews with leaders of these 
organizations were crucial for grounding this project in the historical and legal framework 
of the denationalization policy. All the names of interviewees, except for those easily 
identifiable by their role in the movement (Ana María Belique and Miguel de Jesús 
Dandré), are pseudonyms.  
Partnering with Reconoci.do grounds this research firmly within contemporary 
Dominican “citizenship projects” that are increasingly racist and xenophobic; it provides 
for an examination of anti-Haitianism not only through a critical reading of recent policy 
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and legislative changes,5 but through those who are personally and politically committed 
to combatting it. My hope is that by adopting this focus this work illuminates the anti-racist 
and anti-xenophobic work being done on the island, efforts that are routinely made 
invisible in both academic and popular representations of the Dominican Republic’s racial 
politics through narratives like that expressed in the epigraph for this introductory chapter 
(see also Howard 2001; Martínez-Vergne 2005). As such, this project examines Dominico-
Haitian antiracist struggles as at the forefront of a growing, progressive and anti-racist 
sector of Dominican society, refusing to reproduce a methodological nationalism that 
examines migrants (and the children of migrants) as “differentiated from the mainstream 
culture of the nation-state” (Glick Schiller and Meinhof 2011, 23). Therefore, this research 
offers ethnographic evidence that challenge readings which universally ascribe anti-
Blackness and self-denial to all Dominicans by arguing that Dominicans of Haitian descent 
are at the forefront of a strengthening anti-racist movement that includes allies and natural 
hair advocates.  
If, as some scholars have argued, the meanings of blackness and Haitianess overlap 
in the Dominican Republic, it is necessary to examine how the broader anti-racist 
movement intersects with anti-xenophobic struggles. To that end, I attended four 
gatherings of and conducted six interviews in person and via email with activists and 
                                            
5 During my fieldwork, I made several requests to interview members of the Fuerza Nacional Progresista, 
a political organization with a nationalist philosophy that frequently organizes counter protests against 
Dominico-Haitians, but never received a response.   
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individuals who promoted Afro-textured hair.6 The “natural hair movement” offers one of 
the few moderately organized sites where blackness is regularly and openly discussed and 
valorized in the Dominican Republic in ways that are not always tied to Haitianess. (Many 
of the handful of groups that have been organized in the capital over the last few years, 
including Acción Afrodominicana [Afro-Dominican Action], and the Red Dominicana de 
Jóvenes Afrodescendientes [Dominican Network of Afro-Descendant Youth], were 
defunct by the time I began this research. I interviewed a member of each of these groups 
for this project.) As an important racial indicator in the Dominican context, hair politics 
also bled into my interviews with activists and informal conversations, often hanging out 
in one of the many public plazas where youth gather to discuss culture and politics. Finally, 
when possible, I attended discussions of race, migration, and the Haitian diaspora, gaining 
insight into how academics, artists, and activists outside of the two main cohorts I 
examined were thinking about and representing these issues. Like any ethnography, this 
work is also informed by a diverse milieu of happenstance, intimate, embodied, and 
intensely vulnerable encounters with a wide range of Dominicans and non-Dominicans, 
neighbors, friends, strangers, tourists, and other researchers, part of the process of “deep 
hanging out” (Geertz 1988).  
 
A Reflexive Note  
Ethnography is an inherently “dialogic” practice (Escobar 1993, 383). Throughout 
this project on race and citizenship in the Dominican Republic, my own racial and national 
                                            
6 The term “Afro-textured hair” is used in the dermatology literature to describe a wide-range of hair 
textures associated with African diaspora populations. This term is useful for avoiding the imposition of a 
racial identification that occurs when describing hair as “Black” hair.   
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locations posed both barriers and opportunities. To be sure, I experienced more racial 
privilege in the Dominican Republic than I do in the United States, where I often challenge 
the limits of people’s racial categories as a mixed-race and multiethnic person. In the 
United States, I am afforded advantages because of my light skin and Anglo surname, but 
others rarely perceive me as an unhyphenated White person. The questions, “Where are 
you from? Where are you from originally? No, where are you really from? Where are your 
parents from?” are all features of my social interaction with US residents.  
 In the Dominican Republic, I experienced little ambiguity about my race. I was 
solidly considered rubia (literally, meaning blond but used to describe light-skinned 
persons). On only one occasion was I aware of being read differently when I asked a new 
acquaintance to guess where I was from. He said India (from the Asian subcontinent), 
noting the yellow undertones of my skin. My nationality, however, was less of a clear-cut 
issue. Some, just by looking at me, guessed I was from the US, others Spain, and a few 
from South America, especially Colombia. On a handful of occasions, mostly before 
speaking, I was assumed to be Dominican.  
 Although it is difficult to disentangle whether my nationality or my race were 
responsible for the preferential treatment I sometimes received, they likely worked in 
tandem. One night, I invited some of my closest friends to dinner at my apartment. 
Afterwards, we headed to a popular salsa club with a strict dress code. As the trip to the 
club was impromptu, Joel, who was wearing shorts and flip flops, worried he wouldn’t be 
let in. Although Joel, a realtor, was middle class and trigueño, our friend Frank suggested 
that he enter arm-in-arm with me, who, as an americana could defy the rules more easily 
than he.  
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 At times, my race and nationality posed barriers, including the inability to do 
fieldwork in natural hair salons as was part of my original research plan (see Chapter 4). 
Some Dominicans, I found, are highly critical of the United States due to military 
occupations of their country from 1916-1924 and in 1965. One man, upon learning I was 
from the US, refused to speak with me.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the assumptions, mostly on the part of men, that I was 
looking for or open to intimate relationships. I was asked if I had “ever been with a 
Dominican man,” and the man who delivered my drinking water suggested that I “had to 
try it.” These assumptions were informed by the sex tourism economy in the Dominican 
Republic, mostly known to cater to European and North American straight (Brennan 2004; 
Cabezas 2009; Gregory 2014) or gay men (Decena 2011; Padilla 2012), but also serves 
women despite the little academic attention to this area (Taylor 2001). My presence as a 
White, US woman, traveling without her partner was often interpellated within this 
“economy of desire” that structures many of these interactions. I have struggled with how 
to write about my experiences of sexual harassment in the field, concerned that doing so 
would reinforce negative stereotypes that portray men of color as sexual predators. The 
work of feminist and activist anthropologists underscores the importance of breaking with 
“the discipline’s implicit masculinist ‘shut up and take it’ mentality in reference to 
gendered violence in the field” (Berry et al. 2017, 538). To be sure, the Dominican 
Republic was not an exceptional space of patriarchal violence, and patriarchal violence is 
part of longstanding colonial projects. To that end, these same anthropologists emphasize 
how “oppressions and inequalities ‘at home’ are inseparable from those ‘out there’” (Berry 
et al. 2017, 558), particularly the violence of the highly exploitative tourist economy and 
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broader neo-colonial relations of power between the “Global South” and the “Global 
North” through which my body and actions were read.   
Therefore, when I was recognized as a foreigner, my presence and actions were 
read through this familiar script, presenting an obstacle to navigating relationships with 
men and generating awkward and uncomfortable interactions. Even when I was perceived 
to be Dominican, including in one interaction with a White foreigner who stopped me on 
in the street to ask if I was married, I was interpellated within the sexual economy. In this 
context, rapport, as a hallmark of anthropology, became difficult to establish as interest, 
receptivity, intimacy, and passivity in relationships with men are “constantly 
misrecognized as romantic desire” (Berry et al. 2017, 552) by all members of the 
community. This misrecognition of my actions and intentions was a pervasive danger as it 
held the potential to destabilize relationships of trust through potential association with the 
fetishizing and extractive tourist. In a more immediate sense, my interpellation within the 
sexual economy impelled me to adopt strategies to cultivate a sterile, professional, and 
asexual affective style, drawing from a cache of tactics learned in the navigation of 
patriarchy in the US. At times, I hesitated to challenge comments or actions that made me 
uncomfortable in the interest of preserving rapport with necessary gatekeepers. In other 
occasions, I chose to stop working with individuals who implied that their participation or 
support for this project was contingent on tolerating or accepting sexual overtures. To 
mitigate sexual harassment on the streets and in fieldwork, I attempted to cultivate a sterile, 
professional, and asexual appearance, sweltering in long-sleeved cardigans and avoiding 
conversations not narrowly focused on my research topic. I relate these few (of many) 
examples not to offer any truth about Dominican patriarchy, but to add to the growing 
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conversation about the ubiquity of gendered violence. As the #MeToo movement has 
proven, even the simple act of recognizing the ubiquity of gendered violence and its larger 
structural impact on women’s psychological, professional, and personal empowerment is 
transformative. Yet, work is still needed to locate “productive ways of speaking and writing 
about gendered violence in the field and its intricate connections to the violence we face at 
home” (Berry et al. 2017, 554).   
 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a brief socio-legal history of Haitian migration, pathways to 
legalization, and citizenship policies in the Dominican Republic. This context is crucial to 
placing legal and institutional efforts to restrict access to citizenship between 2005 and 
2015 into a wider scope. Grounding the following analysis in the legal and historical 
context aids in avoiding the pitfalls Nicholas De Genova (2002) identifies in 
anthropological studies of “illegality” which fail to acknowledge that: migrations are 
primarily labor migrations, migrations are not random, but are “produced and patterned” 
and that “illegality” is “consitituted and regulated by law” (424). This analysis makes clear 
that although current citizenship laws and policies do not specifically target Haitians or 
their descendants, institutional practices and modes of Haitian incorporation have imposed 
barriers to access that especially target this group. It does so through a review of the 
historical scholarship, and examination of recent legal and constitutional texts that served 
as precedents to the 2013 ruling.   
 Chapter 3 evaluates the state’s claims that the citizenship reforms are grounded in 
an attempt to modernize citizenship and naturalization policies, thereby making them more 
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just, accessible, and transparent. In 2014, the state instituted pathways to reinstate 
citizenship for 55,000 individuals denationalized by the constitutional ruling and to 
naturalization for the remainder of the 458,000 Haitians and Dominico-Haitians who never 
obtained formal documentation. Although the state’s position is that these policies 
demonstrate a commitment to human rights, the experiences documented in this chapter 
evidence otherwise. Combining observations from the implementation of the Plan 
Nacional de Regularización de Extranjero (National Regularization Plan of Foreigners - 
PNRE) and women’s accountings of their efforts to register their children, this analysis 
examines how citizenship is made through these interactions and asks what kinds of 
citizens are being shaped through them. Together with the previous chapter, this analysis 
resists the fetishization of “illegality” by a focus on the processes that produce it rather than 
situating undocumented persons as the “objects” of study (De Genova 2002, 423).  
 Chapter 4 examines the intersections between the natural hair movement and 
broader anti-racist and anti-xenophobic struggles in the Dominican Republic. As a marker 
of blackness individuals who wear their hair natural in the Dominican Republic are often 
marked as Haitians. By examining both recent public debates about natural hair and the 
ways individual women speak about their choices and experiences in wearing their hair 
natural, I ask whether these framings and decisions can accumulate into political and social 
change. Drawing on anthropological and feminist theories of the body, agency, and beauty, 
this chapter asks whether natural hair should be viewed as a “fad,” divorced from the 
political and anti-racist undertones that infuse some initiates in the movement.  
 Chapter 5 brings these two themes of anti-racist and anti-xenophobic politics 
together through a historical and contemporary examination of the ways race has been 
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defined in the Dominican Republic. First, I provide a detailed examination into how the 
state has defined racial categories over time, providing the first comprehensive analysis of 
the racial question in the Dominican census from 1920-1981. Second, I examine the 
connection between race and color through an examination of both official color 
designations on the cédula and in daily practice. Here, the complex and often contradictory 
ways race has been defined in official state documents breaks the racial “silence” around 
Dominicans’ racial identities. Finally, I explore how Reconoci.do activists negotiate 
national ideologies of race and color as well as transnationally derived representations in 
their struggle for citizenship rights. This chapter examines how transnational activist, 
migration, and cultural networks influence how Dominicans of Haitian descent represent 
and frame blackness, and seeks to evaluate their potential to service social justice goals in 
the Dominican context. Largely, I focus on the limits activists identify within nationalist 
representations of mestizaje, or racial mixture, and opt for a politics based on blackness, 
even when these representations of blackness, particularly the one-drop rule, have been 
explicitly identified as problematic. However, while hypodescent is used in the US toward 
exclusionary ends, activists utilize it toward inclusionary ones.  
 
Note on Terminology  
Throughout this dissertation, I utilize the related expressions Dominico-Haitian, 
Haitian diaspora, and Dominican of Haitian descent. Haitian diaspora is the broadest term 
I employ to reference both Haitian immigrants and subsequent Dominican-born 
generations. I use Dominico-Haitian to reference both the second and later generations and 
long-term residents of Haitian origin regardless of legal status. This is the term adopted by 
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several community-based organizations that work in this community. At the time of my 
field research, Dominican of Haitian descent was the preferred term utilized by 
Reconoci.do and refers exclusively to those born on Dominican territory of Haitian 
ancestry. As Alicia, one of the founding members of Reconoci.do informed me, the hope 
is that one day they will be considered unhyphenated Dominicans.   
 In using the term Afro-Dominicans, I am referring to those who adopt an identity 
as such, either in their personal identification or through their membership and/or support 
for groups that promote Afro-Dominican causes. In contrast, I use the term Black 
Dominicans to refer to Dominicans who are racialized as Black according to their 
phenotype. This group of Dominicans, inclusive of those of Haitian descent and those 
without, are the main targets of structural racism, racial violence, and prejudice.  
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“A sentence cannot erase my life” (Figure 2), reads one of many protest signs at 
demonstrations marking the second anniversary of TC 168-13, commonly referred to 
simply as la sentencia. Exactly two years after its passage, protesters gathered in front of 
the Tribunal Constititucional, the court responsible for deciding the 2013 sentence that 
revoked citizenship for three generations of the Dominican Republic’s Haitian diaspora. 
Most of those protesting that day had been deprived of these documents essential to the 
negotiation of daily life. Without them, residents cannot exercise the most basic rights and 
privileges as citizens and residents, such as voting, contracting legal employment, 
obtaining a cellphone plan, marrying, divorcing, or registering the births of children.  
 
Figure 2 Protest sign in front of the JCE, Santo Domingo, DR, September 23, 2015. Photo by author. 
      
         
 
CHAPTER 2
      
DOCUMENTING THE HAITIAN DIASPORA IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 
1920-2013
Ò UNA SENTENCIA NO PUEDE BORRAR MI  VIDAÓ:
 29 
The protester’s sign urges an examination of the sentence not only as a legal text, 
but also as part of a social history of the struggles for legal and political belonging by the 
dispossessed. Her statement asserts that her existence as a second-generation Dominican 
of Haitian descent is a critique of the law which renders her literally “in transit,” just a 
visitor in the country of her birth. This statement confronts state-led efforts to render the 
longstanding Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic as recent arrivials, invizibilizing 
their contributions. Like generations of Haitians, mostly arriving as agricultural laborers in 
the 20th century, this sign points to the contradictory practices and policies regarding 
Haitian legality in the Dominican Republic and the manifold tensions between the legal 
treatment and lived experiences of citizenship and belonging in the nation’s Haitian 
diaspora.  
Although these questions gained an unprecedented international following only in 
2013, organizations working on the ground in the Dominican Republic have regarded 
access to documentation among their primary concerns since they began to serve this 
community in the early 1980s. The first Haitian civil rights organization established in the 
Dominican Republic in 1982, the Centro Cultural Domínico-Haitiano (CCDH), set as its 
primary aim “to promote recognition, in law and in fact, of the Dominican nationality and 
citizenship of Dominicans” (Martínez 2011, 62). A year later in 1983, the Movimiento de 
Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas (MUDHA) splintered off from the CCDH to address specific 
issues facing women and children among bateyana7 communities, where sugarcane 
workers are housed. Often gendered as a male space—as men were almost exclusively 
                                            
7 Bateyes are sugarcane plantations where workers are also housed.  
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contracted to work on the plantations—the organization’s “main focus is placed on every 
member of the [bateyana] community, including children of Haitian descent ….  
[bateyanos are] considered the largest minority in the country and is often victimized 
through discrimination, racism and xenophobia.”8 These organizations, which have 
ceaselessly rallied around these issues for over three decades, make evident that before the 
legal basis for these measures gained an international audience, extralegal practices of 
denying documentation was one of the primary issues affecting the Haitian diaspora in the 
Dominican Republic at least as early as the 1980s.  
Although this decade saw an upsurge in organizing in the Haitian diaspora, 
Dominicans have had to grapple with the legal and social implications of a growing Haitian 
presence in the country from the beginning of the 20th century, when the first temporary 
workers were contracted by the US occupation forces. Rubén Silié, one of the foremost 
researchers on the Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic, has found that one of the 
primary issues facing this community is the state’s resistencia a definer políticas claras 
sobre la documentación y legalidad de los migrantes (“resistance to define clear policies 
about the documentation and legality of immigrants”) (Silié 1998, 23). Despite the clear 
outlining of jus soli citizenship in the 1929 Dominican constitution, the manner and extent 
to which policies are followed and executed have been the subject of varying state projects 
in direct contradiction to its own laws.   
This chapter presents a brief history of the legal and social precedents of ruling TC 
168-13 from the first large influx of Haitian temporary workers since the early 20th century 
                                            
8 “Mision and Vision,” [sic] Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas, accessed June 16, 2016, 
http://mudhaong.org/en/mision-and-vision/. 
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to the present. Grounding itself in the sign held by the protester quoted in the title of this 
chapter, this analysis is attentive to the ways that legal frameworks are the scaffolding that 
structure, uphold, and make possible various types of lived experiences. However, by 
juxtaposing individual accounts of how laws and policies were enacted and enforced, this 
analysis emphasizes that the law does not fully capture lived experience.  
 
Bringing the Braceros      
Although anti-Haitian prejudices were evident among Dominican elites in the late 
19th century, Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic remained largely unregulated 
until the US occupation of Hispaniola. Overlapping occupations of Haiti (1915-1934) and 
the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) by US forces and the resultant collapse of the local 
agricultural economy prompted the first major movement of Haitians to the eastern side of 
the island in the early 20th century (Rosario and Ulloa 2006, 69). With US occupation came 
increased access to the US sugar market on the Dominican side of the island, and Haitian 
migration served a dual function of providing the labor needed for this rapid expansion and 
releasing some of the population pressure in Haiti caused by mounting resistance to and 
the destruction of the traditional peasant economy.  
At this time Haitian migration surpassed the earlier Dominican reliance on West 
Indian labor in the US-dominated sugar industry.9 These movements undermined attempts 
to abate the influx of Black migrants with the migration law of 1912, which impeded visas 
for nonwhite populations and created agencies to promote the migration of Europeans, US 
                                            
9 By 1918, 7,000 West Indian immigrants were recorded in San Pedro de Macorís; by 1914, 20 percent of 
the population of Montecristi and by 1917, 10 percent of Puerto Plata were from the Leeward Islands 
(Torres-Saillant 2010, 14).  
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nationals, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. That same year, legislation was passed establishing 
Spanish as the official language of the Dominican Republic (Derby 1994). However, given 
the prominence of the sugar companies, it was difficult for the government to ignore their 
demands for cheap labor. Therefore, government ministries continued to issue migration 
permits directly to the enterprise, not to the migrants themselves. Due to this policy, 
companies were granted full control over the movement for workers and were made 
responsible for their return back home after the harvest.  
Despite the implementation of measures meant to monitor and control the influx of 
Haitian workers by the occupation forces, the border between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic remained porous and there was no concerted effort to monitor the use of 
undocumented labor on plantations (Riveros 2014, 34). By 1920, the first year these figures 
were registered, the Dominican census recorded 28,258 Haitian nationals (Secretaría de 
Estado de lo Interior y Policía 1975). The enumeration of this population was a primary 
step in the increasing regulation of the border, with identification becoming requisite for 
border crossing in the late 1920s and even stricter requirements introduced in 1930 (Derby 
1994, 502).  
Although crossings between the two nations remained a regular occurrence in the 
borderlands—particularly given the centrality of the Port-au-Prince economy to the 
Dominican side of the border—these new regulations began to separate unauthorized from 
authorized migrations in terms of the method of migration, socioeconomic class, and mode 
of incorporation of migrants. In other words, “they placed people in a more direct 
relationship to official definitions of nationhood and provided not only a new prism through 
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which Haitian-Dominican contact was understood but also invisible codes of difference 
which could be invoked from time to time by certain groups” (Derby 1994, 502).   
 Despite being infamously brutal, the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo 
(1930-1961) that inaugurated the next decade is often recalled as a period in which 
sugarcane workers experienced relative safety from deportation. In a November 2015 
presentation on cocolo10 migration to the Dominican Republic at the Spanish Cultural 
Center, a site that regularly hosts events and lectures about the country’s African and 
Haitian heritage in collaboration with local activists, artists, and anthropologists, one 
member of the audience related a story passed down from his father about government 
efforts to require that sugar estates obtain—and pay taxes for—the Cédula Personal de 
Identidad:  
Cuando Trujillo comenzó, pasó la ley de la cédula, era para tener control en el país, 
del todo el mundo, no solamente de las cocolos, y se llamaba “Ley de Camino.” 
Había que tener esa cédula que era “ley de camino”…. Los cocolos vivían en 
barracones y tenían una sola cédula o ley de camino y la ponian en una latita con 
una campanita y cómo vivían 20, 30, hombres en un lugar, una sola cédula. Cuando 
iban a San Pedro [de Macorís], al pueblo, cogían la cédula e iban. Tocaban la 
campana. Cuando regresaban, tocaban la campana y ponían la cédula allí. Nunca 
pasó nada. Nunca iba más de una persona al mismo tiempo al pueblo, y siempre 
llevaban la cédula. 
 
When Trujillo began, he passed the law of the cédula, it was to have control in the 
country, in the whole world, not only the cocolos, and it was called the “Law of the 
Road.” You had to have that cédula, which was the law of the road. … The cocolos 
lived in barracks and they only had one cédula, or ‘law of the road’ and they put it 
in a little can with a little bell and, as there were 20, 30, men in one place, just one 
                                            
10 Previously considered a derogatory term, cocolo refers to a heterogeneous group of racialized migrants 
and temporary workers from English- and French-speaking islands in the West Indies, primarily the 
Leeward Islands, including St. Kitts, Martinique, Antigua, Montserrat, Anguilla, and Nevis (Riveros 2014, 
18). See also (Martínez-Vergne 2005, 86.) 
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cédula. When they went to San Pedro [de Macorís], to the town, they took the 
cédula and they went. They rang the bell. When they returned, they rang the bell 
and placed the cédula there. Nothing ever happened. No more than one person went 
to town at the same time and they always carried the cédula.11  
 
While the focus of this work is on the experiences of Haitian workers and their descendants, 
this story highlights the role of three key actors shaping Dominican documentary policies 
and practices during this period: the state, the sugar elite, and individuals. With the 
implementation of the law mandating the use of the cédula in 1932, the Trujillo regime 
strengthened ongoing efforts to extend the state’s power and surveillance, penetrating the 
entire geography of Dominican life. The integration of cane cutters—both long-term 
residents and temporary workers—reveals Trujillo’s primary concern in bolstering his 
command and control, in contrast to alternative narratives that focus on Trujillo’s more 
visible anti-Haitian and anti-Black discourse after the 1937 massacre. The border as a zone 
of potential danger for the regime is an extension of 19th century concerns by both Haitian 
and Dominican leaders given “[t]he Dominican state’s historic inability to define or 
establish territorial boundaries, coupled with nominal treaties with Haiti, had left a legacy 
of border autonomy and antigovernment political subversion in the region” (Paulino 2016, 
50). Armed with authoritarian regime that relied on a “rigidly hierarchical central 
government… Haiti presented the greatest challenge to his [Trujillo’s] rule” (Paulino 2016, 
50).  
Historian Richard Turits (2003) argues that Trujillo’s main concern in rural policies 
was control, modernization, integration. Citing a 1930 survey of government-created 
                                            
11 “Las migraciones forjadoras de la identidad cultural dominicana 3,” accessed June 30, 2016, 
https://youtu.be/uQjHyHXyHdA,  
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colonies established to settle the frontier, he argues that most beneficiaries were Haitian 
nationals or of Haitian descent, which “suggests an alternative construction of the 
Dominican nation that coexisted with official [anti-Haitian] ideals and was embraced by 
some local functionaries. This view of the nation effectively endowed Haitians born on 
Dominican soil, and even some born in Haiti, with Dominican citizenship” (Turits 2003, 
155). Further, Dominican-born Haitians, and even some immigrants, could avoid paying 
the tax levied on migrants by demonstrating Spanish fluency.  
An example of the ambiguity surrounding the question of Haitian rights is a 1934 
case at the country’s northern border. Responding to the petition of a Haitian-born 
agriculturalist, the director of the agricultural colonies granted recourse, extending the 
petitioner the opportunity to relocate his plot outside the border region. The Secretary of 
Agriculture, however, determined that the plaintiff should be evicted from his lands, 
rejecting eligibility for land-rights, and perhaps citizenship. Turits (2003), who documents 
this story, found that despite the absence of official guidelines for handling the cases of 
Haitian nationals with demonstrated ties to the country, such restrictive interpretations of 
Haitian rights and belonging were uncommon (156). However, the border area became 
increasingly contested and even those of Haitian descent who held identity papers were 
often relocated to the interior in efforts to weaken the Haitian influence in the region. 
Therefore, while the rights of temporary workers and their descendants remained unclear, 
and access to these privileges was determined by some local functionaries, clear 
prohibitions on the granting of citizenship rights were inexistent during this period. 
 Institutional control over migration and the opportunities for participation provided 
by the cédula were key to legitimating the claims to the nation for those willing and able 
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to demonstrate loyalty to the Trujillo regime. Although the cédula was widely considered 
one of the most odious features of daily life (Derby 2009, 159), for the Haitian diaspora in 
the Dominican Republic, the access that many, although not all, were granted provided 
new avenues to legitimate their claims to citizenship. However, the practice of withholding 
this documentation, either by the central government or plantation officials, as in the 
narrative of the cocolo above, had significant consequences. Rural elites resisted the 
increased regulation of the border and migrants, particularly the requirement that they 
provide a cédula, at a cost, to each worker. Duplicitous practices, such as the sharing of a 
singular cédula described above, demonstrates both the opposition of rural elites to the 
encroaching arm of the state in their domain of power and the difficulties the central 
government had in regulating the sugar industry. Failing to provide adequate 
documentation restricted the government’s ability to track and regulate the foreign 
immigration upon which the ingenios (sugar mills) depended and often aided them in 
evading their responsibility to arrange and pay for the return of workers after the harvest. 
Although in the 1930s several laws were passed to restrict the number of foreign workers 
in response to the global economic crisis after the boom years of World War I, the 
workforce remained unchanged, as these same laws enabled the Executive Power to 
continue to issue permits directly to the sugar companies beyond the legal limits placed on 
the contracting of braceros (laborers) (Riveros 2014, 35).   
 The anecdote exemplifies how within the conflicts between the state and economic 
elites for the control over Haitian migration, the migrant was often the biggest loser. The 
withholding of legal documentation compromised both the physical and social mobility of 
workers, as they were subject to arrest if caught without it. “This may explain why the 
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cédula was called in popular parlance the papel de camino (the paper of the road) since it 
enabled movement in social status as well as in territorial space” (Derby 2009, 159). That 
the cédula contributed both to control and the improvement of social status is evident in 
that it was the preserve of men until 1940. Its creation was only one facet of Trujillo’s 
modernization plan, bolstered by the promotion of national loyalties. In the absence of a 
widely literate population and limited access to the interior, the cédula played an important 
role in fostering a national imaginary—even among the cane cutters who were obligated to 
carry them and who were otherwise marginalized.  
These documents also catalyzed a national racial mobility as they “fixed” the racial 
identity of the population. The same year the cédula was first issued, a survey of racial 
classification practices in the Cibao region found “the following classification of colors: 
White, Indio, light Indio, dark Indio, Mulatto, red Mulatto, and Moreno (dark) … Very few 
identify themselves as black, except for those who are Haitians or from the English 
colonies” (Turits 2004, 311).12 These documents supplied the means for an official racial 
self-definition at the individual and national scales, and provided tangible evidence of this 
national racial identity to all those who carried the document. In the experience recalled by 
the cocolo-descendant, the ability of an entire barrack of men to utilize the same document 
without detection, or concern of the authorities, also represents the erasure that 
accompanies their undocumented status. Furthermore, these documents helped fashion an 
increasing national—and racial—differentiation between Haitians and Dominicans and 
                                            
12 The results of the 1935 census confirm that most Dominicans identified as “mestizo” (Turits 2003, 311). 
Contemporary policies and practices for assigning color on the cédula will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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other racialized migrants through the increasing prominence of the indio category and the 
imputation of blackness onto national others.  
In this first decade of Trujillo’s dictatorship, several measures were emplaced to 
begin to control, and in some instances, restrict the influx and settlement of Haitian workers 
who began to arrive in large numbers during the US occupation. Even as the Trujillo regime 
gained more control over Haitian migration in this period, questions of economic utility 
and loyalty to the authorities were the early considerations in the granting of the rights and 
protections of citizenship. Therefore, the early years of large-scale Haitian migration 
witnessed few attempts to regulate and monitor migration across the border. The efforts 
that were made often empowered the sugar companies, which sought cheap labor to 
regulate the movement of workers from their recruitment and stay. Access to 
documentation became mandated and, although historical evidence shows that it was often 
withheld to restrict the freedom of social and spatial movement of migrants, it provided 
proof of residency and allowed those who possessed it to access social resources—
particularly the civil registry for children born in the country. The dependency on the 
sugarcane companies for documentation also posed particular obstacles for women who, 
according to a representative of MUDHA, no podía adquirir derechos como el hombre 
trabajador. Si se murió, ella se fue deportada a Haití (she couldn’t acquire rights like the 
working man. If he died, she was deported to Haiti).13  
 
 
                                            
13 Author’s interview with MUDHA representatives, Santo Domingo, July 14, 2015. 
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Dispossession and Dominicanization at the Border   
After the 1937 Trujillo-perpetrated massacre targeting the Haitian diaspora in the 
Dominican borderlands, access to citizenship for Haitian migrants was significantly 
transformed. Most contemporary analyses of race and anti-Haitianism in the Dominican 
Republic locate the massacre as the purest reflection of if not the racist and xenophobic 
attitudes of the entire population, than those of the country’s elite (see Paulino and García 
2013; Turits 2002, 2003). The massacre clearly carved out a central space for anti-Haitian 
rhetoric in Dominican politics. Before the events of late 1937, travel between the island’s 
nations was relatively unregulated; afterwards, it was restricted for both Dominicans and 
Haitians. The massacre of the 17,000 Haitians, Dominicans of Haitian descent, and Black 
Dominicans14 attempted to impose homogeneity in the heterogeneous Dominican 
borderlands.  
 Of the few antecedents of these gruesome events was an initiative to Hispanicize 
the names of dozens of border towns with towns such as L’Eau Noir and Bananes renamed 
for their literal Spanish translations, Aguas Negras and Banano (Derby 1994; Paulino 2016; 
Turits 2003). These efforts had only marginal success, as Derby finds that even six decades 
after these official changes, many at the border continued to use the towns’ former names 
(1994, 512). Ironically, shortly before the massacre, Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
                                            
14 The numbers of those massacred are highly contested. This figure is taken from Turits (2003), who came 
to this estimate using several sources and methodologies. Edward Paulino (2016) also uses this figure. The 
Library of Congress country study estimates 5,000 to 12,000 deaths (2001, 24). Historian Frank Moya Pons 
(1998, 368) puts this figure at 18,000. Dominican officials have argued that the Haitian government 
inflated these figures as it was paid reparations totaling $525.000 in an agreement made in the year 
following the massacre (see Legación República Dominicana Washington, 12 December, 1937, “La verdad 
sobre la masacre haitiana” Colección Bernardo Vega, Archivo General de la Nación No. 031-029, 
http://200.26.174.77/cbvnode/app.html#/details).  
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formalized the first border treaty that had been a source of contention; previous 
administrations’ talks had broken down between Presidents Horacio Vásquez and Louis 
Borno in 1929. Inheriting this issue from his predecessor, Trujillo was determined at the 
outset of his administration to demarcate the border. One observer attributed his success in 
negotiating with the neighboring government to Trujillo’s “‘pride to be of Haitian stock,’” 
which he proclaimed in the press (Paulino 2016, 54).  
 Despite these initial indications that Dominican elites increasingly sought to clarify 
the border demarcation, many described the massacre as a surprise. Historian Bernardo 
Vega’s thorough examination of the archive in his three-volume examination of the 
relationship between Trujillo and Haiti has failed to locate any negative mention of Haiti 
in the Dominican press leading up to the genocide (Vega 1988). To the contrary, the 
Trujillo regime, which exercised almost total control of the media, was overwhelmingly 
laudatory regarding Haiti (Paulino 2016). The element of surprise, however, was integral 
to the logic of the massacre. Officials exploited existing tensions regarding theft of cattle, 
for which Haitians were often scapegoats, and Haitian economic domination. An official 
report from 1938 exemplifies the ways that Haitians were criminalized at this time, as such 
expert thieves that they steal “‘the pillows and clothes underneath the heads of those who 
are sleeping, and steal the cédulas from the men who have inside them the money to renew 
them’” (Paulino 2016, 98). This criminalizing language was related to undermining 
Haitians’ citizenship claims.  
Under the guise of addressing this issue, Trujillo ordered plainclothes military 
officers to terrorize anyone who appeared to be Haitian. The official version of events 
distributed to members of the foreign service abroad argued that the suddenly heightened 
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military presence in the area was due to an executive order to begin deportations of Haitians 
after a tour of the area had left Trujillo in shock over the number of Haitians residing there. 
The violent eruptions that concurred with this initiative were characterized as a 
spontaneous response from scorned Dominicans (Paulino 2016, 71) in efforts to stoke 
nationalist fervor. Most of the border’s residents of Haitian origin were, at this time, born 
on Dominican soil and under law, Dominican citizens by birth. These narratives represent 
the budding imposition of notions of deportability and illegality that would become key 
components in the narrative about Haitians in the Dominican Republic in the coming 
decades. Although no formal restrictions regarding citizenship rights for Haitians and their 
children were introduced in this period, the massacre was executed without regard for legal 
status.  
 In the campaign to indoctrinate the border populations with the government’s 
newly-adopted anti-Haitian ideology and to promote the specter of a popular uprising, local 
residents were often recruited to aid in the killing and were provided arms and shells by 
the local military in exchange for severed ears as proof they had participated in the 
massacre (Paulino 2016, 65-66). By 1937, after over a century of unrestricted migration 
and resettlement, the border had become a space with its own transnational culture, 
economy, and governance (Derby 1994; Paulino 2016; Turits 2003); the massacre, as 
Richard Turits describes it, destroyed a world “to a large extent apart from the rest of the 
nation” (2002, 600). In these frontier areas, Dominicans and Haitians had long lived, 
worked, and formed families together, to the extent that determining who was Haitian was 
often a matter of great difficulty. Given these interconnections, many Dominicans defended 
and protected their Haitian neighbors and kin during these events (see Paulino 2016). An 
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alternative name for the slaughter, the “parsley massacre,” is derived from a test originally 
designed to determine who should pay the migration tax by demanding that the subject 
correctly pronounce Spanish words with rolled rs such as perejil (parsley). Therefore, 
while the massacre furthered a nationalist project on the border that excluded Haitians 
because of nationality, ethnicity, and language, many Dominicans were also targeted given 
that Black skin is often shared by both groups. As Derby (1994) argues, the transformation 
of this territory from an amorphous frontier to a fixed border was the impetus for a 
reorganization of difference in the nation in ways that transformed horizontal relationships 
with Haitians at the border into hierarchical ones marked by racialized difference.  
Beyond those killed in the attacks, an estimated 10,000 fled to Haiti as news of the 
events spread, leaving behind their lands, animals, homes, and belongings. The overall 
demographic impact was substantial. Whereas the 1935 Dominican census recorded 52,657 
Haitian immigrants, there were only 29,500 in 1950. Notwithstanding the concentration of 
these atrocities at the border, localities in the interior, including sectors of Santiago de 
Caballeros, San Francisco de Macorís, and Puerto Plata in the north, were also targeted. 
Mostly aimed at stoking the fervor of Dominican nationalism that became synonymous 
with Trujillo himself (see Derby 2009) and consolidating Dominican dominance over the 
thriving border economy, the massacre also broadcast a clear message about the place of 
Haitians in Dominican society and economy. Even though the “urban elite class included 
many Haitians” (Derby 1994, 514), their wealth and lands did not provide them protection 
in a society marked by strict class divisions, but rather made them targets in the raids. The 
centrality of Haitians and Haiti to economic life at the border was a source of concern for 
the Dominican government behind the massacre. Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital, and 
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markets closer to the boundary were considered more accessible and thriving than those on 
the Dominican side, and the Haitian currency was the unit most frequently used in the in 
the border region (Derby 1994, 516). 
 Despite the wide reach of the killings and an overwhelming concentration of 
Haitian residents, those living in the sugar bateyes were only targeted in one documented 
case (Turits 2003, 170). Rather, in the weeks following the massacre, two sugar mills were 
authorized to contract 1,500 Haitian and West Indian workers (Paulino 2016, 68). In 1920, 
most Haitian migrants (71%) were located at the border; by 1956, less than a third occupied 
the border zones (Martínez 2006, 10).  
Following these events, both island governments agreed upon new migration 
regulations with stricter documentary requirements for crossing in both directions (Riveros 
2014, 35). Two years after the massacre, the Dominican Migration Law of 1939 
dramatically raised the immigration fee from the six pesos established in 1932 to 500 pesos 
levied only on non-Caucasian immigrants (Turits 2003, 170). As an exception to these 
measures, foreign migrants could avoid these strict requirements by migrating as braceros 
(laborers), whose only requirement was to present proof of their nationality. These 
measures pushed many economically marginalized and rural Haitians to migrate as highly-
exploited temporary workers on plantations or without official authorization. Therefore, 
Haitians’ status is the Dominican Republic was tolerated insofar as they were incorporated 
at the lowest economic sectors.   
The massacre’s most enduring significance was the consolidation of 
antihaitianismo as a dominant ideology in the Dominican Republic. Although it was 
forcefully resisted and undermined by the popular classes, “[a]fter the massacre, the 
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government imposed a homogenous top-down model of Dominican identity that 
effectively excluded Haitians” (Paulino 2016, 57) that, in a matter of decades, would imbue 
across various institutions and social spaces, severely limiting Haitians’ access to and 
exercise of citizenship rights. After the massacre, the campaign to “Dominicanize” the 
border continued with the institution of policies aimed at attracting European and Asian 
settlement in the region. The government’s justification of immigration policies and 
settlement packages extended under the rubric of Dominicanization illustrates the ways 
notions of dominicanidad are wound up closely with race and ideas of racial progress. 
Immigrants in this region were limited to a quarter of the population, therefore the 
expanded access to education ensured by the Dominicanization effort, with an emphasis 
on a nationalist curriculum, and anti-Haitianism, was primarily aimed at integrating the 
mostly Dominican population in the region into the nation-state, increasingly defined in 
opposition to Haiti.   
 
Era of Bilateral Accords  
By the mid-20th century, the state, via Trujillo, would become the largest employer 
of foreign Haitian labor through the monopolization of the Dominican sugar industry. 
Concurrent with his acquisition of almost all the nation’s ingenios, Trujillo negotiated an 
accord with the Haitian government to provide workers for these properties, renewed every 
five years from 1952-1986. These agreements outlined strict guidelines for the legal 
entrance and documentation of workers, mandating that the sugar companies cover the 
costs of the cédula, visa, and health certificate for each migrant, their spouse, and children 
below the age of 10 (Riveros 2014, 37).  
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Nevertheless, it was in the interest of these enterprises not to legally register all 
workers on their plantations to avoid such expenses. Given the steady stream of migrants 
who crossed the border without the required documentation, there was an abundant supply 
of undocumented workers. In these cases, employees’ only documentation was often the 
employee fichas (record cards) provided by the ingenios. This card monitored the work of 
the bracero, which was often piece-work, and the receipt of benefits at the end of the 
harvest. Upon receiving them, workers were told that these were their identity documents 
and “from the perspective of the employee, this was their most important document” 
(Riveros 2014, 38). Natalia Riveros (2014) suggests that many foreign workers may have 
been unaware that this was not an official identity document, particularly given the 
President Trujillo’s ownership of the majority of ingenios.  
 An inflated price for sugar and increased demand for labor temporarily protected 
undocumented workers from repatriation for much of the regime of the outspoken anti-
Haitian Dominican president, Joaquín Balaguer (1960-1962; 1966-1978; 1986-1996), who 
rose to power as the right hand of Trujillo. Those picked up by authorities were often 
returned or relocated to state-owned plantations (Hintzen 2016; Martinez 1995; Riveros 
2014, 24; Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004, 41); in some cases, privately-owned 
plantations offered a fee to government officials to supply workers (Riveros 2014, 41). 
Throughout Balaguer’s time in office, as Amelia Hintzen explains, legal status had less to 
do with documentation than occupation and “Haitians could only claim to be in the country 
legally if they were cutting cane, regardless of immigration status” (2016, 182). The 
escalating demand for workers encouraged those who migrated under the bilateral accords 
to overstay their visas, sometimes unwittingly as it was the responsibility of the enterprise 
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to renew them. Increased profitability in the sugar industry also incentivized the illegal 
trafficking of workers across the border. When the political situation became tumultuous 
after the fall of the Duvalier regime (1957-1971), many Haitians established permanent 
residence in the Dominican Republic.  
 By 1990, four years after the close of final accord between the governments, 
President Balaguer recognized the need for a plan to regularize the Haitian migrants 
residing in Dominican territory. Yet, in practice, this plan served to further dispossess 
Haitians migrants, with reports that “many of those who registered had their documents 
confiscated without having previously received any identification that certified their 
temporary legal residence in the country. In other words, the plan seemed to have served 
only to attract workers with promises of regularization, but it only had the effect of taking 
away the documentation in their possession” (Riveros 2014, 44). This program was not 
only for the benefit of local audiences but was a response to increasingly vocal criticism of 
the conditions on the bateyes, which was threatening the Dominican Republic’s privileged 
status in the US sugar market (Ferguson 2003).  
 Beginning in the late 1980s and entering the 1990s, it became increasingly difficult 
to register children with the ficha alone. At this point, individual state bureaucrats governed 
the policies regarding the acceptance of a cédula.  By the mid-1980s, the unacceptability 
of this document to complete state functions and access rights to nationality, marriage, and 
education became official policy, just as it was becoming more difficult for migrants to 
access residency permits and cédulas.15 Instead, more official—and more difficult to 
                                            
15 Author’s interview with Miguel de Jesús Dandre, the Dominico-Haitian civil rights lawyer who 
represented Julian Deguis, Santo Domingo, December 17, 2016. 
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obtain—documents began to be required, such as passports and residency permits (Open 
Society Foundation 2010, 6). This measure increased the number of births that were never 
officially declared in the Dominican Republic, as for many Haitian immigrants, the ficha 
was the only accessible documentation. One woman I interviewed in the province of Monte 
Plata explained that the sudden changes in the policy regarding the acceptance of the ficha 
allowed for the declaration of her older children, but not her younger ones. Further, this 
policy’s impact was felt in the following decades, as subsequent generations of Haitian 
immigrants and their descendants would not have the documents necessary to normalize 
their status and that of their children.  
Even so, many Haitian women in the bateyes had no access to this document, or 
any other form of documentation, due to frequently being excluded from the migration 
permit applications that employers provided to the government. Women migrating 
clandestinely to the bateyes were compelled to request a ficha via a domestic partnership 
with a man who worked for the ingenio (Riveros 2014, 40), a practice that made access to 
rights contingent on sexual access and domestic labor, and increased women and children’s 
vulnerability as women were responsible for registering children. Individuals were not 
passive in the face of these manipulations by the state. Human rights lawyer, Miguel de 
Jesús Dandre, explains that due to the changes in the policy regarding fichas, beginning in 
this period many children were registered by people who were not their parents: “desperate 
parents would say, ‘Look, declare this child for me. I already know that it’s my child but I 
don’t want him to be like that [undocumented]. But it wasn’t fraud. It wasn’t anything 
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fraudulent, it’s that there was no way out.”16 This anecdote suggests not only resistance by 
those who were made most vulnerable by these policies, but also in collaboration with 
individuals who did possess documentation, indicating that a wider cross-section of 
Dominican society resisted these state efforts to deny citizenship.   
 The Balaguer regime dramatized its opposition to Haitian migrants through the 
expulsion of an estimated 35,000 people to Haiti in 1991 (CIDH 1991). For its part, the 
international community reproached the Dominican government for how it identified those 
eligible for repatriation, given that those detained were often not allowed time to present 
evidence of their citizenship or legal residence (Amnesty International 1992). In response, 
the government initiated a new plan to provide temporary work permits to cañeros 
(sugarcane cutters) in 1992. This time, the burden was placed on the employers to solicit 
and pay for the permits. As had occurred under the bracero programs (1960s-1980s), 
employers often failed to comply with the program to avoid both the costs of registration 
and to maintain an exploitable workforce. Even as the power of the sugar industry began 
to wane in the late 1980s with the rapid decline in the price of sugar and the 
mismanagement of the Consejo Estatal de Azúcar (CEA) (the government organization 
that oversaw state-owned plantations), sugar continued to determine the policies and laws 
regarding Haitian documentation. The ingenio often had unconditional control over all 
aspects of life in the batey, including the provision of housing, policing, and transportation. 
As these living quarters formed part of the enterprise, local municipalities did not exercise 
authority in the region. The isolation of the batey presented a further obstacle to knowing 
                                            
16 Author’s interview with Miguel de Jesús Dandre, Santo Domingo, December 17, 2016. 
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and excersing their rights in the country. In some of they bateyes I visited in Guaymate, La 
Romana, Monte Plata, and Santo Domingo provinces, local schools offered classes only 
up to the fourth grade and transportation in and out of the batey (to access schools or 
government offices) is both expensive and difficult as motorcycle ownership (the only 
attainable personal vehicle) was rare. As local roads are often unpaved, roads often become 
impassable when it rains (IACHR 2015, 127).  
Regarding documentation, even those bateyes that provided healthcare services 
frequently refused to emit the documentation necessary to apply for a birth certificate. It 
was estimated that the Dominican-born children of Haitians accounted for over a third of 
batey residents (Martínez 2006, 42). These companies often forcefully maintained large 
portions of their workforce in a condition of illegality, failing to secure adequate 
documentation for their workers, withholding documents, and failing to arrange for the 
return of contracted workers. Worse, once the corporations were in the hands of the 
government under the CEA’s management, these illegal practices did not come to an end, 
but were bolstered by more government-sponsored terror. In a matter of decades, the anti-
Haitian Balaguer had successfully reversed the practice, begun by Trujillo, of making 
documentation both accessible and necessary. Where the previous regime used 
documentation to monitor and control migrants, its deprivation was promoted to prohibit 
access to citizenship during the Balaguer era, closing the door to access documentation that 
had been open for decades. In the following decades, Haitian labor would migrate out of 
the bateyes and into the cities in search of employment. Sugar production, which reached 
its apex in the 1970s with an average yearly yield of over a million tons, was only slightly 
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more than a third of that by 1991, and the economy was being reorganized around tourism 
and manufacturing.  
 
“Un país dentro de otro”: Legal Exclusion and Rising Movements 
The sugar industry’s decline forced the relocation of much of the Haitian diaspora 
from the social, geographical, and political isolation of the bateyes to the city centers 
(Petrozziello 2012). Described by Bridget Wooding and Robin Mosley-Williams as un país 
dentro de otro, the batey is “as isolated as possible from the rest of society, both 
economically and juridically” (2004, 40). After the decline of the sugar industry in the 
1990s, batey residents no longer enjoyed the minimal social protection offered by 
employers or the state that heavily relied on their labor. During my visits to bateyes outside 
Santo Domingo, in La Romana, and Monte Plata in 2015-2016, residents described their 
employment as chiripero, odd jobs, noting the lack of regular employment opportunities. 
Searching for employment outside of these areas, the Haitian diaspora has become 
increasingly visible outside the batey and a much larger concern for politicians, legislators, 
and the public. Following the massive deportations of 1991, these concerns fueled two 
similar deportation programs carried out in 1996 and 1999 (Human Rights Watch 2002, 
16). 
Community organizations, having formed during this period of crisis, had at this 
point been working over a decade in the context of the bateyes, and had started to take the 
struggle for documentation beyond national confines. In 1998, MUDHA, with support 
from the international legal community, submitted the case of Dilcia Yean and Violeta 
Bosico to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. As the mothers of these two young 
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girls had discovered in 1997 when they requested birth certificates for their children (then 
10 months and 12 years, respectively), access to Dominican citizenship for those of Haitian 
descent—even those who possessed valid documents proving their identities—was 
conditioned on race and ethnicity. As their lawyer, Genaro Rincón, testified during the trial 
proceedings: 
Thelma Bienvenida Reyes, the Civil Status Registrar, refused to accept the 
documentation because children of Haitian immigrants could not be declared, 
since their parents were in the country illegally. If the parents are Haitian, the 
children are also Haitian, since the parents are in transit. The Civil Status 
Registrar added that she was following orders from her superiors, which she had 
in writing, even though she refused to produce the document. She then 
commented on the “strange,” “Africanized” or Haitian nature of the children’s last 
names (Case of Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic 2005, 26). 
 
The registrar’s statements demonstrate the connections between race and illegality that 
dominate the contemporary Dominico-Haitian experience. Further, this case conforms to 
longstanding arbitrary application of regulations to prevent Haitians’ access to citizenship 
(see Hintzen 2016; IACHR 2015; Rodriguez 2007). However, the appearance of a 
Dominico-Haitian civil rights organization in front of the Inter-American Court 
foreshadowed the community’s growing empowerment. Moreover, this trial was the first 
in a series of events that would lead to the 2013 decision to retroactively strip 200,000 
Dominicans of Haitian descent of their citizenship. The case broke from the past in that it 
not only featured a local official’s decision to not register children of Haitian migrants, but 
evidenced the rejection of citizenship based on race and ethnicity alone, even when 
Dominican birth was proven by state-issued documentation.   
The court’s ruling in favor of the girls provides an unequivocal argument against 
the state’s selective application of the jus soli provision in the Dominican constitution. 
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However, during the eight years that the international court deliberated this case, 
Dominican legislators approved the restrictive Migration Law 285-04. After August 2004, 
the law explicitly denied jus soli rights for children of undocumented residents. This was 
the first reform of Dominican migration legislation since 1939. Section III, Article 28 
imparts that “[f]oreign women non-residents who during their stay in the country give birth 
to a child (a), should direct themselves to the Consulate of their nationality for the purpose 
of registering their child there” (Ley 285-04 2004, 11). Further, the law instructs hospital 
officials to provide a distinct pink-hued document to those who cannot provide a cédula at 
the moment of birth. These births are registered with the JCE in a Libro de Extranjería 
(Book of Foreigners) with no clearly defined process for establishing rights to nationality 
for mixed-status couples.17 In effect, this ruling requires that all births to mothers who 
cannot provide proof of legal residency be declared as foreign, even as the constitution 
maintains the right to jus soli citizenship. This law takes advantage of a broad interpretation 
of the “in transit” clause of the constitution, providing that all those born in Dominican 
territory are citizens, “con excepción de los hijos legítimos de los extranjeros residentes en 
la República en representación diplomática o que estén de tránsito en ella.”18 Given the 
multiplication of barriers to residency and citizenship documents in the 1980s and 1990s, 
                                            
17 Discussion with officials from the Dominican Ministerio de Salud Pública (Ministry of Public Health) 
during the event “Registro Civil y el Sistema de Salud,” event organized by OBMICA December 2, 2015. 
OBMICA has done extensive work on the subject of parejas mixtas (mixed status couples).  
 
 
18 “With the exception of the legitimate children of foreign residents in the Republic in diplomatic 
representation or who are in transit in it.” “Sentencia TC/0168/13,” Tribunal Constitutional, accessed July 
7. 2016, http://tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/sites/default/files/documentos/Sentencia%20TC%200168-
13%20-%20C.pdf. 
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by the time this migration law was passed, few even long-term residents possessed the 
requisite documentation to claim legal status in the Dominican Republic.  
In the Inter-American Court’s October 2005 ruling in the Yean and Bosico case, 
the court emphasized that long-term residents in the Dominican Republic could not be 
considered perpetually undocumented and urged the Dominican government to reform its 
procedures regarding documentation, which the court found to be inherently 
discriminatory. They recommended a limit of 10 days for the application of the “in transit” 
clause, conforming to the 1939 specification that the law apply to foreign diplomats as well 
as flight and cruise ship crews. Shortly after the ruling was released, the Dominican Senate 
publicly rejected its contents, claiming that nationality is a sovereign issue not under the 
court’s jurisdiction. Activists contested the 2004 law’s constitutionality before the 
Dominican Supreme Court, which ruled in the state’s favor.  
Bridget Wooding (2009) refers to this process as a “test case,” emphasizing the 
systematic denial of citizenship rights on the basis that many descendants of Haitian 
immigrants “do not have Dominican cédulas, they have Haitian sounding names, or they 
are black and speak accented Spanish” (Wooding 2009, 369). Lack of documentation is a 
widespread issue facing not only those of Haitian descent. The only large-scale 
enumeration of migrants completed in 2012 demonstrated just how widespread the issue 
of documentation is for both Dominicans with and without foreign parentage. The 
independent research group Colectivo 63, using these data, determined that 27 percent of 
those with one foreign-born parent lacked a birth certificate despite their eligibility under 
both jus soli and jus sanguinis. Those born to two parents without Dominican citizenship 
fare far worse, with more than half (57 percent) without a birth certificate (2016, 77). 
 54 
Among those living in one of the country’s approximately 425 bateyes, having Haitian 
descent made one significantly more likely to lack documentation. Of the 97% of 
participants in a 2014 United Nations study who were born in the Dominican Republic, 
54.7 percent of first and 47.1 percent of second generation Dominicans of Haitian descent 
lack a birth certificate, the most basic identity document compared to 36.5 percent of batey 
residents without any or immediate Haitian ancestry (Hasbún Martínez 2014, 32). 
Additionally, anthropologist Steven Gregory found that local activists estimated the 
“undocumented” population—excluding those of Haitian descent—as 32 percent of the 
population (Gregory 2007). In a society where documentation is increasingly necessary to 
the functions of social life, including harsher crackdowns on the contracting of 
undocumented employees in several industries, the implications of these figures is 
staggering. By comparison, as of 2015, less than 4 percent of the US population was 
reported to experience a similar condition (Pew Research Center 2017).  
The new migration law’s stance on this issue also contradicted previous 
interpretations of the “in transit” clause. After executing a 1965 study concerning access 
to documentation among the children of Haitian descent, government officials expressed 
concern regarding the provision of these documents by local functionaries. However, the 
Balaguer regime was limited in its efforts to bar access to citizenship by the jus soli clause 
of the constitution (Hintzen 2016). One director of a social organization located at the 
border confirmed to me that this logic regarding the interpretation of this clause was new, 
saying, Antes, no usaron la cosa de ‘en tránsito,’ pero no declararon al hijo si el apellido 
era raro (before, they didn’t use the thing of ‘in transit’, but they did not declare the child 
if the last name was strange.) 
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The Role of the Junta Central Electoral  
In March 2007, the JCE instructed its employees through Circular 017 to identify 
and retain documents with suspected irregularities,19 justifying such measures by claiming 
the organization had received reports of documents being issued to the children of 
foreigners who had not proved their residency in the country.20 While several of the 
participants in this project were impacted before this date, these were not systematic efforts 
undertaken with explicit instructions from the head of the JCE, but were ad hoc actions 
such as the mothers in the Yean and Bosico case. The suspension and inspection of 
documents in this manner became official policy in December 2007, according to what the 
JCE described as a provisional suspension of identity documents to be examined for fraud 
or irregularities. The results of this audit were not released until June 2015, leaving 
thousands without documentation necessary to work, study, travel, and exercise 
fundamental political rights such as voting.  
 In their identification of “suspicious” documents, officials often targeted 
individuals with Francophone surnames and dark skin, with multiple employees reporting 
that officials consulted a list posted in the office to identify typical Haitian names. In the 
municipality of Guaymate in the province of La Romana, a historic center of the sugar 
                                            
19 The documents called into question were not only birth certificates but were meant to include certificates 
of marriage, divorce, or death. In researching this subject, I have not become aware of any suspension of 
these documents.  
 
 
20 The JCE retains the original birth certificates. When proof of citizenship is needed e.g., to enroll in a 
school, take out a cédula, or for employment, a copy is requested at one of the JCE offices. Each copy is 
single-use and is valid for a limited period. 
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industry and therefore a location with a large Haitian population, the entire staff of the local 
Junta Central Electoral came under question when it was revealed that the office’s top 
officials were eliciting bribes to issue documentation to those impacted by the suspension 
of their documents under these policies (Moreno 2007).21 When the secretary at the 
Guaymate government office was asked whether children of other foreign parentage were 
similarly impacted by the audit, she responded, se les entrega a esas personas … Si son 
hijos de ingleses sí se les entrega … cuando el padre es, por ejemplo francés o inglés, sí. 
Pero, por lo general es como la doctora (la oficial civil) dice: un italiano, un francés, un 
americano no viene ilegal a ese país. Esa gente siempre viene con sus papeles en orden, 
vienen por la regla, por la línea (they emit them to those people … If they are children of 
Englishmen they emit them … when the parent is, for example, French or English, yes. 
But, generally it’s like the doctor [the civil official] says: an Italian, a Frenchman, an 
American does not come to this country illegally. Those people always come with their 
papers in order, they come by the law, by the line) (Rodríguez 2007). These statements 
reveal that state institutions are imbued with both policies and beliefs that serve to block 
access to documentation specifically for Haitians, given that they are already presumed to 
be unauthorized immigrants in the Dominican Republic. This places further scrutiny and 
regulation within the process of identifying irregularities. Given the routes through which 
many Haitian immigrants arrived and the privileged access to travel that European and US 
passports provide, some of these assumptions about who is more likely to be undocumented 
may be correct. However, they are also shaped by the varying policies and practices 
                                            
21 Anonymous interview with author, El Seibo, March 17, 2016.  
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regarding Haitian migration over time which have generated irregularies in access to 
documentation.  
It is also widely rumored that during previous elections, particularly during the 
Balaguer regime, government officials would offer cédulas to those ineligible for 
citizenship in exchange for votes. During a visit to Batey Para Mara at the northern end of 
the city, my motoconcho (motorcycle taxi driver), Freddy explained that although his 
mother (of Haitian parentage) had a cédula, she lacked a birth certificate, a prerequisite for 
the cédula. Noting my confusion regarding her situation, he clarified  although she was 
born in the Dominican Republic, she had been unable to obtain documentation, but in the 
1970s was given a cédula, para las elecciones (for the elections), confirming rumors about 
corrupt practices. This irregularity in his mother’s documentation created barriers to 
Freddy’s access to acquiring his own documentation although he was born in the 
Dominican Republic.  
The review of identity documents disproportionately targeted Haitians because they 
regularly placed into question the citizenship of those who had been declared with fichas. 
As fichas are the documents provided to workers by the ingenios, children of cane cutters, 
(overwhelmingly Haitian) are those most often declared with fichas. Outspoken activists 
have also been targeted for the suspension of documents, with some even suggesting that 
the policy was launched in retaliation against the founder of MUDHA, Sonia Pierre, who 
was the first widely publicized case (Moreno 2007). Among the targeted activists was the 
spokesperson for Reconoci.do, Ana María Belique. In July of 2015, the president of the 
JCE, Roberto Rosario, accused Ana María’s parents of committing fraud when registering 
her birth. In a press conference aired on national television, he read the names and identity 
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card numbers of Ana María’s parents, claiming that these numbers corresponded to the 
cédula of other citizens.22 A few days after the statements aired, I asked Ana María about 
the accusations. She explained that she had become accustomed to the targeted attacks in 
the media, even by someone as highly ranked as the president of the JCE. Further, she 
clarified that the numbers he had read on air corresponded to the fichas her parents had 
used to declare her, not cédulas as her parents were not citizens. More than evidencing the 
use of government offices to intimidate Dominico-Haitian activists, Ana María’s case also 
demonstrates the irregularities in this process, as not all her siblings were affected by the 
audit.  
 Almost all of those who participated in this study were impacted by the JCE audit 
in the intervening years before the 2013 sentencia validated the denationalization policy. 
All those impacted by the audit already held documentation and therefore questioned why 
the JCE withheld their documents. The responses interviewees received were varied.    
Some, like Ana María, were told that their parents lied about their citizenship status when 
registering their births; others were informed that their last name appeared on a list of those 
who should be investigated that circulated within the JCE offices, and some were directly 
informed that they were not Dominican, but Haitian, and thus ineligible for documentation. 
The testimonies of these encounters will be explored more in-depth in other sections of this 
dissertation.  
 
 
                                            
22 “Documentos de Ana María Belique estaban en estado de falsedad según JCE,” Noticias SIN, July 9, 
2015, accessed July 16, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GDrWOCtRl8w.  
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Constitutional Change and La Sentencia  
Transformations in the procedures for registering births through the JCE and 
restricting migration laws in ways that disproportionately affected Dominicans of Haitian 
descent were “perfected” in 2010. The constitutional reform of that year changed the 
manner of obtaining Dominican citizenship. Now, it was necessary to inherit citizenship 
from a Dominican parent; it was not enough to be born in the country. These changes 
occurred shortly after the devastating earthquake in Haiti. The same wave of reform 
introduced a new judicial body, the Constitutional Tribunal, becoming the highest legal 
authority in the nation. One of the first major cases heard by the court was that of Juliana 
Deguis’s, whose documents were denied under the audit by the JCE in 2008. Five years 
later, the court upheld the suspension of her documents by confirming the broad 
interpretation of the “in transit” clause to include all undocumented residents. Under this 
logic, because Deguis’ parents were undocumented at the time of her birth, she was not 
eligible for citizenship. The case presented a significant setback in the struggle for 
documentation as it instilled these policies at the constitutional level, impacting 200,000 
Dominican-born children of Haitian descent. Those affected by the decision were left 
stateless.23 Many had lived most of their lives as citizens, including having enrolled in 
college, opened bank accounts, and contracted employment—rights they were no longer 
eligible to exercise without documentation.  
                                            
23 The Haitian constitution did not recognize double nationality until 2012 and does not automatically 
granted it at birth. Many Dominicans of Haitian descent lack the necessary documentation to execute this 
process. The residency requirement constitutes a further obstacle for Dominicans who do not have the 
proper documentation with which to cross into Haiti. Still, many have neither resided in, or visited the 
country, and have little command of Kreyol.  
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 Dealing a further blow, the court anchored its argument in the “in transit” clause, 
which made its first appearance in the Dominican constitution in 1929 and applied its 
decision retroactively to anyone declared between that year and the constitutional reform 
of 2010. The retroactive application of this law violates accepted legal principles and 
invalidates the authority of the both constitution at the time of Deguis’s birth and the civil 
procedure that granted her citizenship.  
 At this point, the international community vociferously denounced the issue of 
denationalization in the Dominican Republic. Calls for protest, boycott, and sanctions were 
heard throughout the island and in the diaspora. These efforts generated marginal reform, 
which will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent chapter. However, because the 
policy was determined by the constitutional court’s ruling in decision TC 168-13 and is not 
a law, its reversal is much more difficult. Doing so in any meaningful way would require 
a change in the constitution or an alternative decision by the Supreme Court. 
 
“Los Humanos Valemos +K Cualquier Ley” 
 
 
Figure 3 “Los humanos valemos mas que cualquier ley” (Humans are worth more than any law). Photo by 
author.  
 61 
 
In the JCE’s final report on the 2007 audit of the civil registry, Roberto Rosario, 
then president, stated: 
 
Estas condiciones generales, que afectaban a todas las personas que habitaban en 
esta parte de la isla, y que convivían en los espacios de pobreza y pobreza extrema, 
nacionales y extranjeros, sin importar su condición migratoria, indujo a muchos a 
interpretar que en República Dominicana habían prácticas discriminatorias, 
xenófobas y/o raciales, en contra de algunos segmentos poblacionales, por parte de 
determinadas instancias públicas, ignorando que en realidad, no era más que la 
expresión de una ineficiencia administrativa generalizada del Estado Dominicano, 
hacia los sectores de menores ingresos, que afectó a todos por igual, sin ninguna 
distinción, por el solo hecho, lamentable, de ser parte de la marginalidad y la 
pobreza que creó nuestra propia sociedad. 
 
These general conditions, which affected all the people who lived in this part of the 
island, and who lived in areas of poverty and extreme poverty, nationals and 
foreigners, regardless of their immigration status, led many to interpret that in the 
Dominican Republic there were discriminatory, xenophobic and/or racial practices, 
against some population segments, by certain public authorities, ignoring that in 
reality, it was nothing more than the expression of a generalized administrative 
inefficiency of the Dominican State, towards lower income sectors , which affected 
everyone equally, without any distinction, just for the unfortunate fact of being part 
of the marginality and poverty that our own society created (Joseph 2015).  
 
In this statement, Rosario insists, as much of the popular discourse, that class, not race (or 
national origin) is the central factor in limiting access to citizenship in the Dominican 
Republic. To be sure, the historical and political trajectory that unfolds in this chapter 
reveals how the sugar industry, at times synonymous with the state, often shaped access to 
citizenship for Haitian migrants. Therefore, while Rosario’s statement is accurate in 
highlighting the central role of class in shaping access to documentation, it is inaccurate 
insofar as it attempts to cleave class from race. Since the introduction of Haitian labor into 
the sugar industry by US forces in the early 20th century,                                                             
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This chapter set out to provide the background for the current struggles for 
documentation and citizenship in the Dominican Republic, particularly the evolution of 
civil and legal procedures during distinct epochs in Dominican history. Doing so, it showed 
how migration became increasingly regulated after the contracting of Haitian braceros 
during the first US occupation. In this initial stage of mass Haitian migration to the 
Dominican side of the island until the recent changes in legislation in the 2000s, the sugar 
industry was the strongest force regulating the movement of Haitian workers into and 
within the country. Even state attempts to regain control through increasing border checks 
and identity document requirements were foiled by the sugar companies’ desires to 
maintain an exploitable labor pool. Although the state held a monopoly of the sugar 
industry since Trujillo’s time, it continued ignoring its own laws mandating documentation 
and the return of workers after the harvest.  
 After the sugar industry’s collapse in the early 1990s, regulating Haitian migration 
became increasingly important as the Haitian diaspora migrated out of the bateyes and into 
the cities. Through several legal initiatives and reforms, between 2004 and 2013, hundreds 
of thousands of people were declared ineligible for citizenship—including three 
generations of Dominicans of Haitian descent who had previously enjoyed their rights as 
citizens. The two protest signs that anchor this chapter render visible the human lives 
impacted by these laws. Figure 3 echoes the call for anthropologists to study citizenship as 
“more than just a legal-juridical set of rights and entitlements. Rather, citizenship is a set 
of cultural and social processes that must be examined in the realm of everyday life” (Siu 
2001, 9). Therefore, the ensuing discussion will focus on the testimonies and experiences 
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of young activists as they navigate the territory of exclusion both as racial and national 
others in the Dominican Republic. 
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As the previous chapter has made clear, la sentencia is but one of many attempts to 
limit the Haitian diaspora’s access to Dominican citizenship. Resistance to these earlier 
efforts was often localized due to the isolation of Dominico-Haitians in bateyes and quickly 
stifled through acts of state violence such as deportation. In contrast, the struggle against 
TC 168-13 gained traction at the international, national, and local levels. A key difference 
was the broad support for afectados in the Dominican diaspora, especially those in the US 
whose own experiences with racism, deportation, and citizenship engendered empathy for 
their compatriots. At earlier junctures in Dominican politics, such as during the Trujillo 
regime, the size and power of the Dominican diaspora were more limited. Now, prominent 
members of both the Dominican and Haitian diasporas such as Junot Diaz, Edwidge 
Danticat, and Julia Alvarez spoke publicly about the crisis and met with island-based 
activist leaders, generating responses to the state that questioned the diaspora’s own place 
within the imagined community. In New York, the center of the Dominican diaspora, 
young Dominican-Americans organized under the banner “We Are All Dominican” in 
response to the citizenship crisis in their country of origin. Through protests, petitions, and 
social media, this group, along with local and international media, ensured that Dominico-
Haitian claims were not ignored.  
Legal and social pressure continued to pose challenges to these policies, forcing a 
response by the Dominican state by mid-2014, exactly eight months after the Supreme 
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Court ruling. The government’s reply took the form of legislation approved by Congress 
and signed by President Danilo Medina on May 23, 2014. The law established two 
administrative processes, distinguishing between those who had been “irregularly 
inscribed” in the national registry (i.e., those whose documentation was suspended), and 
those born before 2007 to undocumented parents who never completed their registry. The 
law refers to these respective categories as Group A and Group B. Tied to the law which 
outlined the pathways to legal residency, and potentially citizenship, are instructions for 
the implementation of an amnesty program targeted at immigrants who had arrived in the 
country prior to October 2011, the Plan Nacional de Regularización de Extranjeros (PNRE) 
established by presidential decree just two months after TC 168-13.  
This chapter is influenced by legal and political anthropology’s perspective on law 
as “an important force in shaping human behavior … as a constructive element ‘within 
culture,’” (Geertz 1996, 35). An examination of experiences of claiming citizenship for 
oneself and for one’s children elucidates the state’s positioning around these questions and 
how individuals and communities gain knowledge about their relationship to the nation-
state. Grounding race and gender within this analysis provides a nuanced understanding of 
the relationship among blackness, dominicanidad, and anti-Haitianism at the center of this 
study. Despite the state’s efforts to characterize the most recent immigration policies as a 
departure from how it has approached this subject in the past (as outlined in the previous 
chapter), new policies continue the same historical pattern of producing Haitian 
“illegality”, concentrating Haitians within labor sectors, and having a specific gendered 
effect.  
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Further, because the state claims to have resolved the significant human rights 
issues posed by the policy via the legal changes mentioned above, an analysis of these 
policies is necessary for capturing their present and future implications for both formal and 
cultural citizenship on the island. To that end, this chapter focuses on the experiences of 
the groups identified in the state’s 2014 response to accusations of denationalization: recent 
Haitian immigrants and women in Groups A and B.   
 
Bureaucratic Failures   
I arrived in the Dominican capital within a few weeks of the deadline to enter into 
the plan. Hoping to take advantage of the tediousness of bureaucratic processes, I 
frequented the Santo Domingo office of the Ministry of Interior and Police in an ominous 
building constructed in the brutalist style near the center of the Distrito Nacional (National 
District). Here, on the building’s third floor, both migrants who had arrived in the country 
before October 2011 and those born in the country and were never registered, were required 
to submit a variety of receipts, forms, and testimonies proving their social, economic, and 
familial ties to the country. To my surprise, my first visits in late May and early June 2015 
offered few opportunities to chat at length, as the process seemed to run smoothly. Clients 
were quickly attended and sent on their way.  
As the June 17th deadline approached, the ministry and the surrounding streets were 
transformed. Barricades reinforced by heavily armed national police replaced the open 
access I witnessed a week earlier, when no more than a few dozen applicants were waiting 
at any given time. With just two days before the plan would close, the atmosphere was 
tense with the realization that some would not reach the building’s interior before the 
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deadline. Similar obstacles were reported at many of the other 36 sites planned to service 
applicants. For the first third of the 90-day plan, only 11 of these centers were functioning. 
Halfway through, only two-thirds were operational. Even with these open, the border area, 
home to the largest concentration of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic, 
remained among the least-served (Riveros 2015, 151). Considering these logistical failures, 
the Dominican government granted a 45-day extension to meet all the requirements for 
those who had succeeded in initiating their applications.  
 
Figure 4  “Lines outside the MIP” This photo is taken from the eastern side of the MIP and after the 45-
day extension of the PNRE. 08.02.2015. Photo by author. 
 In it’s language, neither the denationalization policy or the regularization plan is 
race-specific. However, few of those languishing in the punishing heat and sun outside the 
building’s gates were of other nationalities aside from the Haitians and/or not Black, as 
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illustrated by Figure 4.24 Therefore, my presence among the mass outside the building’s 
gate was immediately noted. While I almost exclusively occupied the rubia (a term 
meaning blond but used by Dominicans to refer to anyone with light skin and European 
features) category, my ethnicity and nationality were often topics of debate. Sometimes I 
was simply called out in the street as americana [American]. One suitor was so bold as to 
yell, “¡Americana, necesito una visa!” (American, I need a visa!), making explicit his 
hopes for migration through marriage. In these cases, race did not need be specified because 
unhyphenated Americans were almost exclusively imagined as White. While some 
assumed that I had come to take advantage of the massive regularization of immigrants, 
most thought that I was in a capacity to help them. I was struck by the mixture of ease and 
desperation with which they offered their personal documents for my inspection. No soy 
abogada ni trabajadora social, I was neither a lawyer or a social worker, I explained, 
discomforted by their insistence that I inspect and approve private papers. Nevertheless, 
they continued to show me furniture receipts, hospital forms, and the photo-copied IDs of 
acquaintances—all bearing witness to lives built in the Dominican Republic. Later that 
day, and throughout the rest of my fieldwork, I noticed how frequently this image repeated 
itself with both migrants and native-born men and women filmed and photographed while 
holding up the documentation that they have—birth certificates, hospital papers, and 
fichas. International media including the BBC, Human Rights Watch, Slate, and national 
ones such as Hoy, and Diario Libre have all published these images. In these images, those 
subject to the lengthy and difficult process by which the state determines who belongs and 
                                            
24 Although I did not survey all members in the line many of those I spoke to claimed that other national 
origin (Asian, European, or Latin American) received preferential treatment. I use Haitian/non-Black to 
account for the presence of cocolos and their descendants.   
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more importantly who doesn’t, offer forms of bureaucratic evidence that makes their lives 
legible to the state. For these images, as in my own experience, were not the products of a 
demand to “show me your papers,” but offered tangible and visible evidence that they have 
a right to belong, a right that, in the case of Group A, has already been authenticated by the 
state. Even though this practice cannot be captured outside of the suspicions and denials 
that often accompany Haitian and Dominico-Haitian claims to citizenship, they evidence 
the power of the bureaucratic process to shape how citizenship is conceptualized and 
expressed.  
The legislative and bureaucratic momentum around issues of immigration and 
nationality since the implementation of the 2004 immigration law signals the Dominican 
government’s increasing preoccupation with discourses of law and order. In response to 
the critiques of its citizenship policies lodged by foreign governments and multi-state 
organizations, state representatives repeatedly defend the denationalization policy, 
asserting its sovereign right to manage its borders and population. In a speech 
commemorating the anniversary of the country’s independence from Haiti in 1844, 
President Medina asserted, “I want to make it clear also that no other nation in the world, 
nor any international organization, can demand that the Dominican Republic make 
sacrifices to its migratory system, or any other sovereign right, beyond what is ordered by 
the laws and the constitution,” (Planas 2015) thereby tying the ability of the nation to fulfill 
its destiny to the maintenance of internal and external borders. This line of defense that 
appeals to the values of self-rule and the necessary fairness and legitimacy of the law has 
been essential to the government’s efforts to counter accusations of racism, xenophobia, 
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and corruption.25 Indeed, neither the constitutional court’s restrictive ruling nor law 169-
14 mention race specifically, aspects that defenders of the policies repeatedly emphasize. 
However, in practice, most of the people excluded from citizenship rights in the Dominican 
Republic since the 2007 JCE audit have been dark-skinned residents of Haitian origin.  
 
Figure 5 "Todo hijo de haitiano es haitiano" Counter-protest sign. Photo by author. 
 
Additionally, state representatives have upheld the conviction that the proliferation 
of new laws and regulations concerning migration, deportation, and citizenship works in 
favor of human rights by eliminating the kinds of prejudice and clientalism outlined in the 
previous chapter. However, this view is facilitated by an understanding of racism in 
Dominican society that portrays inequalities as the result of individual prejudice and denies 
                                            
25 These assertions form part of a large-scale reform effort including a 2012 decree (490-12) that establishes 
a communications bureau in the president’s office in charge of publicizing information about the 
government. This law is geared at installing a government that is “dialogante, transparente, frugal, 
democrático, activo, en la calle, volcado al servicio de los ciudadanos, honesto, respetuoso de las leyes y 
aliado de familias y negocios dominicanos en la brega diaria por su bienestar” (dialogic, transparent, frugal, 
democratic, active, in the street, inclined toward the service of citizens, honest, law-abiding and ally of 
families and Dominican businesses in the daily struggle for their well-being) (Presidencia de la República 
Dominicana, 2018).  
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the role of the law, institutions, and systems in perpetuating race-based inequities. The 
architects of these plans fail to acknowledge that they have racial effects, even if ostensibly 
framed as race-neutral, as immigration policy in the Dominican Republic and much of 
Latin America has been the only legal area that has targeted specific racial groups. The 
Dominican Republic is not alone in its efforts to whiten the population via immigration, 
joined by Cuba’s efforts to attract migrants from peninsular Spain and the Canary Islands 
in the 19th century and Argentina’s overtures to Italian migrants in the 20th century. The 
counter-protest sign held in Figure 5 by a member of a Dominican nationalist party shows 
how those opposing citizenship for Haitians ground their arguments in legal discourse by 
using the Haitian constitution to assert that Dominicans of Haitian descent are not 
Dominicans.  
Moreover, recent state efforts to advance, streamline, and enforce migratory 
policies underlie broader efforts of asserting the nation-state’s modernity. David Theo 
Goldberg identifies “legal expression” as one of the key features distinguishing modern 
states from the primitive: “[l]aw, legal discourse, and legal consciousness assist in 
proliferating state control and discipline across the landscape and population” (2002, 139-
140). To that end, contemporary immigration policy diverges from earlier modes of 
governance founded on territorial exclusion, representing a “bio-political turn” 
characterized by differential inclusion and the creation and maintenance of Dominico-
Haitians as a distinct (and subordinate) population (Martínez and Wooding 2017, 99). By 
drawing in a once legally illegible population via the Plan Nacional de Regularización de 
Extranjero, and by reconstituting the Dominican-born population through the invention of 
Group A and B, the state transforms its source of power from exclusion to inclusion. While 
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simultaneously denying allegations of racism, the state upholds its right to “manage 
populations” through the elaboration and peopling of new subjectivities: Group A, Group 
B, “in transit,” and temporary residents. Each is accompanied by a distinct legal condition, 
including a set of rights, and has engendered multiple postures toward the state and society. 
As feminist and critical legal studies scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) have 
expertly argued, law, when examined closely, often works to reproduce dominant systems 
of inequality. However, as the US civil rights movement, an important reference for many 
of the activists in this work, has shown, it is precisely for this reason that legal institutions 
are central sites of struggle. The first step in this struggle is to uncover the law’s tacit racial 
effects.  
The audit of registrations, while unfairly targeting Dominicans of Haitian descent, 
responded to concerns about inconsistencies and inaccuracies across all levels of 
government. In response, the current regime characterizes itself as undertaking a significant 
departure from these past practices. Part and parcel of this new vision for the modern 
Dominican state is the transformation of the former system wherein rules could be blatantly 
skirted and violated. As Chapter 2 showed, however, these inconsistencies in 
documentation often benefitted the sugarcane estates who had the most to gain from 
withholding documentation, not migrants. Therefore, government authorities understand 
the central problem of documentation to be an inefficient, decentralized, and poorly 
regulated system, a diagnosis that supports a broad-ranging effort to concentrate power 
within the central government and one that ignores issues of unequal access. Beyond the 
changes in birthright citizenship—effectively moving away from the doctrine of jus soli to 
the ideology of jus sanguinis—additional efforts to centralize and modernize power include 
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the extension of presidential term limits, and the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
the body that decided Juliana Deguis’s case in 2013. In response to what has historically 
been a system in which local governments and individual bureaucrats exercised significant 
power over local registries (see Chapter 2), the proposed audit, new legislation, and 
increased border security (along with increased expenditures) all promised to redirect the 
various capillaries of power to the center and place them under centralized state control.  
Anthropological studies of citizenship have long examined the relationship among 
the state, civil society, and citizen-subjects (Yuval Davis 1997; Ong 1999; Rosaldo 1994). 
Many conceive of the relationship between the citizen and the state as dialectical, shaped 
by the interplay between individuals and state ideologies and institutions. Anthropologists 
are concerned with what kinds of citizens populations are invited to become (Pérez 2015, 
21) by way of the numerous state and civil society institutions that often comprise our most 
immediate relationship with the state.  
In the case examined here, the Dominican Republic’s wide-scale attempts to 
reconstitute citizenship have prompted new reflections, anxieties, and the formation of new 
types of subjects. In the analysis that follows, I explore this interplay between institutions 
and identities among two distinctly positioned groups: Haitian immigrants and Dominico-
Haitian mothers—who are responsible for the registration of children. In these interactions, 
the dispositions and actions required to navigate state institutions and claim rights are 
practiced and congealed. Grounding an analysis of the citizenship regimes in these 
experiences of contact renders visible the “heterogeneous assemblage or dispositif that 
combines forms of practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation, 
vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgement, architectural forms, human 
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capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscriptions, techniques and so forth” (Li 2007, 
275) through which the Haitian diasporic population is subjectified and governed. This 
recent shift in the management of the Dominican Republic’s growing Haitian diaspora has 
primarily utilized legal mechanisms to “call subjectivities into being” (Goldberg 2002, 
146) and integrate these new forms of belonging that lie between full and non-citizen.  
In the following section I offer an illustrative vignette drawn from my ethnographic 
observations with the regularization process in the final week it was open when over five 
days, I spoke to and observed petitioners, the bureaucrats receiving them, and the police 
officers monitoring the crowds. As noted earlier, these observations drawn from the final 
days of the plan differ significantly from my early visits to the Ministry of Interior and 
Police. As of 2016, only 244,363 persons of Haitian descent entered into the plan26 of an 
estimated total of 458,233 Haitian immigrants (ENI 2012). Although the 2012 Encuesta 
Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) does not report on how many of these immigrants are 
undocumented, from the findings that 37.8 percent possess Haitian passports (a document 
necessary to apply for residency) and 23.5 percent of the second generation have 
Dominican cédulas, we can infer high numbers of undocumented persons at the time of the 
survey. These figures show the need to address issues of access to citizenship, since the 
government, to date, has failed to service nearly half of the population. The following 
discussion sheds light into some of the limitations in the implementation of the plan that 
demonstrate a continuity with the discriminatory policies outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
                                            
26 Ministerio del Interior y Policía, “Estadísticas generales expedientes aprobados,” accessed 10 March, 
2018, http://mipenlinea.gob.do/Planregularizacion/PublicDashboard.aspx. 
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“Eres blanca” 
I returned to the Ministry of Interior and Police several times as the deadline 
approached to gain a more grounded understanding of the events that dominated national 
headlines. I first encountered the line on Calle Federico Henríquez y Carvajal along the 
building’s east side. As I turned the corner on Avenida Francia, the single-file line along 
the building gave way to a street so overwhelmed by people that authorities were forced to 
close the street to traffic. Ambulatory street vendors selling icy treats, water, sweet and fry 
breads added their voices to the hum of the crowd. Journalists formed their own line on the 
building’s west side where no one was permitted to pass. I spent the next few hours 
speaking with various people in the line, most whom were understandably more concerned 
with how I could help them with their applications than my research questions. The 
temporary suspension on deportations the government had granted was to be lifted at 
midnight the next day and photos of the long yellow school buses like the ones that ferry 
US school children, to be used in deportation raids and emblazoned with Dirección de 
Migración, had been widely published in the press. Nearly all those kept out of the gates 
appeared to be Haitian. Conversations in Haitian Kreyol predominated and those I spoke 
to complained that other national origin groups did not have to suffer the same treatment. 
Although Haitians make up most of the country’s foreign-born population (87 percent) 
(ENI 2012), it was clear once I gained access to the building’s interior that other racial 
groups had an easier time gaining access given the more visible presence of lighter skinned 
persons in comparison with the lines outside. Inevitably, my presence as a young, light-
skinned female didn’t go unnoticed and nearly all of the conversations I had involved me 
 76 
explaining that I was in no position to “grease the wheels” or serve as an intermediary, a 
common practice in a patron-client state.  
Having to repeatedly tell people I could do nothing was disheartening in the face of 
such visible suffering. There were no public bathrooms, food, or water. One woman with 
a small child showed me the flattened cardboard they had slept on the night before because 
she could neither afford to lose her place in line or the bus fare back to La Romana, where 
she lived. These appeals had sufficiently worn me down when I finally agreed to try and 
help Yanick, a 28-year-old Haitian immigrant from northern Santo Domingo. Eres blanca, 
“You’re white,” Yanick insisted when I told him I couldn’t help him. I relented, primarily 
to end the conversation by proving that I had no greater chance of accessing the building 
than he. He led me to the western side of the building, an area that was tightly restricted by 
the police, to a gated side entrance where a member of the Dominican Red Cross, a few 
police officers, and a government employee were stationed just inside the closed gate.  
Yanick’s commitment to the idea that my physical appearance and US-accented 
Spanish were sufficient qualifications was undermined by his urging that I slip the 
government employee a thousand-peso note. Already concerned that I had crossed an 
ethical line by attempting to circumvent the process, I drew a clear line at bribery of a 
public official, to Yanick’s disappointment. I was invited to take a seat just inside the 
compound, but they refused to let Yanick through. If the process was for me, I was assured, 
they would be more willing to help, but in this case, I had to wait for the jefa, the 
government employee responsible for overseeing the entire regularization process. Despite 
the chaos beyond the gates, the shaded spot was comfortable and the attitude among the 
guards was calm and relaxed. One of the officers, a 19-year old recent cadet named Manuel, 
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extended a cold bottle of water and some advice. He expressed the concerns about me, a 
foreign White woman hanging around Haitians. I was damaging my reputation, he warned. 
Although I had been warned in similar contexts that Haitians were dangerous and I should 
be cautious, Manuel’s warning implied that the danger was not Haitians themselves, but 
the possibility of being “contaminated,” and thereby judged by Dominicans to be less 
worthy of respect or protection. We continued to talk about the migrants’ situation, all 
agreed that it was tragic, but reasoned that it was the migrants’ own fault for waiting until 
the final week to complete the process. The officers characterized them as overwhelming 
the regularization process, consistent with narratives of how immigrants overwhelmed 
other public and private institutions. When the jefa appeared, all small talk turned to 
seriousness as everyone perked up to attention. A woman in her 40s, the boss seemed both 
annoyed and overwhelmed. Without asking for any specifics of my situation, she promised 
that if I appeared in the same spot at 2 PM the following day she would escort Yanick and 
I into the building. Once outside, I shared the good news with Yanick, who appeared 
pleased that his plan was on track. Both exhausted from the heat and sun, before heading 
home he assured me that it would be easy to spot me in the crowd the next day, the only 
way we could meet because he didn’t have a cellphone.  
 I arrived early the next day to continue observing the process and to talk to some 
of the applicants in line. The scene at the ministry that day was even more chaotic than the 
previous day. Within an hour of my arrival, I was talking to applicants near the middle of 
the line when I felt a sudden surge in the crowd. I felt people starting to push back on me 
and finally heard someone yell, ¡Corre! (“Run!”) and the crowd rushed eastward. Someone 
stepped on my heel causing me to lose my shoe, but the crowd was too strong to turn back. 
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I found a ledge about a half block away to rest alongside four young men. One of them 
bought me an icee from a vendor and explained that the police had released tear gas on the 
crowd for the second time that morning. Earlier, they had seriously injured an expectant 
mother causing her to lose her child from the impact of the canister. Although several others 
I spoke to that day had a similar recounting of that morning’s attack, I was unable to find 
any newspaper reports confirming this version. Reports merely mentioned the mother 
being sent to the hospital but did not register any fatalities. Regardless of the truth of the 
event, its recounting throughout the crowd informed and reinforced the Haitian and 
immigrant community’s feelings of mistrust of the police, vulnerability in their interactions 
with authorities, and sense of injustice. These rumors became an outlet for voicing their 
collective sense of discontent when there are few options to contest their mistreatment, 
what James C. Scott refers to as the “weapons of the weak” (2000[1987]). To be sure, the 
victims’ responses were severely limited by what was at stake—their livelihoods in the 
country—and so the line quietly and quickly reconstituted itself.  
Still unable to locate Yanick in the chaos, when 2 PM came around I decided that 
rather than waste the opportunity to help one of the exhausted and fraught applicants, I 
would try to take someone else. Roger was a tall, slender, dark-skinned youth with 
cornrows and a slight lisp, who had followed me that day pleading to me that I help him. 
To my surprise, there was no objection from the officers when Roger took Yanick’s place. 
Later, an employee of the ministry, Antonio, who had seen me observing the process, and 
who would intermittently allow me access to the grounds, explained that some assumed I 
was being paid for my services as an intermediary. Perhaps Yanick’s reading of the 
Dominican officials’ white supremacist ideology was correct. I did not offer any money, 
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favor, or courtesy in exchange for the privileges both the police and the bureaucrats 
extended to me.  
Once in the building, the large open waiting area seemed relatively clear in 
comparison to the street below and offered welcome relief from the blazing sun. Roger and 
I were directed to some rows of green plastic chairs, where they took some preliminary 
information and pointed us to another narrow room where government employees took 
Roger’s photo for his residency document. On closer inspection of the translated birth 
certificate emitted at the Haitian embassy, the clerk realized that Roger was just 17 years 
old and was only eligible to register under his parents who, as Roger explained, still lived 
in Haiti. ¿Por qué no me dijiste? (“Why didn’t you tell me?”), I asked Roger. He explained 
that he had to try as he had no other options.   
 Dejected, Roger, only a few days from his eighteenth birthday, was at a standstill. 
I would continue to see him outside the ministry later that day when he told me he had 
found someone to pose as his parent if he could just get inside again. Despite my own 
disappointment with my inability to do anything in the face of so much suffering, Roger 
gave me a copy of a 2” x 2”-sized photograph as a gift for helping him. It was one of those 
I had seen the week earlier being taken on an exterior wall on the side of the Haitian 
embassy, where both men and women donned either a cream-colored or a black blazer 
provided by the embassy before posing in front of a white sheet tacked to an outside wall.27 
The Haitian consulate provided the service to speed up applying for the passport necessary 
to meet the requirements of the PNRE. Before we left the building, I thought quickly on 
                                            
27 Although Roger was not able to regularize his status during the PNRE, he remained in the Dominican 
Republic and continued to call me to check in over the next several months.  
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my feet and made sure that I could still use the favor promised to me and found Yanick as 
soon as I left the building. The officers at the door had changed at this point and Yanick 
insisted that I advocate for his pregnant sister who could not endure the long lines outside 
the ministry, but the guards had already decided to let pregnant women and small children 
inside. Eventually, Yanick was able to enter too, by insisting that he was her husband.  
More than communicating the palpable human drama of the regularization 
program, this vignette contradicts the state’s claims that the legal and bureaucratic 
framework it has erected is the solution to the vast irregularities and highly prejudicial 
ways that citizenship has historically been accessed in the Dominican Republic. As one 
applicant, Jean, whom I met in the early days of observing this process, noted, the chaos 
and obscurity of process created opportune loopholes for those with social and economic 
capital to gain the system. In many ways, Yanick and Roger utilized their capital as Spanish 
speakers who were comfortable enough to elicit a favor to gain an advantage in the process. 
As a medical student, David, whom I talked to after spotting him in his lab coat, 
demonstrated, those Haitians who evidence a certain class standing had much more ease in 
accessing the program. In the example related above, my inability to make claims on the 
state based on formal citizenship, much like those waiting in line, was mitigated by the 
positive perceptions of my race, class, and nationality. As my racial presentation was at the 
forefront of these interactions, these ethnographic snippets bring to the fore how racial 
privileges operate within citizenship law that masks itself as universally accessible.  
Further, much of the regularization plan required documents that proved 
employment, social ties to Dominican citizens and institutions, and economic contributions 
in the form of rent, utility, and furniture receipts. For the most vulnerable Haitian 
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immigrants residing in the barracones, or barracks, provided for cane workers and whose 
lack of documentation has pushed them into informal and low-paid work, this threshold 
was too high. However, this system has followed the same pattern Nicholas De Genova 
(2013) finds in asylum regimes where: 
in systematic and predictable ways, asylum regimes disproportionately disqualify 
asylum seekers, and convert them into “illegal” and deportable “migrants.” All such 
officially “unwanted” or “undesirable” non-citizens are stigmatized with 
allegations of opportunism, duplicity and undeservingness. The compulsive 
denunciation, humiliation and exquisitely refined rightlessness of deportable 
“foreigners,” furthermore, supply the rationale for essentializing the juridical 
inequalities of citizenship and alienage as categorical differences that may be 
racialized. This social ignominy must be understood to be part of a larger 
sociopolitical production of migrant “illegality.” Discursive formations that uphold 
and propagate the notion of migrant “illegality” more than mere “consequences” of 
a more elementary (prior) violation persistently serve as veritable conditions of 
possibility for the larger sociopolitical procedures that generate and sustain this 
“illegality” (1181).  
 
Although this is just one account of the more than 250,000 interactions Haitian migrants 
had with the amnesty program, it follows the historical patterns of migration being 
primarily race-based.  In their analysis of the regularization plan, Martínez and Wooding 
question whether the state’s expectations for its capacity to execute such a large program 
were too grand or whether the plan was designed to fail (2017, 113). Though it might be 
difficult to measure intent, the results of the plan are more revealing. It has succeeded as a 
“spectacle” whereby already existing forms of illegality are redirected from the state to 
subjects who are portrayed as undeserving.  
 
Deterritorialized Citizenship  
Recent developments in Dominican citizenship policy and the international 
backlash it prompted diverge significantly from the reputation the Dominican Republic 
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cultivated in the 1990s, when progressive academics lauded the Dominican Republic for 
paving the way towards a more expansive framing of citizenship by including the 
Dominican diaspora (but not the Haitian diaspora in the Dominican Republic). The 
readiness of the Dominican government to institute policies to establish and maintain 
political and economic ties with Dominicans abroad has caused scholars to portray it as a 
paragon of a transnational state (see Duany 2008[1994], 2011; Glick Schiller 1999; 
Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Levitt 2001; Sagás and Molina 2004; Sørensen 1996). For example, 
the Dominican Republic approved voting rights for expatriates in 1994, passed regulations 
making it easier for migrants to transport goods to the island, and incentivized resettlement 
by constructing housing designated for returnees (Levitt 2001). Validating the Dominican 
diaspora’s claim to belonging and extending cultural and political citizenship required a 
“re-imagination” of the national community. These developments are part of the 
“deterritorialized nation-state” in which national and political belonging are not 
territorially fixed (Basch et al. 1994). While this re-imagination is made possible in part 
through the broadened possibilities of “simultaneity” forged by technological 
advancements, the role of race is key to how “deterritorialized citizenship” provides a space 
for diasporic Dominicans while simultaneously excluding Dominico-Haitians.    
In the Dominican Republic, and much of Latin America, understandings of race 
and nation are fused vis-à-vis the ideology of mestizaje. Notably, mestizaje emerged in the 
post-independence era purportedly as a remedy for the deep racial divisions at the 
foundation of the colonial system. By repudiating any racial difference within the nation-
state boundaries, public intellectuals like Juan Pablo Duarte hoped to foster liberal 
citizenship based on the principle of fraternity and equality (see Mayes 2014, 22). 
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Nevertheless, this vision is more accurately one of racial homogeneity rather that “silences” 
racial claims (Rodríguez-Silva 2012). Scholars have long defined nationalism as a form of 
extended kinship, including Benedict Anderson’s framing of the nation as “horizontal 
fraternity” (1991[1983]) to Thomas Eriksen’s likening of nationalism to a “metaphoric 
kinship” (2010). In popular discourse, the nation is frequently rendered in kinship terms 
including the motherland, fatherland, brotherhood, and founding father. Eriksen argues that 
nationalism fills a need for community, belonging, security, and continuity to fill the void 
rendered by the weakened social importance of kinship (2010, 131). “Metaphoric kinship” 
relations are not just affective but must simultaneously justify a particular (real or potential) 
power structure. Trafficking in the language of blood and gendered hierarchies, family 
metaphors are always raced and gendered.  
Because race and nation are so closely intertwined in the Dominican Republic, 
populations racialized as Black have both difficulty claiming belonging and highlighting 
the ways racism blocks them from attaining legal and substantive citizenship. Mestizaje 
binds understandings of race and nation in ways that engender the simultaneous 
racialization and “illegality” of Haitians. This racial logic to citizenship explains how the 
Dominican state can simultaneously extend rights to the Dominican diaspora while 
maintaining the exclusion of the Haitian one. Additionally, through mestizaje, the state 
maintains its status as a “racial democracy.” In nationalist discourse that excludes the 
possibility of Haitians and unmixed blackness, Haitians cannot be imagined as members 
of this extended family as these lines are redrawn to include the diaspora. The inclusion of 
the Dominican diaspora emphasizes that territory, culture, and language are less important 
than blood and kinship as evidenced in the legal shift toward jus sanguinis. In other words, 
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extended family ties have become the key criteria to defining Dominican nationality since 
the 1990s under the transnational state. The recent citizenship laws at the center of this 
discussion are also grounded in these entanglements between race and rights. While this 
point merits further study on the modes of inclusion of the diaspora, it highlights the ways 
inclusion is grounded in race, ensuring that Dominicans of Haitian descent are 
unassimilable in the eyes of the state.  
 
Engendering “Illegality”  
La desnacionalidad tiene cara de género. 
Denationalization has a gendered face.  
— MUDHA representative  
At the global scale, birthright citizenship is the exception to the rule. Only 30 
countries in the world grant automatic citizenship regardless of the citizenship status of the 
parent. In the Americas, where population density remained low, birthright citizenship was 
utilized to encourage European settlement in the colonies (Peralta 2015). More recently, 
birthright citizenship has come under attack not only in the Dominican Republic. For 
example, in 1995, members of the US Congress debated a measure to rescind birthright 
citizenship. Ireland and France revoked their own birthright citizenship policies in 2005 
and 1993 respectively.  
Women and women’s reproduction are often the locus of these anxieties about 
birthright citizenship. In the United States, anti-immigration advocates have circulated the 
trope of the “anchor-baby” in which women cross the border to give birth, thereby securing 
birthright citizenship for their child and future citizenship for themselves through family 
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reunification programs. Immigrant mothers are also blamed for burdening the already 
under-resourced medical system. In the Dominican context, Haitian women are equally 
targeted as being excessively fertile and a public burden. Articles in the Listín Diario and 
El Día attributed up to 80 percent of births in Dominican hospitals at the borders to Haitian 
women, downplaying national-level findings that in the first quarter of 2017, only 18 
percent of births were to Haitian women (Altuna Tezanos 2018; Acosta 2017). However, 
an Oficina Nacional de Estadística’s 2016 report shows that only 5 percent of births that 
year were to Haitian mothers, suggesting that these other sources of data may include 
Dominicans of Haitian descent.28 Both articles emphasize the financial burden of births on 
taxpayers in the publicly funded health system. Thereby, Haitian women become the 
scapegoats for the failures and limitations of the publicly managed health system.  
Notwithstanding that Migration Law 2085-04 eliminated birthright citizenship, 
which was consecrated in the 2010 constitution, state officials continue to perpetuate the 
stereotype of the anchor baby. The president of the Central Electoral Board, Julio César 
Castaños Guzmán, told reporters in 2017, “la República Dominicana tiene que decidirse a 
no seguir siendo un ‘paritorio’ de Haití, porque son miles las mujeres que están cruzando 
la frontera para venir a dar a luz al país, y luego buscar que esos niños sean 
nacionalizados” (Altuna Tezanos 2018). (“The Dominican Republic must decide not to 
remain a ‘birthing center’ of Haiti because there are thousands of women who are crossing 
the border to give birth and later seek for those kids to be naturalized.”) These comments 
were made after a May 2017 resolution (03-2017) aimed at addressing what the 
                                            
28 Government documents regularly place Dominicans of Haitian descent in the “Haitian” category.    
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government identifies as a new strategy by Haitian parents to access Dominican citizenship 
via their children. The government has also identified the practice of child abandonment as 
a growing concern, publicly accusing Haitians of abandoning their children, thereby 
forcing the state to grant the child Dominican citizenship because the legal status of the 
parents is unknown. Dominican officials believe that parents will exploit their child’s 
citizenship when they reach the age of majority to solicit a family unification visa.  
Representing women’s fertility as devious is a common strategy in anti-immigrant 
campaigns in the Dominican Republic, the US (see Chavez 2017), and elsewhere. Such 
portrayals dehumanize immigrant mothers by rendering them incapable of basic human 
emotions such as love and empathy. Their avowed selfishness is in direct opposition to the 
characteristics attributed to ideal mothers: self-sacrificing and devoted. The dedication of 
these immigrant mothers is questioned even before they cross the border; as the medical 
director of one hospital reported, muchas haitianas llegan a la Maternidad con 
enfermedades infecciosas y de transmisión sexual, como anemia, tuberculosis, con VIH 
Sida, problemas respiratorios y otras complicaciones (“many Haitians arrive at the 
Maternity with infectious and sexually transmitted diseases, like anemia, tuberculosis, with 
HIV/AIDS, respiratory problems, and other complications”) (Luna et al. 2017). Not only 
do these narratives destroy the concept of the immigrant family, thereby framing women 
as criminals and breeders (Lugo-Lugo and Bloodsworth-Lugo 2014), these images shift 
the focus away from male migration, which is sought after by powerful economic interests. 
Moreover, these articles ignited a public panic by identifying an increase between the 2016 
and 2017 of births to Haitian women, some even attributing this growth to “tours,” 
“mafias,” or “cartels” that traffic pregnant Haitian women across the border (see Luna et 
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al. 2017; Bonilla 2017). However, none of these articles points to the possible impact of 
immigration policies in increasing the number of mothers with documents that identify 
them as Haitian nationals, both those who benefitted from the PNRE (84,108 women) and 
those in Group B,29 who were born in the Dominican Republic but given documents that 
identify them as Haitian nationals.  
 Women’s experiences in maternity wards and as mothers arose at various times 
during my research. To be sure, the reversal of birthright citizenship policies had a 
disproportionate impact on the ways immigrant fertility, mothering, and sexuality were 
represented in news, politics, and popular culture. Undocumented women of Haitian 
descent, particularly those who reside in bateyes, are vulnerable at multiple levels. In my 
work helping Reconoci.do expand its base among residents who were undocumented 
before the sentence took effect (Group B), I encountered women who said that their male 
partners were reluctant to see them resolve their status to maintain control over them. 
Mariela, a resident of Batey Euskarduno, told me, “Quería estudiar, pero me casé porque 
no tenía documento” (“I wanted to study, but I got married because I didn’t have 
documents”). Outside the municipal offices in El Seibo, I spoke to another mother, Regine, 
about the difficulty of motherhood during this process: 
J: ¿Te sientes responsable?  
 
R: Uh huh. Sí, porque la muchacha mía, ella, cuando … que la profesora que le dijo no 
podía seguir estudiar [sic] con su papel, entonces fui a la junta a ver si la podía declarar. 
Fui y saqué un papel del alcalde con otro papel de acta … entonces, vino allí y tiró foto y 
                                            
29 A total of 8,755 persons received residency cards under Law 169-14 that list their nationality as Haitian, 
although they were born in the Dominican Republic. Most lack and are not eligible for Haitian citizenship. 
Therefore, when women with these identity cards give birth, their children are registered in the Libro de 
Extranjería as Haitian nationals. Data disaggregated by gender are not available for this group (see 
Amnesty International 2015).  
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firmó … entonces cuando que llegamos buscando buscan y buscan, llaman por teléfono, 
los expedientes habían perdido. No estaban en Hato Mayor, aquí, tampoco allá … Ella se 
puso mal, se puso mal, ya. Entonces ella fue y se casó. No siguió. 
 
J: ¿Cómo deprimida? ¿Se puso deprimida?  
 
R: Ella fue y tomo 40 pastillas … Sí, cuarenta pastillas, sí. Estaba casi muerta. Cuarenta 
pastillas. Aspirina tomó. Entonces, llegó al médico bien grave. Entonces estuvo allí días, 
días allí, interna allí … Por el papel … Ella quería ser profesora. Pero ya no pudo. Por el 
papel, por su acta.  
 
[J: Do you feel responsible?  
 
R: Uh huh. Yes, because my girl, she, when … when the professor told her she couldn’t 
continue studying with her paper, then I went the junta to see if I could declare her. I went 
and I got a paper from the mayor and other certificate … then, she went there and was 
photographed and signed … then when we arrived searching and searching and searching, 
calling, the records had disappeared. They weren’t in Hato Mayor, here, or there either. 
She got bad, she got bad then. So, she went and got married. She didn’t continue.  
 
J: Like depressed? She got depressed?  
 
R: She went and took 40 pills …. Yes, forty pills. Yes. She was almost dead. Forty pills. 
She took aspirin. Then, she arrived at the doctor very ill … then, she was there for days 
and days interned there …. because of the document …. She wanted to be a teacher. But 
she couldn’t anymore [because of her birth certificate].  
 
For Regine’s child, both marriage and suicide were last resorts in what seemed like a 
hopeless situation with few viable options. Moreover, this was the burden Regine raised 
when I asked about her own feelings about being unable to declare her children. This is the 
burden she carries. Another woman, Yokasta, shared how her own partner forced her into 
sexual labor in a neighboring community housing sugarcane workers, which prohibited 
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female residents. Her lack of documentation and the oppressive conditions of poverty in 
her community made this type of labor one of the few available options.  
In the reversal of birthright citizenship, immigrant women are portrayed as overly 
reproductive and as leeches on the state. For nearly all the mothers of Haitian descent I 
encountered during my fieldwork, childbirth was often a traumatic experience due to their 
treatment by hospital staff. One woman, Julisa, whom I met in Batey Alemán near La 
Romana, was still emotionally raw from giving birth just a few months earlier. Although 
the group of women I was speaking with was talking about the recent deportation raids that 
had taken place in the batey, Julisa pulled me aside, already brimming with emotions and 
seeking an empathetic ear for her recent birthing experience. No había camas (“there were 
no beds”), she told me. Doctors forced her to give birth on the floor after which she was 
discharged while still bleeding. During the Cesarean birth of an older child, she recounted 
how the doctors had left an instrument inside her, a mistake she attributes to the rush and 
lack of care she experienced due to discrimination. While this experience remained at the 
surface of Julisa’s emotions that evening, they were not exceptional in relation to her 
experience giving birth to her four other children, nor from the many first and secondhand 
stories I heard throughout my fieldwork. Beyond the persistent shortages and common 
stresses on hospital facilities that are common in the Dominican Republic, she understood 
that hospital staff further discriminated against her because of her Haitian heritage and 
presumed undocumented status.  
Moreover, women’s negative experiences extended beyond the birthing process 
itself. It was common that children “inherited” their undocumented status from their 
mothers. If a woman lacks nationality documents at the moment of birth, she is directed to 
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a foreign registry, or the Libro de Extranjería, by the proportioning of a pink slip to fill out 
and take to the registration office located within the hospital. When Dominican fathers 
attempt to register their children as citizens with their identity documents, they are often 
turned away because their claims are suspected of being false. Hospital workers often told 
the couples that the mother needed to register because her maternity was undeniable but 
the father’s was not (see Petrozziello 2015). Allied organizations have argued that this 
unofficial practice violates the rights of fathers to pass their citizenship status to their 
offspring. This claim plays into the unequal access to justice for men and women and into 
heteronormative and patriarchal nationalist constructions which invoke “imaginary 
child[ren] on whose behalf a better future is to be struggled for” (Luibhéid 2013, 149).30 
Because children inherit their status from their parents, their relationships are often 
strained. One mother in a batey near Guaymate shared that her 18-year-old son, Ricardo, 
had not spoken to her in over a year, por su situación (“because of his situation”), she 
explained. Not only did Andrea’s son find her culpable for his undocumented status, but 
Andrea blamed herself for not successfully protecting her son’s right to Dominican 
nationality.  
The practice of denying men’s attempts to register their children was so prevalent 
that some women were not even aware that fathers offered a pathway to citizenship for 
their children. In San José de los Llanos, where I had accompanied members of 
Reconoci.do to the local JCE office to demand the distribution of cédulas, Yasmina, a 23-
year old mother, recounted the difficulties she experienced in attempting to reestablish her 
                                            
30 This strategy differs significantly from a more sustained focus on women’s unequal access to citizenship 
and offers a productive means to show how gender discrimination impacts men as well as women.  
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citizenship since 2007. After having to first leave school, re-take the eighth grade, and live 
without national health insurance, Yasmina continued to confront various barriers to the 
full exercise of her citizenship. During the eight-year period during which she tried to 
obtain her citizenship documents, she made trips to gather documents throughout the island 
because of the confusion produced by the process of transcription, which relocated Group 
A’s citizenship documents in the registry, creating two different identities that raised flags 
when individuals tried to get documents for school or work:  
tengo que asistir a San José de los Llanos por lo de la cédula, después tengo que ir 
a Santo Domingo por el certificado, pero no sé si me van a entregar, ayer yo fui a 
Santo Domingo, el miércoles fui también. Tuve que ir a las dos Juntas, la del distrito 
y a la principal. Y allá no me lo pudieron resolver y me entregaron unos documentos 
para entregar allá en la secretaría de la educación para que me puedan dar el 
certificado de cuarto pero ese papel no lo quieren recibir allá en la secretaría y me 
mandaron donde me declararon, a la Junta donde me declararon para que me den 
una certificación porque de los dos [registros]. 
  
I have to go to San José de los Llanos for the ID, then I have to go to Santo Domingo 
for the certificate, but I do not know if they will give it to me, yesterday I went to 
Santo Domingo, Wednesday too. I had to go to the two Juntas, the district one and 
the main one. And there they could not resolve it and they gave me some documents 
to deliver to the secretary of education so they can give me the certificate of fourth 
grade but they do not want to receive that paper in the secretary and they sent me 
where they declared me, to the Junta where I was declared to get a certification 
because of the two [registrations]. 
 
In Yasmina’s estimation, transportation for these trips can cost up to 425 pesos, almost 10 
USD and more than a tenth of the monthly wages for someone living at the rural poverty 
line (Carneiro and Sirtaine 2017). Yasmina’s story is certainly not unique and was echoed 
by Diana, a young mother who had received her cédula when she came of legal age in 
2001. However, when she went to get a copy of her birth certificate in 2007, the JCE 
refused to grant her one and sent her to the capital when she demanded to know why her 
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request was denied. Because Diana already possessed a cédula, she had successfully 
registered three of her five children.  She estimates that between 2013 and 2015 she went 
to the Junta more than 20 times, spending an estimated total of 20,000 RD, about $444 
USD.  
While Yasmina’s story reinforces the critique of the bureaucratic system as a 
principal obstacle in individual’s efforts to gain residency and citizenship, despite her 
numerous encounters with the state she had still been unable to register her three-year-old 
daughter, thus perpetuating the cycle of the lack of documentation. When asked about her 
daughter, despite Yasmina’s struggles and efforts to gain the necessary nationality 
documents outlined above, she blamed herself for her daughter’s undocumented status: por 
mi culpa no está declarada… como no tengo documento no la puedo declarar (“by fault 
of my own she’s not declared… because I don’t have a document I can’t declare her.”) 
When it was revealed by the activists I was with that the child’s father could ensure her 
daughter’s citizenship, Yasmina assumed that this was only possible if the mother was a 
citizen: hay muchas personas que se han ofrecido declarla pero yo no quiero (“many 
people have offered to declare her but I don’t want them to”). For Yasmina and mothers in 
similar situations who often considered, were pressured into, or allowed their child to be 
declared under the name of a citizen friend or relative, came an attendant fear of losing that 
child. The child’s paternal grandmother offered to complete the declaration under her 
name, but Yasmina forbade her from doing so, refusing to give up her right to be 
acknowledged as the child’s mother. Due to recent policy changes that made 
documentation a central aspect of their lives, many turned to such strategies as a solution, 
if not for them, then for their children. Often, however, such strategies to retain a sense of 
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stability or dignity for their families had adverse consequences, as is the case with one 
woman I spoke to in Batey Euskarduna, who had fraudulently claimed that she was born 
in Haiti because she had not managed to secure any Dominican documentation.  
Under the current Dominican citizenship law, established in 2004, all mothers who 
fail to show proof of legal residency at the time of birth are directed to the foreign registry; 
however, if the father is a citizen he may register the children as such. While this policy 
was not the focus of my research, the number of violations is so high that in 2015 the think 
tank OBMICA spearheaded a public campaign to combat these violations. Although it is 
unclear how prevalent this practice is, several mothers I met during my fieldwork had 
considered having friends or family members register their children. While the burden to 
register births more frequently falls onto mothers, fathers are named as those responsible 
for the registration of children in the law (Petrozziello 2015). As the proportion of hospital 
births rose, registration centers were relocated to allow for registration on-site (Petrozziello 
2015) using the papel de la cama (literally, the bed’s paper), containing the basic 
information of the mother and child that is the primary proof of birth. This change, along 
with the widespread extralegal practice of doubting paternity claims, effectively made 
mothers responsible for the registration of their children, thereby placing the burden of 
inherited undocumented status on their shoulders. For Dominican women, especially those 
in marginalized communities, motherhood is an important social identity and provides one 
of the few opportunities for women to gain status, respect, and the possibility of financial 
security. As Dorothy Roberts (1997) argues, “[b]laming Black mothers … is a way of 
subjugating the Black race as a whole …. devaluing motherhood is particularly damaging 
to Black women …. Being a mother is considered a woman’s major social role” (10). The 
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demonization of Dominico-Haitian women’s fertility and their negative experiences during 
the birthing and registration process strip women of these social and economic benefits 
extended to mothers and which are often necessary for their survival.  
The practice of refusing declarations made by fathers further strains the family as 
it not only prevents the recognition of children’s citizenship rights but also reproduces the 
single-mother headed-household, which is demonized in popular representations of deviant 
migrant mothers noted above. Precisely because of the extralegal and discriminatory 
character of these denials of citizenship, women themselves often appear as the source or 
bearers of this problem. This gender asymmetry is reflected in the membership and 
involvement in Reconoci.do, where most attending meetings are women. Notwithstanding 
the agonies that women experience in this process, that exasperation and defeat are not the 
only emotions that women expressed. Rather, the amount of attention these longstanding 
issues had received and the organized response it engendered, have fostered renewed action 
among those affected. After years of facing the state alone, Diana reported that she feels 
she has mucha fuerza (“much force”) and that the organizations gave her ánimo (“energy”) 
to continue in a process when she felt that todo había terminado (“everything had 
finished.”)  
This shift in official citizenship policy from jus soli to jus sanguinis makes clear 
that the family is a primary site in the government’s management of national boundaries. 
Eithne Luibhéid writes that the same heteronormative logic of “reproductive futurism,” 
which foregrounds the family in its efforts to secure “particular kinds of national futures 
… justifies state interference in the sexualities, childbearing opportunities, and parenting 
by women of color, poor or disabled women, lesbians, migrant women, and others” 
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(Luibhéid 2013, 149-150). For women who are multiply marginalized in the Dominican 
state, motherhood often becomes their only avenue of encounter. The experiences outlined 
above show that hospitals and the documentary agencies contained within them adopt 
practices that withhold the possibility of being recognized as “good mothers” and, 
therefore, claiming rights and belonging through gendered notions of citizenship. Despite 
the herculean efforts some mothers make in their efforts to secure documentation for 
themselves and their families, the state’s focus on birthright citizenship as a threat to 
national security and sovereignty contributes to the demonization of women’s sexuality 
and reproduction in society at large, in their families, and in their own lives. 
Further, the shifting of the burden of documentation from fathers to mothers revives 
older forms of racialization and un-freedom, whereby the mother’s status determines that 
of her offspring. Such forms were a prominent pillar of women’s exploitation under slavery 
to simultaneously maintain black women’s sexual availability to White men and reproduce 
the slaveholding system. Moreover, this same racialized logic of belonging makes it 
possible to imagine diasporic Dominicans as citizens and Dominicans of Haitian descent 
as foreigners. The intertwining of race and nation under the ideology of mestizaje has 
provided for the extension of the national belonging vis-à-vis a retrenchment of racial 
boundaries.  
 
Conclusion   
At the core of this chapter lie concerns over the ways new configurations of 
citizenship in the Dominican Republic—both that aimed at offering a consolidated pathway 
to citizenship for some immigrants and undocumented Dominican-born residents and 
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restrictions on birthright citizenship shape the lives and identities of those targeted by these 
policies. Despite the promotion of the amnesty program and the shortened period of 
residency as a sign of the state’s recognition of the Haitian diaspora’s contribution to the 
Dominican Republic, the application process exhibited a disturbing disregard for these 
potential citizens. The long lines, incidents of abuse, and practices of discrimination and 
corruption demonstrated to applicants the limits of their rights even as law-abiding and 
authorized residents. Here, the line between legal and non-legal became blurred. Martínez 
and Wooding (2017) critique scholarly interpretations of these recent events that would see 
them as a return to the Trujillo-era atrocities against Haitian immigrants. However, their 
reading of the historical record only encompasses the massacre, not Trujillo’s efforts to 
extend the state’s power and surveillance through documentary practices, including the 
mandate to carry cédulas. Like current President Medina, Trujillo’s discourse and practices 
often promoted order and modernity including urban planning and appeals to human rights 
via the resettlement of Jewish refugees. Both then, as now, documentation is utilized to 
produce a condition of “illegality” that forces the marginalization of Haitians and 
Dominico-Haitians in lower economic sectors.  
 Moreover, the application process grounds citizenship on one’s connection to 
“true” Dominicans through marriage, community, or employment, which ignores the 
historical segregation of the Haitian diaspora in bateyes with high rates of lack of 
documentation. The conditions of extreme poverty and employer-provided housing, 
sometimes holding multiple families and generations, makes the barriers to prove 
economic contributions even more difficult for this population. The ethnographic vignettes 
supplied in this chapter promote readings of these events that contest the state’s claims to 
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the fairness and color-blindness of its laws, policies, and institutions. Equipped with this 
alternative reading, some immigrants can adopt strategies to benefit from the system, 
although they are among the few with access to higher education and/or foreign 
anthropologists.  
The other group that was largely successful in regularizing their status were the 
cañeros, who benefitted from a strongly organized labor union and who did not diverge 
from their acceptable position at the bottom of the economic scale. Reflecting on the 
number of those left out of this process, it is easy to consider it a failure. However, as a 
mechanism that both silenced much of the opposition in the international community and 
a sorting tool that did not preclude the state from making claims to the fairness and color-
blindness of the process, it could be easily rendered a success. Rather than serving as an 
invitation for undocumented persons to enjoy the rights and protections granted by law, 
this process made clear that these rights are not guaranteed but are granted at the discretion 
of authorities, especially for impoverished and racialized populations. Each of these 
narratives enrichens scholarly understanding of the ways that “illegality” intersects with 
parallel forms of oppression such as race, class, and gender.  
 New restrictions on birthright citizenship emphasize this point. The unofficial 
practice of linking children’s citizenship status to that of their mothers recalls older patterns 
of tracing racial lineage and conditions of freedom to mothers. These pressures strain 
family relationships, both between mother and child, parents, in-laws, and other family 
members trying to intervene. More importantly, they deprive mothers of the positive 
associations and strong kinship ties associated with motherhood, transforming motherhood 
into a source of grief and depression. They also marginalize fathers from the process of 
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documenting their children’s legal status in the Dominican Republic. These unofficial 
procedures, coupled with the state’s explicit efforts to target birthright citizenship as a key 
social problem, serve to demonize women and their fertility and portray them as leeches 
on state resources. Non-citizen women therefore cannot access discourses that would see 
their motherhood as a contribution to the future of the nation. In contrast, they, and their 
offspring, are rendered stateless with no clear path to citizenship. The experiences of both 
Haitian immigrants and Dominican mothers of Haitian descent illustrate the intimate 
connections between race and citizenship in the Dominican Republic as they are infused 
with gender and class. They render visible the mechanisms the state employs to render their 
claims on the state as illegitimate.    
 It remains to be seen what will come of the new registries instituted by the JCE in 
correspondence with these legal mechanisms. Considering these measures, activists have 
protested the process of transcription whereby their previous registry is voided and moved 
to the Libro de Transcripción. Anxieties about this process stem not only from the 
difficulties and confusion generated by the double-registry as described by Yanina above, 
but also arise from activists’ concerns that their segregation in the registry makes them 
legible to the state in distinct ways and therefore potential targets for specific interventions. 
Additionally, the Libro de Extranjería, where the children of undocumented persons are 
registered, generates its own set of anxieties, associated with what Donald Martin Carter 
refers to as the “revocability of the promise of the future” (1997, 196) that accompanies 
the precariousness of being labeled a foreigner. Given the roles of segregation, codification, 
and subjectification in the most recent citizenship policies, these fears are far from 
unfounded. What is clear is that new citizen subjectivities are being founded, ones not 
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based on outright exclusion, but differential inclusion, resonating with activists’ fears. 
Confirming their suspicions is the realization that “illegality,” contrary to the way it is used 
in popular discourse, is not a characteristic borne in migrants (and their descendants), but 
is created by the processes outlined above, whereby they are “stigmatized with allegations 
of opportunism, duplicity and undeservingness” (De Genova 2013, 1181). Finally, 
although the organized movements for Dominico-Haitian rights are nascent, they also arise 
out of these processes. It is precisely the targeting of birthright citizenship that has led to 
the cementation of Dominico-Haitian identity as distinct from the larger Haitian diaspora 
and made its specific needs visible. In turn, the institutional knowledge gained in these 
struggles to access rights are key to the success of activist work.  
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Tu afro no cabe en la foto 
“Your afro does not fit in the photo”  
 
On June 28, 2014, an article bearing the title Tu afro no cabe en la foto was 
published in the Spanish newspaper, El País, by the Dominican activist and artist Rita 
Indiana. The op-ed, occupying just three short paragraphs, related the story of Gisela 
Paredes, a Dominican journalist who was told that she must straighten her natural hair 
before being allowed to take the photo to renew her cédula. After gaining wide circulation, 
several women added their voices to the complaint against the JCE, citing the 
discriminatory comments made by employees of the agency when they attempted to 
procure the document. Authorities had reportedly told Gisela, Con esa greña, no hay 
cédula (“With that mop, there’s no cédula.”) Others added that they were instructed to first 
blow dry their hair straight to sit for the portrait. The requirement that women with full, 
curly heads of hair should undergo hair straightening processes to access documentation 
goes beyond officially mandated guidelines that simply require that the forehead and ears 
be visible on the photograph. 
Further, the instructions given to the women—that they return with their hair 
straightened—rather than a simple request to gather their hair suggest that to make 
individuals legible to the state, they must conform to ideals regarding racial belonging, 
represented in hair, and measured by subordination to a dominant a White racial order. 
CHAPTER 4
“YO AMO MI 
PAJON”:
NATURAL  HAIR  AND THE  NATIONAL  BODY
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This is a familiar pre-occupation for the JCE, which until 201431 determined the 
skin color categories on the cédula. Although such cases may not be new, they gained 
national and international attention in 2014, given two recent developments in racial 
politics on the island: the growth of the natural hair movement, a loose collective, mostly 
women, who promote the acceptance of afro-diasporic hairstyles; and the 2013 policies 
that denationalize Dominicans of Haitian descent.  
While not all made the connection between their treatment by the JCE and state-
based policies of discrimination, some saw the obstacles to cedulación as another 
manifestation of the denial of citizenship rights—either legal or cultural—to Black 
Dominicans. Although the disenfranchisement of Dominico-Haitians reached the highest 
levels of government, it too had started with the refusal of the JCE to emit documents to 
the descendants of Haitians, often identified by the color of their skin alone.  
The screen print appearing below documents these incidents to audiences in New 
York and Santo Domingo. Figure 6 appeared in the exhibition titled “Consequential 
Translations”, which framed New York as a diasporic space where Dominicans and 
Haitians can bridge racial, ethnic, and national difference. The print features a light-skinned 
woman with visible African features, whose large afro takes up most of the print’s space. 
Below a frame in which the woman’s face barely fits is the same phrase from the El País 
article.  
The massive proportion and asymmetry of the woman’s afro are in direct 
contradiction with the same white square that fails to contain it. In contrast to the manicured 
                                            
31 In the 2014 redesign of the document, the color category was eliminated.  
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round shapes of the afros from the 1960s/1970s era, the woman in the screen print has hair 
that grows freely in all directions, paying homage to, but suggesting a break from, the 
militant discipline of previous generations and disciplined beauty practices.  
The determination that natural haired women “do not fit” reinforces a limited vision 
of the national body that excludes cultural and aesthetic representations of blackness. The 
rejection the afro as an appropriate national image is a refusal to recognize the place of the 
afro as a representation of Black politics and identity within the national body. Its 
regulation also reflects its power and potential danger to uproot a White supremacist 
political order.  
 
Figure 6 Alex Guerrero. Tu afro no cabe en la foto, 2015 Screen print. 22” x 30”. 
http://www.laluchaoneisland.com/alex-guerrero?lightbox=dataItem-iq863e3v, accessed September 28. 
2016.  
In this chapter, I examine the radical potential of the afro in the contemporary 
Dominican space, given the ways that Afro-textured hair is coded as Haitian in the 
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Dominican Republic. To that end, I examine how the afro destabilizes the boundaries 
between blackness and the ideal citizen with attention to whether and how the afro can be 
read as embodied resistance. Given the virtual absence of an anti-racist, Black social 
movement in the Dominican Republic (see Simmons 2009), the natural hair movement 
offers the opportunity to explore how the efforts of ordinary Dominicans to navigate 
blackness may create spaces for Haitian belonging. An examination of the natural hair 
movement acts as a bridge, linking the concerns of Dominico-Haitian activists with those 
of other groups who promote Black identity.   
 
Race, Beauty, and Hair    
Mary Douglas’s Natural Symbols (1970[1996]) is the primary anthropological text 
to situate the body as a socially determined site where cultural meanings can be read. 
Douglas argues that bodily presentations communicate symbols which are “restricted by 
the demands of the social system” (76) reflecting sites of social struggle. Pierre Bourdieu 
(1979[2010]) applied this approach to the study of class, developing the concept of habitus 
to index the ways class identity is embodied including aesthetic choice, posture, and 
mannerisms. Michel Foucault’s development of the concept of biopower (1979) situates 
bodies not just as sites to be read, but as key agents in the execution of the governmentality 
of populations.  
     Approaches to beauty cultures, relevant to the present analysis, have drawn on the 
concept of biopower to examine how female bodies are disciplined and women often make 
extreme efforts at “self-improvement” to meet beauty norms (Bordo 1993; Nichter and 
Nichter 1991; Wolf 1991). Beauty ideals are tied to social functions such as work, 
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reproduction, and the production of women’s subordination. The central preoccupation of 
this literature is the location of agency in women’s beauty cultures. Therefore, these works 
make practices of resistance and refusal more visible than in Foucault’s original 
articulation of biopower, insisting that women employ embodied strategies in ways that 
challenge and derive benefit from dominant systems of power.  
 Scholarship on beauty pageants return to the question of governmentality, focusing 
on the judgment and performance of beauty as a public spectacle. Pageants are civic events 
where elites crown queens who represent the “ideal female citizen,” conforming to race 
and gender standards (Banet-Weiser 1999; Craig 2002; Rahier 1998). At the same time, 
they increasingly are avenues for women to stake a claim to civic life through the public 
communication of career and public aspirations (Banet-Weiser 1999) and can be a critical 
tool for communicating new racial, national, ethnic, and gender aspirations. This work has 
documented that beauty ideals are indispensable to the national imaginary by offering 
public displays to which citizens can aspire.   
 Black feminist scholars have made significant contributions to this scholarship, 
particularly emphasizing racialized aesthetics. Focusing on physical attributes such as hair, 
shade, nose and body shape, they have sought to locate the origins and effects of a beauty 
ideal that preclude Black bodies. As in earlier work on women and beauty, this literature 
has gradually moved from an examination of the ways that Black women reproduce and 
internalize their domination by ascribing to these ideals and are making efforts to recognize 
and make visible distinct modes of agency (see Banks 2000; Mercer 1987; Tate 2009).  
 The work on hair in the Black community has followed this pattern of moving its 
focus from internalized oppression to a more attentive examination of hair as it reflects 
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domination and resistance. Hair straightening practices date back to slavery, when women 
used oils and plant resins to modify the texture of their hair (de Sá Dias et al. 2007, 2).  
Black communities in the the Americas and Europe still designate hair as “good” and “bad” 
and have high rates of hair straightening and relaxation. Alongside shade, skin color, and 
nose shape, these works have examined the racist origins and negative effects of “good 
hair” and “bad hair” designations (Collins 1990[2009]; hooks 1993). Efforts to de-
psychologize choices over haircare have placed more emphasis on how women navigate 
embodied strategies of accommodation and resistance. Therefore, this work rejects the 
unproductive line of questioning that places the burden of representation on women by 
claiming that hair straightening is a manifestation of self-hatred and portrays women as 
acting on the knowledge of a system that values whiteness. Instead, scholars evaluate these 
choices in the context of a multitude of strategies, some aimed at self-care and others at 
navigating racially hostile environments such as the workplace.  
Kobena Mercer (1987) argues that hair straightening must be understood as 
historically situated. Straightening practices took on new connotations after the rise of the 
afro during the 1960s. In the “post-liberated” era of hair that succeeded the afro, Black 
hairstyling cannot be read as a mimicry of the White cultural form (which has been 
dethroned with the validation of the Black aesthetic) but should be seen “as creative 
responses to the experience of oppression and dispassion” (34) that include a variety of 
elements to form “new configurations of cultural expression” (51). Three decades after the 
publication of “Black hair/style politics,” hair straightening continues to be popular among 
African diaspora communities as one option among a repertoire of “authentic” African 
American styles (Banks 2000; Tate 2009). As women of color whose bodies are regulated 
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from all sides, choice becomes empowering whether between straight or natural styles 
(Banks 2000, 74). Therefore, “authentic” Black hair culture is an inherently hybrid culture 
that embraces mixture.  
Natural hair has received far less attention beyond the 1960s/1970s Black power 
politics of the afro (Weekes 1997). Once a potent symbol of rejection of White supremacy, 
the afro has since become a fashion, devoid of any real connection to revolutionary politics 
(Davis 1994; Morrison 2006; Walker 2000). The contemporary revival of natural hair in 
the United States appears to follow the trend toward commercialization over politics (Byrd 
and Tharps 2014).   
 Previous discussions of Dominican hair have all addressed the relationship between 
hair and the acceptance/denial of blackness. The most thorough of these is Gerald Murray 
and Marina Ortiz’s 2012 study of the role of the salon in Dominican culture. This 
investigation challenges what the authors see as a discourse demonizing Dominican racism, 
identifying several myths within the existing scholarship that uncritically denigrate 
Dominican racial formations. Further, they disavow the role of racism in promoting desire 
for straight hair, arguing that the popularity of hair straightening is due to its ability to make 
hair more manageable.   
 While Ginetta Candelario’s 2007 study dwelt on the Dominican diaspora in the US, 
it can be extended to the relationship between race and beauty in Dominican culture. 
Candelario’s work focused less on the actual practices of haircare and more broadly on 
racial aesthetics and attitudes among the workers and customers of the establishment where 
she conducted her fieldwork in New York City. She challenges the tendency to evaluate 
Dominican racial configurations within a Black/White binary found in the US, supplanting 
 107 
the binary for a tripartite model that privileges a mixed-race aesthetic. Dominicans, she 
argues, do not simply mimic a European racial aesthetic, but adopt the national racial 
construction of mestizaje. This assertion adds complexity to Cassandra Badillo’s (2001) 
short discussion of natural hair. Badillo also challenges the idea that hair straightening 
changes one’s racial identity, insisting that its major function is to signal acceptance of a 
system of white supremacy. To this date, no scholarship has seriously considered the 
potential role of the natural hair movement to pose a challenge to a racialized aesthetic that 
devalues blackness.  
Social science research on beauty, and especially hair, provides ample evidence 
that bodily aesthetics can both reflect and resist domination. Women’s bodies are enmeshed 
in discourses of power articulated through bodily aesthetics, given the Cartesian division 
of women into the realm of the body and men into the realm of the mind. Beyond gender 
relations, the representations of women’s bodies are implicated in the construction of the 
ideal citizen, which is also classed and raced. Few have studied the significance of hair in 
determining racial/social hierarchies in the Dominican Republic. However, the scholarship 
based on US and British contexts provides a useful starting point for considering agency 
in Dominican haircare practices that emanate from within distinct racial classification 
systems. Further, at a historical juncture where citizenship is being redefined and 
reexamined in the public sphere due to the publicized policies regarding Dominicans of 
Haitian descent, challenging the dominant racialized aesthetic in the Dominican Republic 
carries with it the potential to challenge exclusionary nationalism.  
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“They Say Dominicans Do the Best Hair”: Straightening as Slavery 
In her seminal book on Dominican racial identity, Candelario (2007) argues that 
hair texture, not skin color, is the primary racial identifier in the Dominican Republic. She 
is not alone in arguing that hair is a palimpsest on which society’s racial ideologies can be 
read. Hair is often privileged in everyday conversations about blackness because hair is 
“the most tangible sign of racial difference” (Mercer 2013, 101). Unlike skin color, hair 
texture is more readily manipulated, making it a powerful tool for examining the effects of 
racial ideologies. Murray and Ortiz (2012) describe Dominican society as a pelocracia 
(literally, a government based on hair), given the central role of hair in determining social 
position and the declining importance of skin color (9). Their 2012 study on hair salons 
found that their numbers rival that of colmados, the ubiquitous Dominican corner stores, 
with only 10,000 fewer beauty salons, totaling around 55,000 establishments with 150,000 
employees. There are no available statistics on the prevalence of hair straightening in the 
Dominican Republic, but it is a widespread global phenomenon. An estimated 80 percent 
of African American women have chemically straightened their hair at some point, along 
with 49.2 percent of black women in Cape Town, South Africa. In a 2007 study, 59 percent 
of African American women had relaxed hair (Aryiku et al. 2015, 1692). At an event about 
the politics of natural hair in Santo Domingo, one woman who spoke estimated that 
“98.99999… percent” of Dominican women straighten their hair. 
Haircare is also an important economic factor in the lives of Dominican women. 
Women spend between 10 and 12 percent of their gross income on haircare. Those who 
earn more, invest more in these services and products (Murray and Ortiz 2012). A Listín 
Diario article published in 1998 and cited in Candelario (2012) claimed that women spent 
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up to 30 percent of their income on haircare services (185). Women who wear straightened 
or relaxed hair, or hair with extensions, can spend anywhere between $30 and $80 USD 
per month, depending on whether they purchase their own products and the frequency of 
their visits, which can be up to twice a week (Murray and Ortiz 2012). These services are 
not limited to the wealthy sectors, but women at all socioeconomic levels are expected to 
visit the salon to cultivate socially accepted hair styles. It is a common practice that women 
rely on a romantic partner to pay for costly salon services (Saunders 2013), given that only 
half of all Dominican women participate in the paid labor force (Lugo 2012).  
Salon visits also require a significant investment of time. It is common for women 
to form queues at salons at 9 AM, most of which do not accept appointments, and not leave 
the salon until the late afternoon. The day before a major holiday or on the weekend is 
especially busy with waits extending up to four hours and treatments lasting a minimum of 
two hours for a wash, setting in rollers, and blow dry. Straight hair styles are typically 
accomplished by applying chemicals or heat, both of which can be painful and traumatic 
processes. This is especially true for young women whose first experience with hair 
straightening is often for a special occasion, such as a communion or primary school 
graduation, instilling in them the idea that natural hairstyles are inappropriate in such 
venues. The salon plays such an integral role in women’s lives that most never wash their 
hair at home, given the difficulties of reproducing “aesthetically acceptable” styles without 
the aid of an expert (Murray and Ortiz 2012, 116).   
Many women are enculturated into this beauty culture that emphasizes straight hair 
at a young age. bell hook’s (1993) narrative of her experience with hair straightening as a 
child shows it as a social practice that, while both painful and traumatic, facilitates bonding 
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and sharing between generations of women. Although some Dominicans have naturally 
straight hair, it appeared as if most didn’t. Beyond my own observations, during 
intermittent rains, strangers and friends were often concerned about my naturally straight 
hair getting wet, assuming that it had been blow-dryed straight. In another instance, at a 
community event in Los Mina, three young girls from 7-9 years old were especially curious 
about my hair and one girl cautiously stroked it. Some Dominican girls begin hair 
straightening as early as four (Rodríguez G. 2007), often for a special occasion, cementing 
straightened hair’s hold on idealized standards of beauty. However, young women’s hair 
is less closely regulated and Minerva, an interdisciplinary artist in her early 30s, told me 
that as a girl, she was not conscious of her hair, despite being the only member of her family 
with curls. Later in life, her decision to wear her hair natural posed professional and 
educational barriers.  
 The thermal and chemical methods of straightening are both damaging to hair. With 
the thermal method, an oil protectant is first applied and the hair is brushed and blow-dried 
straight, often set in large curlers and dried under a hood dryer or passed through an electric 
flat iron. Chemical methods, often called relaxers, cause more permanent damage to hair 
as they employ alkaline agents to penetrate and break down the keratin complex in the hair 
shaft (de Sá Dias 2007, 4). The application of these chemicals is frequently painful, causing 
a burning sensation on the scalp. If used improperly, they can cause permanent scarring to 
the skin. Regular hair straightening carries several other medical consequences and has 
been linked to long-term hair loss, dandruff, and alopecia (Aryiku et al. 2015, 1694). Given 
the potential dangers associated with these substances, women are obligated to seek 
professional services. For critics of hair straightening, evidence of its damaging effects 
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bolsters their claims that women are victims. Eva, a Reconoci.do member, describes the 
multiple burdens of hair straightening: 
Después de que yo terminé el bachillerato y mi graduación, fui y mi desricé y dije 
a poco no vuelvo. Veo que cuando yo me lavo la cabeza y veo que mi crecimiento 
sigue igualito. Entonces pa’ tu desrizarte … tanto dinero … y el tiempo que tú 
pasas, y el dolor de cabeza que te da, y ya, en los quince días tú tienes que volver. 
Es una esclavitud. 
 
After I finished high school and my graduation, I went and I straightened my hair 
and I said, I won’t come for a bit. I see that when I wash my hair and I see that my 
growth comes out the same. So, for you to straighten … so much money … and the 
time it takes, and the headache that it gives you and, fifteen day later you have to 
go back. That’s slavery.32 
 
Slavery is a useful metaphor that captures the relationship between the exacting pressures 
of hair straightening and a White supremacist racial order. This statement places these 
practices firmly within a system of racial oppression, invalidating interpretations of hair 
straightening that place the practice outside of dominant White supremacist structures and 
consequently pathologizing women who partake in the practice.  
When not in the salon, women with straightened hair take steps to maintain the 
style, sporting tubis and satin head wraps to prevent disturbing their hair and to preserve 
its natural oils. Women who manage their haircare at home or in a friend’s house, a 
minority, often wear their hair piled on their head in rolos (curlers) to help set their 
straightened styles. During the Dominican summers, a concern is the frequent Caribbean 
downpours that threaten to undo straight hair dos. Unexpected showers often force women 
to run for cover, wrap their heads in plastic, and be trapped inside to avoid another trip to 
the salon. These measures to protect straightened hair are not only economic 
                                            
32 Author’s interview in Santo Domingo, March 20, 2016.  
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considerations, but reflect the fear women have of appearing in public with their natural 
hair textures.  
A popular saying warns male suitors that they should not marry a woman before 
taking her to the beach (Murray and Ortiz 2012, 2) because when in contact with water, 
straightened hair regains most of its former structure. This anecdote contributes to social 
pressures to “marry well,” with appropriate partners resulting in potentially lighter skinned 
children. It also suggests that women straighten their hair to deceive others by occupying 
a higher social position than that to which they would otherwise be relegated. Further, this 
anecdote suggests that hair is an important factor in the selection of potential partners. One 
natural hair blogger shared a story in which she canceled a date because she could not get 
an appointment at the salon in time. “I panicked thinking that he would know my real hair,” 
she wrote (Féliz 2014).  
Women’s fears extend beyond the potential loss of a romantic partner to include 
the fear of violence. Natural hair often carries racialized connotations of poverty, as 
mentioned above, and rebelliousness. In the Dominican context, blackness, and natural hair 
in particular, communicate immorality, indecency, and criminality. Beauty itself 
“remain[s] deeply enmeshed in questions of morality” and the refusal to meet beauty ideals 
represents an “aesthetic danger” (Brand 2000, xiv). In a 2007 article in Diario Libre, the 
popular roots singer Xiomara Fortuna reported that she no longer used public transportation 
due to the constant harassment she was subjected to: Me preguntan si acabo de salir de 
prisión. La gente simplemente no quiere que se vea esa imagen (“They ask me if I was just 
released from prison. People simply don’t want to see that image”) (Diario Libre, 13 June, 
2007). Unlike Fortuna, whose middle-class position allows her to avoid the social stigma 
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women experience because of their hair choices, most Dominican women cannot afford to 
avoid such public spaces where they may encounter verbal or physical violence.   
 During the discussion after an event on the history of natural hair in Santo 
Domingo, a young woman said she was assumed to be muy ligera, “very loose,” and was 
subject to frequent harassment by men in the street. Carmen, a local independent journalist 
and activist, told me:  
Tener el pelo natural es como tú estas mala... Hay hombres que le’ gustan a las 
mujeres que tienen el pelo natural por el mito que viene desde siglos que utiliza a 
la mujer negra como una mujer de uso. A mí me han dicho: “¡Ay! ¡Ese cabello! 
¡Yo te quiero agarrar!” A mí me lo dicen. 
 
Having natural hair is like being bad…There are men who like women who have 
natural hair for the centuries old myth that utilizes the woman as a woman to be 
used. They have said to me, “Ay! That hair! I want to grab you!” They say that to 
me.33 
 
Carmen’s reference to a centuries-old myth: the colonial dichotomy between White 
women’s purity and Black women constructed as “immodest and as exuding an animal 
sensuality” (Tate 2007, 301), an extension of slave-era relations where Black women’s 
bodies were considered the property of white men. These associations are exacerbated for 
women who are already criminalized or discriminated against for their Haitian ancestry.  
 
Men’s Hair 
In patriarchal society, women’s beauty standards are more restrictive than men’s. 
However, men in the Dominican context are expected to maintain short hair, considered as 
more professional. Men pay significantly less for professional haircare, about $8 US for 
                                            
33 Author’s interview Santo Domingo, April 10, 2016.  
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these services, including a shave and visit to the barber bi-weekly, depending on their rate 
of growth. Men with straight, wavy hair and loose curls have more freedom to wear their 
hair a bit longer. Carmen became especially interested in the racial implications of men’s 
hair after a college professor reprimanded her college-aged son and demanded that he cut 
his hair: y no solamente a él, a todos los muchachos que tienen trenzas, se las mandó a 
cortar (“and not just him, to all the boys who have braids, she sent them to get a haircut.”) 
During our interview, she pulled out her notebook to read a quote she had recorded from a 
young classmate of hers. When she asked him why he kept his hair so short, he claimed 
that the style cleared his face. He went on to clarify: La frente se me ve muy negra cuando 
tengo el pelo largo, y no es que me avergüenza el color (“My forehead looks very Black 
when my hair is long, and it’s not that I’m ashamed of my color.”) The youth’s comments 
highlight the relationship between hair and perceptions of color, while they reject an 
interpretation that he is practicing self-hatred.  
Carmen was struck by the way he disavowed the connection between his hair 
choices and race. However, this young man’s experience is not uncommon. Often, choices 
about bodily presentation and care are not considered to be political. Many women whom 
I spoke to did not see their preferences as having any significance beyond their own 
personal inclinations. They especially did not see the role of race in these choices. 
Therefore, they allow for a different relationship toward blackness to be formed by 
appreciating and valuing Black hair while not focusing on a politics of identity. While as a 
political strategy, it runs the danger of depoliticizing the Black body, it also has the 
potential to undermine the Dominican system of racial classification. Hair also presents an 
irrefutable, undeniable truth of remaining connections to blackness, despite genealogical 
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and nationalist revisions that try to place blackness securely in the past or abroad. It also 
offers a point of identification between Haitians and Dominicans across national and ethnic 
barriers, although much work remains to be done here.  
Boys and men with longer Afro-textured hair often face harassment by the police. 
An activist living in a marginalized barrio in the national district reported that there, young 
men with these hairstyles were regularly identified as criminals and thieves, and arrested. 
David, who was visiting his mother after moving abroad, told me that he was arrested 
thirteen times for various crimes he did not commit because his dark skin and short dreads 
were associated with criminality. On one occasion, David recalled, he was threatened with 
deportation because authorities accused him of being Haitian, linking pelo malo to 
Haitians. Authorities requested that he accurately roll his rs before releasing him.  
These moral connotations are pronounced in the categorization of hair as pelo 
bueno (good hair) or pelo malo (bad hair). In her analysis of the same terms, Candelario 
(2007) defines these terms, writing, “There are clearly racial connotations to each category: 
the notion of pelo malo implies an outright denigration of African-origin hair textures, 
while pelo bueno exalts European, Asian, and indigenous-origin hair textures” (182). 
Murray and Ortiz (2012) define pelo malo as “the curly hair characteristic of individuals 
of African descent” and pelo bueno as “straight hair, inheritance of not only Caucasians 
that brought those as slaves, but also other genotypes, including Asians and the already 
decimated Taíno Indians” (4). Murray and Ortiz use this latter definition to argue that 
straight hair is not an aesthetic tied to whiteness alone but represents a wide spectrum that 
includes, but is not exclusive to, North America and Europe. They extend Candelario’s 
argument that Dominicans demonstrate a strong preference for a mixed-race aesthetic 
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beyond a White/Black binary. However, they fail to examine the societal demands that 
require straight hair styles to navigate everyday life in the Dominican Republic. Pelo 
malo/pelo bueno represents the dominant narrative around hair straightening practices on 
the island that divorces them from questions of race and power. Natural hair advocates, 
however, are working to challenge this discourse.   
 
Institutionalizing Straight Hair  
Dominican media continues to play a significant role in privileging straight hair 
and light skin. In 2013, Yaritza Reyes, who competes with natural hair and openly 
celebrates her African heritage, won the Miss Dominican Republic beauty contest. Before 
her crowning, few television shows or magazines featured women who did not have 
straight hair—either natural or processed. In recent years, beauty magazines, films, and 
commercials have increasingly featured dark-skinned women with abundant curls. Yaritza 
played a supporting role in a popular Dominican comedy film, Tubérculo Gourmet (2015), 
alongside a natural-haired actress who played her sister.  
Although natural hair is increasingly represented in popular media from the La 
Sirena department store catalog to Banco Popular commercials, traditional African 
hairstyles and textures remain taboo in public offices, places of employment, and schools. 
Such hairstyles are deemed inappropriate and unprofessional, especially for women 
working in white-collar occupations. Therefore, those who do not abide by normative 
expectations of beauty suffer very real consequences that block their access to public 
services and the material benefits they provide. Despite having signed various international 
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accords aimed at eliminating racial discrimination, Dominican public and private 
institutions are rarely held accountable for these widespread practices of discrimination. 
Often, schools and employers utilize policies such as a dress code and the concept 
of buena presencia (literally, “presentability”) to justify the exclusion of Afro-descendant 
people from work and educational spaces. Feminized service positions in tourism or 
customer support frequently place more scrutiny on women’s appearance. In an article on 
the nature of discrimination in the Dominican Republic, one interviewee observed, “most 
of the secretaries and receptionists are white” (Rumbo 1995, 10). A female student 
supported this claim highlighting how buena presencia is used to exclude racially 
undesirable applicants from certain economic sectors:  
Hay áreas … como la comunicación, los servicios a clientes, el turismo y otras áreas 
comerciales, donde el prejuicio tiene más peso porque las empresas buscan por lo 
regular personas con “buena presencia,” entendiéndose por buena presencia que 
tenga la tez clara, rasgos caucásicos y pelo lacio, nunca rizo. Creo que las mujeres 
lo sentimos mucho más porque con los hombres la sociedad es más benévola en ese 
sentido.  
 
 
There are areas … like communication, customer service, tourism and other 
commercial sectors where prejudice has more weight because the businesses 
regularly look for people with “good presence”, understanding that for good 
presence one must have light skin, Caucasian features, and straight hair, never 
curly. I believe the women feel it much more because with men, society is more 
benevolent in that sense (Rumbo 1995, 10).  
 
In her work among Brazilians and Puerto Ricans in New Jersey, Ana Y. Ramos-Zayas 
(2012) suggests that the practices of “self-care” implicit in the requirement that employees 
embody “good presence” should be viewed as more than vanity or luxury, but “among 
young women of color, these were also aspects of “upkeeping” that were central to getting 
a job” (220). As public positions in customer-facing professional and administrative 
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sectors, positions that are often occupied by women, the racialized aesthetics of these fields 
are highly scrutinized. Employment in the service industry offers a means of class mobility 
for women with little experience and education. As the service and tourism sector expand, 
barring women of color from these positions is increasingly detrimental to their economic 
futures.  
In a 2013 television interview on the program Ser Humano, five women recalled 
experiences of discrimination on the streets and in the workplace. When offered 
employment at a company, a woman featured on the program was told that she had to 
straighten her hair to work for the marketing company. Unemployed at the time, she 
reluctantly straightened her hair after one year of abstaining from straighteners. The 
company never contacted her again and after having several unsuccessful job interviews, 
she began to suspect that she was not being hired because of her natural hair (Ser 
HumanoTV 2013). Most women, however, only suspect that obstacles to finding 
employment are due to their natural hair because they are never told expressly that it is the 
reason they were not hired.  
 
Education  
“En nuestras escuelas, tú no puedes ir con el pelo afro. En nuestras instituciones 
tú no puedes estar con el pelo afro. Si es no es racismo, ¿qué diablo es?” (“In our schools 
you can’t attend with afro-hair. In our institutions, you can’t be there with afro-hair. If 
that’s not racism, what devil is it?) Rafael, a young Dominican rapper whom I met 
performing at an event about racism, posed this rhetorical question. He wore his hair in 
long dreadlocks that almost reached his waist. Rafael articulated the difficulty of talking 
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about racial issues in Dominican society. Many Dominicans deny the existence of racism 
in the country, reasoning that there is no systematic effort to segregate and oppress darker-
skinned Dominicans. While acknowledging the existence of prejudice, the Dominican 
Republic comes out ahead when compared to the United States as legal race-based 
regulations have been uncommon in the Caribbean country. However, the recent visibility 
of cases barring children from school for wearing natural hair has led some to question the 
role of public institutions in promoting racism. In addition, the racial implications of la 
sentencia 168-13—discussed before—has raised troubling legal questions about the 
racialized mistreatment of Haitian immigrants and their descendants.  
Young women experience discrimination at all educational levels where they are 
shut out of classes and exams for their hair. Rosa, a young college student who was not of 
Haitian descent but considered herself an ally, recalled her struggles to wear her hair in 
natural styles at multiple points in her high school career. In her second year of high school, 
the director and the psychologist urged her to change her natural hair style: 
no fue permitido mi pajón porque no era lacio ni estaba recogido. Entonces, cuando 
yo estaba en tercero, de bachiller, yo aún así, llevaba las trenzas. En primer lugar, 
me botaron, a mí me dejaron fuera [del aula] … y yo le dije que no me podían sacar 
de la escuela por mi forma de peinado y la directora dijo que había una circular del 
Ministerio de Educación que prohibía ese tipo de peinado en los centros educativos 
… Cuando yo le solicité a ella que por favor me dejara leer la circular delMinisterio 
de Educación ella me dijo que no. 
 
my afro wasn’t permitted because it was neither straight or gathered. So, when I 
was in my third year, of high school, I was still like that, I wore braids. In the first 
place, they kicked me out and left me outside [of the classroom] … and I told her 
that they couldn’t take me out of school because of my hairstyle and the director 
said that there was a memo from the Ministry of Education that prohibited that type 
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of hair in the educational centers … When I asked that she please let me read the 
memo from the Ministry of Education, she told me no.34 
 
Without evidence of an official policy, school authorities repeatedly pressured Rosa to 
change her hair. Further, the director’s justification of the rule by citing the Ministry of 
Education as the source of the policy intended to impress on Rosa that her hair was not 
only deemed inappropriate by the individuals at her school, but at the level of the state. 
Rosa attributed her ability to stand up for her rights to her parents, who always instilled her 
with self-confidence.  
 At the university level, Alicia, a Dominican of Haitian descent who struggled for 
years to secure the proper documentation to study, recalled that on the second day of 
Spanish class, she was so humiliated by the professor for her braided hair that she 
unenrolled from the course. In front of more than 50 of her classmates, the professor told 
her, Te ves tan ridícula con ese cabello. ¡Pero qué fea! ¡Qué ridícula! … Eso te queda muy 
ridículo. Tú te ves muy fea. (“You look so ridiculous with that hair. But how ugly! How 
ridiculous! That looks ridiculous on you. You look very ugly.”)35 Alicia responded by 
saying, Si no le gusta mi cabello eso es problema suyo, eso no es problema mío. Lo 
importante es que yo me sienta bien con ello. (“If you don’t like my hair that’s your 
problem, it’s not my problem. What’s important is that I feel good about it.”) Although she 
defended herself in that moment, asserting that her hair style was more than about beauty 
validated by outsiders, but about a personal pride and confidence, Alicia could not return 
to the class that she had worked so hard to enroll in. She assumed that she could never get 
                                            
34 Interview in Santo Domingo, March 9, 2016.  
35 Interview in Santo Domingo, March 16, 2016. 
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a fair grade from a professor who would make these remarks. Alicia never reported the 
incident to the school administration, reasoning that it would just brush it off. If someone 
had attacked her physically, she explained, there would be a response, but the institution 
regularly dismissed verbal attacks such as the one she experienced. 
 Recalling her own experiences at work and in school, Minerva reflected that she 
never had issues with her abundant, curly hair before she experienced discrimination within 
these institutions. Although she visited the salon at times, she did not feel that straightening 
her hair was obligatory. She considered it one among a variety of styles she could adopt at 
any time. Although her family accepted her preference, once she enrolled in an elite 
Catholic school she ran into problems and was prevented from attending classes until she 
straightened her hair. She describes that episode in her life as muy violento (“very violent”), 
and realized that realmente, ese pelo significaba algo (“really, that hair meant something.”) 
Later in life, at a job in a prominent art museum, she was told that her form of dress was 
inappropriate. Minerva knew that this meant her hair, finding that her dress conformed with 
the code she was given. She was fired shortly after that and although she was never told it 
was because of her hair, she continues to suspect that was the reason.   
 Hairstyle is especially important in regulating labor and education because it 
communicates obedience to the dominant norms of society. Failing to straighten one’s 
Afro-textured hair signals resistance and rebelliousness, traits not desired in the highly 
structured settings of the school and workplace. More than communicate the racial desires 
of its wearer, “in order to find a job and/or acceptance in social circles, circles that in some 
manner exert authoritarian control, women need to show their submission and acceptance” 
(Badillo 2001, 38). Therefore, Badillo argues, straightening often represents one’s 
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willingness to stand down to racial and gender-based oppression and accept racial 
hierarchies as valid, if not natural. Moreover, the experiences of the women related above 
demonstrate how public and private institutions police natural hair.  The preoccupation 
over natural hair further demonstrates its potential to challenge existing power relations 
because women’s rejecting such racialized beauty standards poses a challenge to both 
racial and patriarchal sources of oppression. Although the experiences of the women 
related here focus on those who challenge discriminatory practices, they reveal the difficult 
social and economic conditions that structure women’s haircare choices in the Dominican 
Republic.  
 
Roots of Resistance  
In July 2016, protests erupted over the discriminatory comments of the Minister of 
Higher Education in Science and Technology to a student whom she reportedly told, no le 
doy becas a personas que tengan pelo como tú … Soy anticuada (“I don’t give scholarships 
to people like you … I’m old-fashioned.”)36 As a government employee charged with 
judging the suitability of students to represent the nation abroad, the minister may have felt 
that the woman’s natural hair would incite a negative perception of the country, given that 
those bearing such hairstyles are considered less intelligent and unprofessional in the 
Dominican Republic. The scholarship sought by the student was for study in Spain. 
Perhaps, given the foundation of Dominican culture in Hispanicism, sending a natural-
haired representative of the nation to the “Mother Country” would undermine the state’s 
                                            
36 Account by student Fátima González Méndez (Nicky) reported in a letter drafted by activists sent via 
email communication August 8, 2016.  
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practice of distancing itself from blackness. Furthermore, the minister’s classification of 
her position as anticuada both situates her attitude within a long tradition of resistance to 
Afro-diasporic visibility in the public sphere and acknowledges the modernizing impulse 
that has ushered in the recent transformations in Black aesthetic practices and identity.  
 What originated as a Facebook post describing the incident Nicky González wrote, 
so that quede constancia que ella es una racista (“there is a record that she is a racist”), 
benefited from the support of a growing coalition of activists and individuals organized 
around the issue of natural hair. Within days, the post was shared over 5,000 times and 
received over 7,000 “likes” by those supporting the political science student. A small group 
of protesters, mostly women representing a variety of skin colors from light to dark-
skinned, gathered outside the Ministry of Education’s offices on August 11, 2016 and 
chanted:  
Tenga cuidado que en esta isla, ya no podemos seguir siéndonos racistas. Tu 
herencia afro hoy reivindica, saca e’ tu mente el fascista que te habita. Sal a la calle, 
ponte la’ pila’ y la violencia no dejes que se repita. 
 
Be careful because on this island, we can no longer remain racists. Your African 
heritage demands today, rid your mind of the fascist that inhabits you. Go out in 
the street, get animated, and don’t let the violence repeat itself.  
 
Several of those in attendance were members of various social movements in the country 
with representatives from organizations focusing on labor, feminist, and Haitian diaspora 
issues.  
A letter cataloging the demands of the protestors addressed to the minister, her 
immediate supervisor, and the president sought that educational curriculum be revised to 
prevent future generations from reproducing the same racist system. Twenty-six 
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organizations and 186 citizens signed in support of the complaint, which called for the 
inclusion of an anti-racist perspective, critical perspectives on colonialism, the 
visibilization of the struggles of Afro-descendants and maroons, and more diverse 
representations in textbooks, reflecting the diversidad del fenotipo dominicano (“the 
diversity of the Dominican phenotype.”) The letter argued that the educational system itself 
was responsible for perpetuating racism.  
The letter also links these discriminatory practices to the practice of barring 
undocumented children, mostly poor, Black, and of Haitian descent, from public schools, 
thereby linking codes of dress and appearance to broader systems of racism and 
xenophobia. Many of the interviewees’ experiences recounted in this chapter affirm the 
connections between natural hair and anti-Haitian stigma, suggesting that the widespread 
adoption of natural hair may help destabilize the divisions between Dominicans and 
Haitians and the associations among blackness, savagery, and criminality. Furthermore, 
racism is framed here not as an individual, but as a structural and institutional problem. 
The broad connections that these protesters make between the rejection of a cultural politics 
of Black hair and anti-Haitian policies demonstrate the potential of these issues to mobilize 
and represent a broad coalition of activists around race, gender, ethnic, and migration 
issues.  
 
The Dominican Natural Hair Movement  
What exactly constitutes natural hair is unclear. While it is sometimes used 
exclusively to describe hair that is free of all chemicals and dyes, more broadly it is used 
for hair that is free of chemical relaxers or any process that alters the texture of the hair. 
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Therefore, many experiment with color, chemically derived, and synthetic hair. The growth 
of the natural hair movement is noted in a footnote in Murray and Ortiz’s Pelo malo/pelo 
bueno: 
Existe en el país una corriente de mujeres de pelo muy rizo que lo lleva 
orgullosamente “natural” (así entre comillas, pues para que luzca “hermosamente 
nautral” deben ponerse tratamientos especiales que muchas veces solo pueden 
obtener en el salon). La mujer que lleva el pelo rizo suele ser de clase media alta, 
segura de sí misma, con cierto nivel educativo y de ideas socio-políticas liberales, 
y muchas veces con sentido artistico. (Hay otros casos en que se trata de simple 
pereza o falta de dinero) .… Sin embargo, representa una corriente minoritaria 
dentreo de una cultura estética que valorize, casi de manera dictorial, el pelo lacio. 
 
 
In the country, there is a trend of women with very curly hair who wear it very 
proudly “natural” (in quotes, because to look “beautifully natural” they should use 
special treatments that much of the time they can only get in the salon). The woman 
who has curly hair is usually from the upper-middle class, sure of herself, with a 
certain level of education and liberal socio-political ideas, and much of the time 
with an artistic side. (There are other cases in which it is simply a matter of laziness 
or lack of money) .… In any case, it represents a minority faction within an aesthetic 
culture that valorizes, almost in a dictatorial manner, straight hair (2012, 10).  
 
Despite Murray and Ortiz’s dismissive tone when describing the natural hair community, 
since the completion of their study, the natural hair movement has rapidly expanded. The 
year 2012 saw the aperture of the first hair salon in Santo Domingo dedicated solely to 
natural hair, Go Natural Caribe (Grassals 2014), with a second natural-hair salon, Miss 
Rizos, opening in 2014 and moving into a bigger location in 2016. At least every other 
month, local members of the natural hair movement, largely entrepreneurs, organize public 
gatherings in the capital.  
 During the natural hair events I attended in Santo Domingo and the surrounding 
area, the demographics of the attendees confirmed Murray and Ortiz’s characterization of 
the constituency of the movement. Women I spoke to worked in liberal politics, media, and 
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medicine, among other middle and upper-middle class professions. While many of their 
activities involved the promotion and sale of products, they also served as networking and 
social opportunities.  
 These events provide important spaces for women who face the types of 
institutional discrimination described above, along with harassment by strangers and 
family members alike. For women in the Dominican Republic, as in many other places, 
gratuitous comments about their appearance are almost ubiquitous. In my interviews with 
women who wore their hair natural, every single one recounted experiences of harassment, 
either in the street, in the salon, or within their families. Women were regularly called loca, 
haitiana, greñuda, and escoba (literally, crazy, Haitian, hairy, and broom), among other 
derogatory names. As Carolina said in her SerHumano TV appearance, Yo caminando en 
la calle, la gente me mira y me llama “haitiana,” y para mí, no me importa que me llamen 
así pero sé que lo hacen con una intención de ofenderme (“When I walk down the street, 
people look at me and they call me ‘Haitian,’and, for me, it doesn’t matter but I know they 
do it with the intention of offending me.”) Therefore, Carolina makes clear her rejection of 
negative associations with Haitians.  
When first deciding to stop straightening her hair, Eva went to the salon after five 
months of growth and the hairdresser assumed she had returned to desrizar (uncurl) it. 
Leaving with only a trim, she said that her decision to stop straightening surprised many. 
She traveled abroad shortly after and received many compliments on her hair. She 
welcomed the positive reactions, still sensitive about the way she looked. She explained, 
En mi país, no lo ven así (“in my country, they don’t see it like that.”)  
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Bloggers describe “going natural” as a process whereby women must eliminate any 
hair that has been chemically altered and learn new approaches that do not significantly 
alter the hair’s structure. Although many people have never chemically straightened their 
hair, bloggers generally assume that most going natural have hair that has been transformed 
and/or damaged by excessive application of these chemicals and/or heat, given the 
predominance of these practices. There are generally two different paths to “going natural”: 
transition and el gran corte, or “big chop,” both involving cutting off the hair that has been 
altered by straightening.  However, those who opt for the “big chop” have not gone through 
a period of letting their hair grow out (without straightening) beforehand.   
As indicated by the gerund tense in the phrase “going natural,” it is framed as an 
ongoing process. Dominican Republic-based social media groups offering support to 
persons transitioning to natural hair document this process by posting updates at varying 
intervals of the style and length of members’ hair three months, six months, and a year after 
adopting the natural hair style. Much like sobriety tokens in Alcoholics Anonymous, one’s 
hair length and health offer evidence of one’s daily struggle to resist the pressures to 
straighten. Thus, “going natural” is not a temporary decision, but a long-term and 
permanent process which marks a definitive break from “unnatural” hair, or as one 
hairdresser in a natural hair salon put it, el pelo que no te pertenece a ti, “the hair that 
doesn’t belongs to you.” She turned from the client she was working on and explained that 
if her client, who was dark-skinned with tightly coiled hair, exchanged her hair with my 
straight, fine hair, we would both look “wrong,” suggesting that it would not match our 
phenotype. However, the distinction between “natural” and “unnatural” hair was far from 
an absolute dichotomy. Although naturalistas (naturalists) are expected to maintain a 
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commitment to not straightening their hair, dyeing and adding extensions are generally 
accepted as forms of creativity and expression. “Natural” hair, therefore, was framed as 
communicating one’s racial truth by not masking the hair as a marker of race.  
In the face of the regular harassment and discrimination that women experience, 
entrepreneurs/activists have emerged to provide services and support for the growing 
natural hair community in the Dominican Republic. The most prominent and vocal 
speakers on this subject, like Carolina Contreras (Miss Rizos) and Evelin Guerrera 
(Quisqueya Natural), got their start through social media that offered practical advice for 
caring for natural hair, emotional support and guidance, and product reviews and 
endorsements. Two of these social media sites have converted their virtual following into 
full-service salons (Go Natural Caribe and Miss Rizos), both located in high-end sectors of 
the capital district. One of these salons was designed intentionally as a place to support 
women’s choice to wear their hair in natural styles.  The owner of one of these spaces is 
involved in training her staff and instructing guests to avoid negative and disrespectful 
comments, including a jar into which those caught using terms such as pelo malo, must pay 
a penalty. On her visit, Eva described the space as cozy, de uno mismo, “of one’s self,” 
given that the clientele who frequent these spaces tend to share similar aesthetic and 
political views.  
When I inquired whether I could sit and observe in preparation for an interview 
with the proprietor, she denied my request. While I was welcome to partake in the salon’s 
services, she explained, she did not want her clients, who have limited spaces to enjoy these 
services free of judgment and scrutiny, to feel as if they were being observed. Although I 
did not insist, I suspect that being a non-Dominican born with straight fine hair would 
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exacerbate the issues the owner saw with my presence in the salon. Clients already lived 
in a context where images of a light-skinned Latina with straight hair were the norm they 
were constantly pressured to emulate.  
Women’s decisions to “go natural” vary by reason, including economic and health 
concerns. These reasons can transform over the process as events in women’s lives change 
their meaning and needs from their hair and haircare regimen. In over 300 responses to the 
question posted on the Miss Rizos Facebook page (May 24, 2016), ¿Por qué regresaste a 
tu cabello natural?  most women cited health concerns and lack of time to go to the salon 
as the top reasons why they returned to their natural hair. Less than 5 percent of the 
respondents cited racial pride or consciousness as a primary factor. This is not to say that 
race was not among the concerns that women expressed or that an individual’s 
understanding of these practices could not change over time.  
Eva’s initial decision to stop straightening her hair was motivated by the financial 
burden of frequent salon visits and the detrimental health impact of the chemical 
straightening process. It was only later, as she increasingly became involved in social issues 
that she began to associate natural hair with racial identity: Ahora ya no la veo como una 
decisión económica pero una forma también de uno aceptarte como uno es. Mientra’ yo 
iba viendo en cada reunión, cada cosa, la identidad de uno y lo cultural …” (“Now I don’t 
see it not as an economic decision but also as a form of accepting oneself as they are. At 
the same time, I was seeing in every meeting, everything, one’s identity and the cultural 
….”) Therefore, in Eva’s case, the physical and economic burden of haircare, alongside a 
growing consciousness gained through overtly political and cultural activities, led her to 
frame her haircare practices within the terms of racial pride. At an event on the politics of 
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the afro, the consensus was that natural hair was only a significant act of resistance if it 
was worn by those with an awareness of its potential meaning. While most in the audience 
found the increased visibility of the style to be positive, it could not be categorized as 
revolutionary.  
While Eva complained about the prohibitive pricing of natural hair salons, with the 
most affordable service at one salon costing 500 pesos37 (~11 USD), Eva admitted that as 
spaces designed to serve the natural hair community, salons offer a refuge from what is 
often a hostile public atmosphere for persons who maintain natural hair styles. Salons also 
serve as spaces in which women can confidently ask questions and seek advice about how 
to care for their Afro-textured hair, given the dominance of the straightening culture. Often 
excluded from traditional hair salons that promote straightening and relaxing treatments, 
events and spaces created specifically for those with natural hair offer important 
alternatives for socializing among women. Eva said that she regularly experienced negative 
comments in the salon, where customer and employees alike would openly talk about how 
“bad” and “hard” her hair was. More than its utilitarian function, the salon is a social space 
where women gather to talk about a wide range of topics and “reaffirm their personal worth 
beyond their roles as mothers, wives and lovers, and workers” (Candelario 2007, 208). 
Therefore, the salon can be a therapeutic space (Black 2006) where women are validated 
and make community. Natural hair salons work at providing an alternative space where 
women of color can continue to build these relationships without fear of rejection. This is 
particularly significant for Dominican women who are accustomed to visiting the salon 
                                            
37 Cost of a wash, deep treatment, and detoxification or twists at Miss Rizos Salon. Source: 
https://www.missrizos.com/el-salon/.  
 131 
frequently. Freedom from the burden of salons that straighten hair is one of the advantages 
touted by those who wear their hair unprocessed. In addition, social media sites offer virtual 
spaces for creating female-to-female relationships. I am aware of at least six groups based 
in the Dominican Republic and, as of 2014, the blog Miss Rizos claimed at least 40,000 
followers. Eva admits that today, the popularity of natural hair makes the transition process 
easier than it was for her when she decided to “go natural” seven years earlier: 
Ahora … no sé si es por la moda dique del afro y eso, pero el tiempo en que yo dejé 
de desrizarme la gente me veía difícil. Todo el mundo se ponía a murmurar. Incluso, 
lo que no hacían que yo me desrizaba era de que darme dinero pa’ ir a desrizarme. 
En el segundo día que yo no me desricé estaba todo el mundo, “Mira, yo te voy a 
dar tanto para que tú vayas y te desrice’ ese pelo. Porque está muy feo.” 
 
Now … I don’t know if it’s because the fashion of the afro as they say and all that, 
but at the time that I stopped straightening the people looked at me hard. Everyone 
began to whisper. Including what they hadn’t done when I straightened my hair was 
they gave me money so that I would go straighten my hair. The second day that I 
didn’t straighten the whole would was like, “Look, I’m going to give you this much 
[money] so that you can go and straighten your hair. Because it’s ugly.”38 
 
The social space and sense of community helped Eva through the years come to terms with 
her transition. Her pride in her appearance, one that visibilizes her African heritage, has 
also helped her claim her Haitian heritage with pride, and she claims to no longer feel 
offended by people tell her she looks Haitian, tengo que parecerme haitiana, “I have to 
look Haitian,” she said, because her parents were born there. Here, Eva makes clear the 
connections that tether Haitianess, hair, and blackness.  
Given the difficulties women face in school and the workplace when sporting un-
straightened Afro-textured hair, it is no surprise that the natural hair movement is largely 
                                            
38 Interview in Santo Domingo, March 20, 2016. 
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led by middle- and upper-class women who exercise significantly more economic options 
than lower-class women. The services at the salon are also pricier given that women 
frequent them far less than they do the traditional salons. A wash at a traditional salon costs 
around 150 pesos, about $3 USD, and the most popular natural hair salon charges more 
than three times that much. Both Eva and Alicia complained about how expensive the salon 
services were and treated their visits to the natural hair salon as a rare, but special occasion. 
Although many impoverished women cannot afford to straighten their hair, few 
understand their haircare choices as political as many women at the forefront of the natural 
hair movement. Instead, unstraightened hair is often a marker of poverty and women are 
frequently offered money by acquaintances and strangers who assume their decision not to 
straighten their hair is due to economic constraints. Similarly, due to the practice of 
racializing Haitians as Black and poor, those with natural hair were regularly called 
“Haitian” in the street, often used more as an attempt to insult than an effort to accurately 
identify them. During the incident with the professor, Alicia, a university student and 
Dominican of Haitian descent activist, was told that only haitianas de la orilla (a pejorative 
term for Haitians in the Dominican Republic) wore their hair in braids. Unsure as to exactly 
what this meant, Alicia speculated that the professor was referring to the most marginalized 
and poor Haitians. Alicia does consider natural hair to be part of Haitian culture, although 
many Dominican women adopt the style.  
Although Alicia, Carmen, and Rosa all criticized the natural hair movement for 
being more concerned with fashion than politics, Eva only gained the confidence to wear 
natural styles after it had become popular to do so. The same reluctance she felt when 
revealing her Francophone last name was transferred to her hair, which also marked her as 
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Haitian. She first began to straighten her hair at thirteen but began to feel the stigma of 
natural hair when she left the batey to move to the city. In the batey, it was common to see 
people with natural hair. Once in Santo Domingo, she realized that no one in the church or 
university she attended wore their hair in natural styles. Despite wanting to abstain from 
straightening, she thought, Si yo dejo de desrizarme, ¿cómo me voy a ver? Imagínate, yo, 
negra y pobrecita … y no. (“If I stop straightening, how am I going to look? Imagine, me, 
Black and poor … and no.”) They all perceived participation in the natural hair movement 
as requiring expensive treatments or attendance at gatherings in far or middle-class places 
such as Boca Chica or Mirador Sur. These were spaces less accessible to working class 
women.  
 
The Potential Politics of the Pajón  
One of the most prominent natural hair advocates in the Dominican Republic, 
Carolina Contreras, who has appeared in dozens of international and international venues 
including The New York Times, Al Jazeera, Latina, and Cosmopolitan, told one 
interviewer: 
I feel so indebted to these kinks and curls for making it easier for me to talk about 
something that’s often uncomfortable and intimidating to discuss. The truth is that 
many people don’t want to hear about the Diaspora, being Black, Africa, etc. but if 
you can capture their attention through a conversation about hair, if you empower 
them by teaching them how to care for something they were taught to hate, then we 
can talk about our blackness and what that means (Dawson 2014).  
 
Like the protesters who organized in support of Nicky Gónzalez, Carolina frames hair as a 
vehicle to move forward conversations about race and the African heritage. However, 
unlike the protesters, she rejects the method of public protests, chants, and slogans, finding 
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them less effective means than the alternatives provided by hair care. In an interview at her 
salon, she argued:  
it’s an easier vehicle and channel to talk about these things because it’s fun and 
because it’s aesthetics initially and we’re not like, it’s not harsh, and it’s not like 
in-your-face and I think that oftentimes when we do have those kinds of activisms 
like the “Black is beautiful” and “Black power,” not to say that they weren’t 
successful, they’re not important in history and where we are now, but I feel like 
they’re not necessarily the way to go now because I think that people shy away 
from those terms or from that approach. It’s like saying Black is beautiful or saying 
Black power is like almost preaching to the choir. Usually the people who respond 
to that are people who are already empowered, people who already acknowledge 
that they’re Black. You can’t go into a community where people don’t like 
blackness and be like “Yo, Black is beautiful” and they’re like … ”Okay, I’m not 
Black, I’m not Black, what you talkin’ about?” So, it’s like oh, yo amo mi pajón or 
talk about curls and it just makes it a lot easier.39 
 
Carolina’s insistence that “Black is beautiful” is a less useful tool than a discourse about 
self-care and self-love stems from a recognition that the phrase has less to do with bodies 
and more about promoting Black consciousness. This philosophy intimates a sharp 
awareness, gained from experience as an activist, that the most effective means of 
resistance are embedded in daily life (Scott 1990). For Carolina and others in the natural 
hair movement, the materiality of the body made it more recognizable as a site that reflected 
society’s anti-Black prejudice.  
 . The owner of the nation’s first natural hair salon saw her role not as promoting 
natural hair as the only option but expanding women’s choices. By not enforcing a rigid 
Black aesthetics, this iteration of the natural hair movement allows for the integration of 
blackness within dominant conceptions of mixed race identity (mestizaje) in the Dominican 
                                            
39 Interview in Santo Domingo, June 9, 2015.  
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Republic. Therefore, it creates a space in which African inheritance is located in the body 
and is appreciated and nurtured:  
hoy día ya sea por moda o por cambio de estilo de vida, mucha gente se ha abierto 
a la idea de llevar su cabello natural sin complejos y afortunadamente a la par se 
han diseñado productos para nuestro tipo de pelo que nos ayudan no solo a llevar 
el cabello natural, pero también a llevarlo de una manera hermosa y cuidado. 
Siento que las mujeres también estaban ya cansadas de solo tener la opción de 
llevar el cabello alaciado, pasando por todos los procesos que ofrece un salón 
convencional; ahora existen más posibilidades, ya sea que quieras arreglar el 
cabello en casa o que quieras ir a un salón donde sabes que la oferta no sólo se 
limita a químicos para alisar. 
 
today whether it be fashion or change of lifestyle, many people have been open to 
the idea of wearing their natural hair unapologetic and fortunately alongside this 
they have designed products for our type of hair that help us not only to have 
natural hair, but also to wear it in a beautiful way and take care of it. I feel that 
women also were tired of only having the option of wearing the straightened hair, 
going through all the processes that a conventional salon offers, there are now 
more possibilities whether you want to fix your hair at home or you want to go to 
a salon where you know that the menu is not only limited to chemicals to 
straighten (personal communication March 30, 2015).  
 
The salon owner asserts that expanded choices for women of color give them more control 
over how they represent their bodies. In her view, multiplying women’s options is more 
empowering than merely replacing a White aesthetics with a Black aesthetics.  
By activating a collective of people who share their stories of transition to natural 
hair, stories where discrimination and intolerance often play a significant role, this 
community reveals that widespread refusal of natural hair manifests the effects of racism 
made invisible by the ideology of racial democracy in the Dominican Republic. Burnt, 
brittle, dry hair, and scars from chemical burns wrought by the straightening process are 
tangible representations of the deleterious effects of beauty ideals that devalue Afro-
textured hair. Some describe their break from the cycle of straightening as escaping 
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enslavement to straightening their hair, referring to the frequent need to visit the salon and 
the disproportionate burden placed on Black women to submit to harmful and painful 
chemical processes. Alicia identified the prevalence of natural hair among Haitian 
communities as emerging from a stronger self-esteem among Haitians than among 
Dominicans. In Haiti, she speculated, you could go out with your natural hair and no one 
would say anything to you; no one would look at you strangely, pero aquí no, she said of 
the Dominican context. If you entered a space with your hair mal arreglado (in disarray), 
they would look at you up and down. That is why Dominican women are obligated to go 
to the salon, while Haitians are not, se arreglan en el patio, (“they do their hair on the 
patio”), she stated.  
Inherent to the promotion of an aesthetics of the pajón is the necessary challenge 
to the dominance of the racialized ideal of pelo malo as it reinscribes this hair as worthy of 
the same types of nourishment and skilled care as straight hair. The politics of the pajón, 
celebrated in proportion with its size, the bigger the better, also poses a challenge to a 
discourse that characterize Black women’s hair as in need of management and control and, 
by association, women themselves. By not framing women’s haircare choices as an 
explicitly political act, Carolina is also providing a space for women to define how to read 
their own bodies, thereby fostering a sense of control over their image within a patriarchal 
system, in which women’s bodies are frequently utilized to meet the needs of men. In this 
space, women can choose to join their body in the collective of an Afro-Dominican politics 
or an individual politics of self-love. To be sure, even within these spaces, and especially 
outside them, one cannot control the myriad ways that one’s body is read. Even as she tries 
to open up a space for women’s control and is careful not to frame haircare choices as 
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moral choices, a political commitment to combating anti-Black racism informs Carolina’s 
motivations. For her, the increasing visibility of natural hair is directly related to a 
recognition of the contributions, presence, and values of Afro-descendants in the 
Dominican Republic and the wider Latin American context in which she works.  
 However, framing these choices as individual ones and minimizing their broader 
social significance, runs the danger of destabilizing the types of collective mobilization 
that is necessary to create political change. The idea that the body only represents personal 
choice is an illusion because the body “can never be a struggle free zone” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992, 40). Framing the body outside of the political produces a limited 
interpretation of the behaviors of women who straighten their hair, suggesting that it is a 
matter of individual psychology more than widespread economic, social, and emotional 
sanctions that affect women who abstain from hair straightening.   
One prominent local activist and journalist involved in a wide range of pro-
immigrant, anti-racist, and feminist organizations was wary of these social entrepreneurs. 
Although she participated widely in conferences and even helped organize a November 
2015 conference titled El sentido político del “afro”: La experiencia de la activista 
afroamericana Angela Davis, Carmen refused invitations to collaborate with the 
proprietors of these salons, none of whom attended the event she helped organize. She told 
me:  
A mí me estaban invitando. Ellas han tratado todos los espacios que hay sobre la 
temática afro … las mujeres de los salones esos. Yo me he cuidado porque yo no 
quisiera … porque en una actividad que es social, se relacione con algo comercial 
porque detrás de los salones hay una gente que se está beneficiando del problema. 
Para mí es como mover el problema del salón que te pone blanca, como el pelo liso, 
mover el problema a un salón que dice que te mantiene afro pero detrás de eso, aún 
siendo afro, hay un mercado. 
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They were inviting me. They have addresses all the spaces that there are on the 
afro- subject … the women from those salons. I’ve been cautious because I didn’t 
want to … in a social activity, relate it to something commercial because behind 
those salons are people who are benefitting from the problem. For me, it’s like 
moving the problem from the salon that makes you white, like straight hair, move 
the problem to a salon that says that it will keep you afro but behind that, staying 
afro, there’s a market.  
 
Carmen rejected the premise that such businesses could be serving the needs of women. 
She went so far as to call them racist because they continued to promote the idea that 
women needed to invest a significant amount of financial and emotional resources in their 
physical appearance. Statements such as these reflect a preoccupation with the possibility 
that natural hair promoters were simply replacing a White beauty ideal with a Black one 
(Tate 2009). Alicia echoed these doubts and saw the natural hair movement as producing 
its own limiting ideas about beauty. The idea of a salon to treat natural hair was 
contradictory for her. Natural haircare was such because it could be performed at home as 
it had been for centuries. The salons dedicated to natural hair communicated to her that 
one’s natural hair was accepted, pero ¿en qué forma? (“in what form?”) These salons 
advertised that they maintained natural hair, ¿pero como tú quieras? No. Hay un prototipo. 
Esos salones nos están marcando un prototipo… algo estandarizado.” (“How you want it? 
No. There’s a prototype. Those salons are marking a prototype for us … something 
standardized.”) She found more freedom in the Haitian tradition of hairstyling, which 
included a larger diversity of styles.  
For Carmen, these natural hair advocates did not fully accept their blackness, por 
eso insisten que te hace tanta vaina (“That’s why they insist that you do so many things to 
yourself.”) She read the tutorials, product trials, and services they offered as means of 
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transforming blackness in ways that were more acceptable in a racist society. Y hay algunos 
que se lo tiñen de rubio (“And there are some who dye their hair blond,”), she told me. 
Solamente lo pueden tener natural si lo tiñen de rubio. Entonces, son manifestaciones del 
racismo (“They can only have it natural if they dye it blond. So, they are manifestations of 
racism.”) These comments indicate how anti-racist aesthetics can impose its own 
“normalized racializing standards” (Tate 2007, 306) that reproduce forms of exclusion. 
Carmen’s comments refer to the focus on fashion, self-improvement, and beauty that 
natural hair communities continue to promote. She is upset by the standards that were 
continually imposed in these settings and championed instead the idea that the body should 
be appreciated for its humanity rather than its aesthetic appeal.    
In her comments, Carmen draws on a feminist critique of beauty standards as 
oppressive. Beauty occupies so many of women’s resources and its continued prominence 
does little to challenge the relegation of women to the realm of the body. She criticized the 
natural hair movement’s creation of networks of support, understanding that real liberation 
comes from the personal conviction that one’s body is beautiful. Shirley Tate (2009) 
suggests that beauty cannot exist without this recognition; beauty “after all is not just there. 
Beauty must be worked on and worked up. Beauty must be touched, felt, seen and 
recognized” (25). Therefore, the construction of beauty is an inherently social practice. 
Natural haircare recognizes the “work on and worked up” aspects of beauty but strives to 
transform the audiences that matter when evaluating Black women’s beauty, precisely 
through the centering of the like-minded community that Carmen criticizes.  
However, at the natural hair events I attended, the women in attendance largely 
appeared to be happy and confident, outwardly demonstrating little of the pressures to 
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conform Carmen describes in her critique of the movement. To be sure, tutorials and 
product sales were prominent features of these events, promising to enhance women’s 
natural beauty. In addition to these messages of self-improvement. The two public natural 
hair events I attended were also significantly different, suggesting the diversity of natural 
hair spaces. The first event, organized as a white party for which attendees were instructed 
to dress in white clothing, was held in an upscale beachfront restaurant in Boca Chica, a 
site about a half hour bus ride outside Santo Domingo, known for its robust sexual tourism 
economy (see Cabezas 2009; Gregory 2014). Certainly, the event’s location and dress code 
created a more rarified atmosphere which may support Carmen’s criticsms.  
By contrast, an event held a few months later in July was organized in a public park, 
albeit in a middle-class neighborhood of Santo Domingo, drawing significantly more 
attendees than the one held at the hotel. The organizer, Miss Rizos, sought volunteers to 
publicly undergo el gran corte “the big chop,” a very close-cropped cut that would 
eliminate all processed hair. More than spectacle, several women crowded around the 
woman to offer support. The contradictions are inherent in beauty as a double-edged sword, 
“as capable of destabilizing rigid conventions and behavioral models as it is of reinforcing 
them” (Brand 2000, xv). The contrasts between these two events serve to challenge the 
dualism that Carmen attributes to the movement, showing more complexity.  
 
Conclusion: Splitting Hairs  
The natural hair movement has made strides to challenge the traditional dominance 
of straightening in the Dominican Republic. Against the hegemonic discourse that 
separates these practices from racial politics, the experiences of those who dare to wear 
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their hair natural illustrate the danger natural hair poses to the dominant system of race 
relations. Precisely because of the racialization of Afro-textured hair, its increased visibility 
carries the potential of dismantling the structure of racist discrimination by eroding its 
connotations with criminality, depravity, and barbarity. Aesthetics are not marginal 
political concerns but central to struggle; “[i]n a revolution, the established body ideal is 
one of the first things to be overturned or redefined in favor of a more ideologically 
appropriate replacement” (Reischer and Koo 2004, 308).  
 Social theorists have argued that the power of an embodied, performative resistance 
is often more impactful than purely discursive acts (Butler 1990; Scott 1990). Some, like 
Miss Rizos, see the potential of a politics of the pajón as key to combatting racial injustice 
in the Dominican context, where a discourse of racial justice and Black identity are 
typically absent from the national public conversation. This perspective rejects the limits 
of the recognizable national subjectivities by preferring an embodied politics over one of 
identity. Mercer maintains that pride is a “prerequisite for a politics of resistance and 
reconstruction” (1987, 36). Therefore, while a small step, the natural hair movement has 
potential to spawn a sense of ownership and pride over the physical inheritance of 
blackness. The question is whether this pride, if not articulated as explicitly Black pride, 
will be able to erect a bridge to include persons of Haitian descent.  
 Others argue that natural hair’s true subversive potential is only possible with a 
strong political basis. This perspective was forwarded at the roundtable El sentido político 
del “afro”: La experiencia de la activista afroamericana Angela Davis. However, all the 
theoretical foundation for the conversation utilized the work of US-based scholars 
operating within the context of the “one-drop rule,” whereby any amount of African blood 
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places you within the Black identity category. By contrast, Angela Davis, at the center of 
the talk, would exercise significant skin color privilege as a racially mixed person, if she 
were located in the Dominican context. Like Carmen, this academic group criticizes the 
natural hair movement’s lack of political and theoretical foundation. However, their 
politics founded on international discourses parallels the critique that dominant hairstyles 
in the Dominican Republic are basados en una imagen que no encaja [con] lo que somos 
(“based on an image that does not fit what we are”) (personal communication, March 30, 
2015).  
In her examination of the role of resistance in quotidian haircare practices among 
US women, Rose Weitz suggests a narrower conceptualization of resistance to evaluate the 
liberatory potential of practices. To qualify as resistance, practices must meet two 
requirements: reject subordination and challenge the ideologies that support it (Weitz 2001, 
607). In these terms, the natural hair movement in the Dominican Republic today clearly 
meets the first requirement as it rejects the privileging of straight hair. It is clear that for 
the moment, some women participating in the natural hair movement do conceive of their 
practice as challenging ideologies. Given the recent conversion of natural hair into moda 
(fashion), many see the most eminent danger to its radical potential as its appropriation by 
dominant culture. Aware of the ways the afro became devoid of its revolutionary 
significance in the US, it remains unclear whether the adoption of the afro by controversial 
pop culture figures such as “Amara la Negra” (the Dominican-American celebrity) strips 
its potential to urge a reconsideration of blackness.  
In contast, Carolina, the woman behind Miss Rizos did not find the 
commercialization of natural hair to be a danger. She was proud to be an entrepreneur 
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whose work was recognized and compensated within a system that prioritizes capitalist 
accumulation; she acted on the belief that capitalism and consumerism were “linked to the 
elevation of a racial identity” (Thomas 2004, 251), representing accommodation within a 
capitalist system of racial oppression. Limiting access to the language of natural hair may 
also promote a dynamic whereby those with the freedom to utilize Black cultural symbols 
are the most economically secure, blocking access to the anti-racist cultural symbols often 
utilized by Haitian diaspora organizations. 
The radical potential of the natural hair movement lies in its ability to make racism 
visible as the collectivities organized around it work together to challenge practices of 
racial discrimination, particularly as they occur in state institutions. Its member’s bodies 
serve as clear representations of Africa’s presence in the Dominican Republic, a presence 
erased from the nation’s history and landscape. This appeal to Africa provides a potential 
bridge to the nation’s Haitian community, often discriminated for their proximity to 
blackness. However, the commercialization of natural hair may create cleavages between 
various kinds of blackness, such as those already existing in the color taxonomy often used 
in the country and those associated with national identities—either US or Dominican. 
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Somos un país sin rostro (“We’re a country without a face”), Yesenia told me. By 
the time of our interview at the end of my fieldwork in 2016, statements like this one that 
highlight the diversity of “Dominican looks” had become familiar. For many Dominicans, 
the seemingly infinite variety of racial and ethnic markers from hair and skin color; eye, 
nose, and mouth shape; and hair texture is a point of pride. This pride extends beyond the 
anxieties over protecting Dominican culture and autonomy in the face of Haitian 
immigration, tourism, and transnational Dominicans. Rather, like Yesenia, many 
Dominicans celebrate the central role of racial and ethnic mixture as a progressive element 
of their national identity. Moreover, racial mixture (mestizaje) has been key to the 
formation of national identity in the post-colonial period in the Dominican Republic and 
the wider Latin American region. 
To be sure, this notion that a Dominican phenotype is undefinable transcended the 
tight-knit activist circles in which Yesenia was enmeshed, reflecting the nationwide 
acceptance of mestizaje as a founding racial myth of the Republic. This perspective was 
shared in a panel as part of Afrodescendencia Fest, a series of presentations and 
performances organized to commemorate the 1796 slave uprising at the Nigua plantation 
in San Cristóbal province. The first of these October 2016 events, a panel titled 
“Perspective on the Material and Immaterial Patrimony of Afro-Descent in the Dominican 
Republic,” consisted of academics and public officials exhorting the public to recognize 
CHAPTER 5
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and preserve various elements of the African cultural heritage, from archaeological sites to 
religious practices. Except for the organizer, a serious middle-aged man who always 
dressed in the crisp whites of Santería initiates, none of the invited speakers would be 
considered Black by Dominican standards.  
The penultimate speaker, a 40s-ish professor from a northeastern US college, used 
the greater part of her allotted time to speak on the remarkable spectrum of Dominican 
phenotypes, listing a series of surprising combinations, such as rubio, con ojos chinos y 
piel morena; morena con ojos azules y pelo crespo (“blond, with Asiatic eyes and brown 
skin; brown with blue eyes and curly hair.”) She argued that only through the recognition 
and appreciation of this multiplicity can the exclusion, silence, and erasure that have 
marked Dominican politics in the last several years be challenged.  
As the woman concluded her presentation, I could see Ernesto, a café con leche-
colored bohemian who I frequently ran into at the events, shake his head. He leaned over 
and muttered, Nuestro problema es no reconocer que somos negros (“Our problem is not 
recognizing that we are Black.”) He repeated this concern in the discussion following the 
panel, eliciting a resounding applause from the crowd, mostly the typical cadre of 
intellectuals, students, artists, and activists who frequented the center’s events.  
For Ernesto, the complicated phenotypical taxonomy that persists in the Dominican 
Republic fundamentally negates blackness. He is part of a growing group of Dominicans 
who are skeptical of the utility of multicultural politics for assuring racial equality. Conflict 
over whether the multiracial nationalism expressed in Yesenia’s optimism regarding un 
país sin rostro, and Ernesto’s skepticism about the motivations of multiple skin color 
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labels, represent the broader range of positions adopted by contemporary anti-racist 
activists in the Dominican Republic and beyond.   
This chapter examines official narratives around mixture, blackness, and 
indigeneity in the Dominican Republic. As this project is primarily concerned with the role 
of race in determining access to nationality for Dominicans of Haitian descent and 
citizenship rights, I examine how the state has promoted different racial narratives at 
distinct historical junctures via two key public documents: the census and national identity 
cards or, cédulas. These narratives themselves show that not all Dominicans internalize the 
state’s racial divisions and hierarchies. However, an understanding of the state’s efforts to 
shape national racial identity vis-à-vis these documents is essential to understanding how 
activists, the state, and ordinary Dominicans envision an anti-racist future. Building on 
previous chapters which have focused on the ways blackness and Haitianess are co-
articulated in the Dominican Republic, this discussion elaborates on the ways 
understandings of race are produced at the national level (via identity documents and 
censuses) and contested at the transnational level (via US-influenced representations of 
blackness). My analysis suggests that Dominicans of Haitian descent are transcending the 
limits of national racial ideologies through appeal to transnational racial representations.   
 
Mestizaje and National Identity 
 
Ernesto’s and others’ skepticism about the potential for an anti-racist movement 
informed by narratives of mixture is well founded. Since before the founding of the 
republic, Dominicans have constructed themselves as mixed-race, adopting the ideology 
of mestizaje that continues to inform Dominicans’ individual racial identity and their 
 147 
understanding of the racial composition of their nation (Martínez-Vergne 2005). Therefore, 
Ernesto joins others who find that mestizaje so far, has not generated the racial harmony 
promised by its progenitors. Here, I use mestizaje to discuss the foundational idea that 
exists in the Dominican Republic and other Latin American countries populations are of 
mixed race origin. I do so to interrogate how activists negotiate Black identities.40  
Various Latin American intellectual elites, including Simón Bolívar and José Martí 
in the 19th century, promoted mestizaje as a racial ideology founding a unified national 
identity vis-à-vis racial and cultural miscegenation (de la Fuente 2001; Miller 2004). 
Although the mestizaje discourse recognizes the three central racial roots of the region’s 
populations (African, Indian, and European), the African element is marginalized in 
official racial representations (Hernández 2013; Martínez-Echazábal 1998). Developed as 
a model to counter the colonial racial order, which rendered most of its subjects incapable 
of self-governance, mestizaje provided the central scaffolding for early progressive 
formulations of sovereignty and citizenship in the region during the early 20th century. 
In the Dominican Republic, one of the nation’s founding fathers, Juan Pablo Duarte 
(1813-1876), exemplified this ideology in the 1844 poem El Criollo:   
Los blancos, morenos,  
Cobrizos, cruzados,  
Marchando serenos,  
Unidos y osados,  
La Patria salvemos  
De viles tiranos  
Y al mundo mostremos  
Que somos hermanos. 
 
                                            
40 While this chapter focuses on racial mixture, mestizaje is often used to discuss cultural hybridity as well. 
Mesitzaje is similar to the term creolization but the former is used most often in the scholarship on Latin 
America.   
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The whites, morenos, 
Copper, crossed,  
Marching serene,  
United and bold, 
The nation we save 
From vile tyrants 
And show to the world 
That we are brothers.41 
 
In the title of this poem, which serves as a call to the cause of independence, Duarte centers 
on the figure of the criollo, like himself, the American-born descendant of Spaniards. That 
is, while acknowledging the central role of morenos and cobrizos in the independence 
struggle against Spain, Duarte imagines the criollo as the ideal national figure.  
In this moment, Duarte secures a place in the canon of 19th-century Hispanophile 
Dominican literature, which aims to “produce a sovereign nation while simultaneously 
appeasing criollo colonial desire to retain whiteness and European cultural dominance” 
(García Peña 2016, 25). Yet, this gesture is not to be mistaken as analogous to the Spanish 
colonizers Duarte was mobilizing against. The criollo is both a national and racial figure 
that incorporates blancos, cobrizos, and morenos, representing the European, indigenous, 
and Black populations that predominate on the island. Through the advancement of the 
process of mestizaje, as the Mexican philosopher, José Vasconcelos later conceived it, a 
unique race would eventually arise from crossracial contact that would unite Whites, 
Asians (referred to by Vasconcelos as Mongols), Blacks, and indigenous persons 
(Vasconcelos 1997[1925]). Similar visions of racial mixture served as the foundation for 
                                            
41 Quoted in Durán (2013, 45). See also Mayes (2014, 22).  
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most of the independence struggles in the region in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
However, as reflected in Duarte’s usage of moreno42 in place of negro, effectively diluting 
the role of the African population, blackness rarely occupied equal places to whiteness in 
the national imaginary.    
 
Mixed Race Scholarship  
In contrast to Ernesto’s skepticism regarding the mixed-race vision of Duarte and 
other early independence leaders, much of the scholarship on race in Latin America has 
celebrated mestizaje as a model of racial equity (see Bergad 2007; Degler 1986[1971]; 
Harris 1964; Hoetink 1971[1967]; Skidmore 1993[1974]). To the US and Western 
European scholars who dominated the field, the rhetoric of inclusion and celebration of 
mixture was markedly distinct from formal policies of racial discrimination and 
segregation in the global north. These scholars pointed to the comparatively low levels of 
racial segregation, frequency of intimate interracial unions, and the porosity of categories 
to further their arguments that Latin American and Caribbean societies were non-racist. 
This wave of research represents what Jean Rahier (2003) calls the scholarly fetishization 
with notions of hybridity that “tends to obfuscate the oppressive ideological realities” of 
Latin American racial formation (42).  
Despite the differences between mestizaje and US and European racial systems 
dictated by hypodescent and limpieza de sangre, scholars often failed to examine the 
continuities between post-independence racial construction and the colonial system. A new 
                                            
42 Moreno derives from the Spanish word for “moor.” It is used in the Dominican Republic to describe a 
person with dark skin (López 2015).  
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wave of scholarship inspired by growing anti-racist social movements emerged in the 
1980s, offering a more critical examination of the links between mestizaje and the eugenics 
movement (see Hernández 2013; Miller 2004; Stepan 1991; Wade 2003). This scholarship 
maintains that while on the surface mestizaje appears to invite heterogeneity, it is more 
accurately conceived as an “all-inclusive ideology of exclusion” (Stutzman 1981). 
Contrary to its rhetorical embrace of difference, mestizaje seeks to produce a “single 
homogenized and emblematic composite” (54), represented in post-independence 
Dominican Republic by the criollo and later the indio.  
In her examination of Dominican racial narratives, Eva Michelle Wheeler (2015) 
shows how because mixture was the foundation of anti-colonial unity, its origin lies in the 
Código de Legislación para el Gobierno Moral, Político y Económico de los Negros de la 
Isla Española,43 the Spanish colonial code known as the Código Negro Carolino (1784), 
which regulated the treatment of Black persons in the Spanish colonies. Importantly, this 
code consecrated racial mixture as a mechanism for reclaiming whiteness after five 
generations of presence of “white blood” (Wheeler 2015, 35), meaning that White status 
could be achieved through selective partnering. However, the pathway toward racial 
mobility was mostly unavailable to mixed-race persons, most of whom were considered 
“illegitimate,” “so much so, that ‘mestizo’ and ‘illegitimate’ were practically synonymous” 
throughout most of the Spanish colonial period in the Americas (Wade 2009, 69). The 
informality and/or exploitative nature of these crossracial unions blocked access to the 
bureaucratic channels through which mixed-race persons could prove their lineage.   
                                            
43 The Legislative Code for the Moral, Political, and Economic Governance of the Island of Hispaniola. 
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While mestizaje is the dominant register through which scholars have examined 
racial mixture and hybridity in Latin America, creolization is used in a similar vein by 
scholars in the broader Caribbean region. Unlike mestizaje, articulations of creolité 
emerging from English and French Caribbean scholars center blackness in their 
construction of hybrid identities. Early influential writers in this vein such as Edward 
Kamau Brathwaite (1971), Jean Bernabé et al. (1990) and Stuart Hall (1993) expand on the 
negritude movement in their writings but identified creoleness as not reducible to either 
the African, American (indigenous), or European influences in Caribbean culture. Whereas 
both Bathwaite and Bernabé et al. adopt more laudatory stances regarding the radical racial, 
cultural, and political potentials of creolism, as indicated in the title of the article “In Praise 
of Creoleness” (Bernabé et al. 1990), Hall (1993), and later Shalani Puri (2004) center 
politics in their examination of hybrid identities. First, Hall (1993) maintains that 
Caribbean blackness is always-already hybridized, rejecting the purity implied in the 
juxtaposition between creolism and blackness. Further, Hall centers the politics of 
representation as a central medium through which identities are made, not merely 
reflections of identities as such (236). Paul Gilroy (1999) follows Hall through a rich 
examination of processes of cultural hybridity in the Afro-Atlantic diaspora. Second, in her 
analysis of hybridity, Puri (2004) takes issue with hybridity’s post-nationalist and post-
colonialist foundations as implicated by her predecessors. Integrating her analysis with 
then emergent theories of transnationalism and globalization which predicted the nation-
state decline she argues that creolism, like mestizaje is not opposed to nationalist projects 
but, has supported them, as especially exemplified in Latin America.  
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As Puri points out, after independence male elites, mostly light-skinned criollos 
like Duarte, tied mestizaje to the idea of national progress. Years later, the criollo Mexican 
intellectual, Vasconcelos, often considered the central architect of modern mestizaje 
philosophy, conceived it as a process of blanqueamiento (whitening), wherein “[t]he lower 
types of the species will be absorbed by the superior type. In this manner, the Black could 
be redeemed, and step by step, by voluntary extinction, the uglier stocks will give way to 
the more handsome” (1997[1925], 30). Moreover, this evolutionary process would result 
in the natural selection of the best traits of different racial populations, resulting in a 
“cosmic race” superior to any individual racial and ethnic group. These ideas were shaped 
by both the eugenicist science that centered reproduction in human progress and the 
concomitant idea that Blacks were incapable of self-rule. 
 
Race and Sovereignty after the Haitian Revolution 
The ideology of mestizaje took root in most of post-colonial Latin America during 
the 19th and 20th centuries. In the Dominican Republic, the proximity of Haiti, the impact 
of its 1791 revolution, the Haitian occupation of the entire island of Hispaniola (1822-44), 
and the successive wars of independence are important elements of the framings of race 
and blackness. Therefore, much of the scholarship on race and nation has centered on the 
history of this relationship. As the first sovereign Black republic in the region, Haiti 
exposed the consequences of defying the global racial order. The Haitian Revolution 
decoupled blackness and unfreedom produced under slavery; all Haitian citizens were 
considered Black after 1804. However, nations at the brink of independence feared meeting 
the same fate as Haiti: economic sanctions, withheld recognition, and the payment of 
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reparations. In the post-colonial context, Dominicans began to differentiate themselves 
from the White oppressors they sought to overthrow, but because of the relative absence 
of plantation-based slavery, the existence of a large free colored population, and their 
efforts to distinguish themselves from Haitians, most did not identify as Black (Sagás 2000, 
23). The utility of this “racial” differentiation between Dominicans and Haitians was 
confirmed during the US occupation of Hispaniola in the early 20th century, when troops 
withdrew from the Dominican Republic a decade before returning rule to Haiti, a decision 
largely based on Dominicans’ ability to make claims to a civilizing discourse that 
associated whiteness with progress, reason, and prosperity (Candelario 2007). Therefore, 
mestizaje served not only as an internally directed unifying project, but to project an image 
of the nation’s racial composition to the outside world.  
Historian April Mayes (2014) argues that progressive political intellectual Pedro 
Francisco Bonó was openly critical of the privileging of Black identity in the Haitian 
revolution’s iconography, which he found more limiting than the criollo identity adopted 
by most Dominicans at the time. Bonó and other independentistas believed that the Haitian 
vision of Black nationalism would exacerbate Dominican racial divisions (Mayes 2014, 
27). For Bonó, mestizaje not only made sense given the ways Dominicans had come to 
understand themselves, as a mixed population whose condition of freedom and nationality 
removed them from the “Black” category, but also served to quell racial anxieties that 
accompanied the nation-building process. Despite Haiti’s own history of European 
colonialism, Dominicans usually view Haitians as more purely Black than they are. 
However, this narrative of the development of mixed race identity in the Dominican 
Republic in opposition to Haiti naturalizes the difference between the two nations. 
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Milagros Ricourt (2016) argues that US colonial and Dominican nationalist narratives 
exaggerated the differences between how race was formed on the different sides of 
Hispaniola. This perpetuation of racial difference has furthered efforts to maintain Haitians 
as an exploitable source of labor. Therefore, Ricourt finds that mestizaje not only served to 
legitimate the predominant practice of racial crossing and provided persons of color with 
opportunities for social mobility; it also met White elites’ need to contain the racial 
ascendency of the newly liberated population through the maintenance of White 
supremacy. As such, the turn away from Haiti provided a clear indication that Dominicans 
refused to participate in the racial radicalism represented by the Haitian Revolution.   
 
Racial Democracy 
Despite the widespread recognition by Dominicans who adopt racial improvement 
strategies that fair-skinned persons garner social advantages, most Dominicans also 
characterize their society as a “racial democracy” (Freyre 1946), wherein all citizens, 
regardless of race, are given equal opportunities. Moreover, the Dominican Republic often 
appears as a “racial paradise,” wherein social relations are distinguished for their high 
degree of racial harmony, even under slavery (Hoetink 1971; Tannenbaum 1992[1946]). 
Similar ideologies operate in Puerto Rico and Brazil. Writing in 1881, Bonó described the 
colonial system as one in which el español aportó suma benevolencia, gran caridad y 
mucha dulzura en las desigualdades sociales que tal sistema imponía. Sus relaciones de 
mayoral y dueño, de amo y esclavo se sostuvieron en una igualdad relativa (“The Spaniard 
bestowed the utmost benevolence, great charity, and much tenderness in the social 
inequalities which that system imposed. His relations of foreman and owner, of master and 
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slave were maintained in relative equality”) (AGN 2007, 54). Less than a generation later, 
the US would occupy the entire island, finding the occupants unsuitable for self-rule 
[ostensibly based upon their racial composition] and setting the stage for Trujillo’s rise in 
1931.  
Under Trujillo, the Dominican state claimed exceptionally egalitarian race relations 
to emphasize its modernity. Ideologies of miscegenation presented opportunities for 
Dominican elites to distance themselves from Haiti and its revolutionary ideals, and from 
the firm racial line drawn by US and European elites. Through the ideology of mestizaje, 
locals claimed moral superiority for overcoming internal racial conflicts. Trujillo 
manipulated this image by inviting Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany to resettle in Sosúa 
on the island’s northern coast. Despite mild public acknowledgment of measurable 
inequalities in the quality of life for dark and light-skinned Dominicans, these differences 
are most often ascribed in popular discourse to individually-held prejudices rather than a 
systemic concern.  
My interactions with ordinary Dominicans evidenced Dominicans’ adoption of 
these views. Frequently, when introducing myself and explaining the purpose of my visit 
there, interlocutors took issue with my use of a racial framework to examine inequality in 
their country. In one such interaction, a young male professional who had spent several 
years working in the eastern coast of the US and having recently returned to the island told 
me, Existen unos prejuicios (“There are some prejudices”), pero no es como allá (“but it’s 
not like there.”) My own US citizenship, and Dominicans’ cache of knowledge about the 
US, often made the United States a measuring rod for racism. Dominicans proudly told me 
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that their government had never instituted legal segregation, and defensively asked why I 
did not stay in my own country if I really wanted to learn about racism. 
 
Race in the Dominican Census 
 
The census is a fundamental tool for understanding the interplay between state 
racial formations and ordinary citizens’ understanding of race. Although the Dominican 
Republic has not collected data on race since 1960, much can be learned about how the 
state has approached the question of racial identity in the past and how it conceived race at 
varying points over the course of the four decades (1920-1960) when racial data were 
captured. Official figures for these years as reported by the Oficina Nacional de Estadística 
are presented in Table 1 including, when available, the categories provided to the 
enumerator and how the results were labeled in reports (as color, race, or both). The 
categories by which the state organizes race continue to influence the ways Dominicans 
understand race. Census data are a rich source of information as the “central administrative 
technology” of what David Theo Goldberg (2002) describes as the “racial state” (188). The 
historically variable categories in the census affect what Goldberg calls “state speech” as 
it “circulates revised and reworked popular categories of racial conception [and] lends the 
authority of the state to racial distinction” (189). Beyond its local impact, as a public 
document the modern census serves as a “national portrait” that communicates the contours 
of national identity abroad as well as to ordinary citizens (Loveman 2014, 28). Therefore, 
census categories not only reflect existing racial classifications but also contribute to 
shaping them. Census categories carry weight, not solely through the work of the armies 
of interviewers who were previously commissioned to go door-to-door, subjecting the 
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entire population to its racial categories, but also by projecting this national racial image at 
home and abroad. A brief history of race in the Dominican census is illustrative of how the 
state envisions itself in racial terms.   
While the impetus toward blanqueamiento, or generational whitening, remains, 
many Dominicans now imagine that mestizaje has succeeded in the creation of a 
homogenous populace combining European, Indigenous, and Black ancestry. Accordingly, 
the state suspended the collection and distribution of racial data in its national census after 
1960. Often, census racial data are used to measure progress toward racial equality. 
However, understanding that Dominican society has overcome racial inequity via the 
production of a universal racial identity (the mestizo/mulato), the race question was 
eliminated after the completion of only four censuses. This analysis of the census 
demonstrates how it was utilized to represent this racial progression.  
The 1920 Census, completed under US military occupation and the country’s first 
ever completed post-independence, collected data on race but did not proscribe the 
categories to be used (ONE 2012, 17). The form employed by enumerators simply featured 
a blank column labeled “color or race,” which they would complete based on their 
observation of the respondents. Without clear organizing categories, enumerators relied on 
common understandings intelligible to both the general population and the Secretary of 
Interior and Police, which was charged with the census. While the precise instructions for 
1920 census takers have not been archived, in all subsequent years, enumerators 
determined racial classification.  This reliance on visual observation to divide persons into 
race and color categories (used in different years) suggests that race is una categoría 
fenotípica percibida (a phenotypically perceived category), as described in a 2012 report 
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by the Office of National Statistics (ONE), the agency responsible for collecting and 
disseminating national population statistics (ONE 2012, 18). The 1920 data presented in 
Table 1 show a population distribution concentrated along the middle racial category, with 
half (49.7) of the population identified as mestizos and near equal proportions of Black 
(25.4) and White (24.9) persons comprising the other half of the population.  
Table 1: Race in the Dominican Census44 
Year Label Options Results (Percent) 
1920 Color or Race  Open-ended Blanco: 24.9 
Mestizo: 49.7 
Negro: 25.4 
1935 Color or Race  Blanco 
Negro 
Amarillo 
Indio 
Blanco: 13.045 
Mestizo: 67.5 
Negro: 19.4 
Amarillo: 0.02 
1950 Color (Determined by 
enumerator)  
Blanco 
Negro  
Mestizo 
Amarillo 
Blanco: 28.1 
Negro: 11.5 
Mestizo: 60.4 
Amarillo: 0.03 
1960 Color (Determined by 
enumerator) 
Blanco 
Negro  
Mulato 
Amarillo 
Blanco: 16.1 
Negro: 10.9  
Mulato: 72.9 
Amarillo: 0.1 
1981  According to the 
physical characteristics 
and accent (determined 
by the enumerator) 
Dominican 
Haitian  
Other Nationality  
Dominican: N/A46 
Haitian: N/A 
Other: N/A 
1970; 1993-201047 N/A N/A  N/A 
                                            
44 Adapted from Oficina Nacional de Estadística, “La variable étnico-racial en los censos de la población en 
la República Dominicana,” accessed March 13, 2018. 
www.one.gob.do/Multimedia/Download?ObjId=1938, p. 17. 
 
 
45 Oficina Nacional de Estadística, “Censo Nacional de Población,” acccessed February 19, 2015, 
http://www.one.gob.do/Estadisticas/302/censo-1950. 
  
 
46 Results of the 1981 census are available, but the results of the question pertaining to Dominican or 
Haitian identity are missing. Oficina Nacional de Estadística, “Censo 1981,” accessed March 8, 2018, 
https://www.one.gob.do/censos/poblacion-y-vivienda/censo-1981.  
 
 
47 Years the census did not include a racial/ethnic question.  
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The subsequent 1935 census results reported in Table 1 demonstrate a decline in 
both the White (13.0) and Black (19.4) population and a surge in the mestizo category 
(67.5). A 1948 treatise on the second census, Historia y estadística de la República 
Dominicana, highlighted this trend, eliminating the largely Black immigrant population 
(including Haitians and cocolos) from its analysis to argue that the nation was moving 
toward the uniformity of mixture.48  Identifying shrinking White and Black groups as an 
improvement, this work illustrates that mestizaje sought to eliminate all racial distinctions, 
not just blackness. To be sure, Vicente Tolentino Rojas, the author of the treatise, was 
influenced by the prevailing social context in which eugenicist “scientific” ideologies 
prevailed. However, the reading of mestizaje as overlapping with White supremacy ignores 
the more complex ways that Dominicans grappled with their indigenous and African roots.    
The following census taken in 1950 reported a notable decline in both the Black 
(11.5 percent) and mestizo (60.4 percent) population, coupled by a significant increase in 
the proportion of Whites (28.1). Taken at the height of the Trujillo regime, this census 
indicated a reversal of the pattern of mixing established in previous years.49 Additionally, 
the census questionnaire removed the term raza (race), while maintaining the term color. 
The official presentation of the results makes it clear that its author intended to distinguish 
                                            
 
48 The National Office of Statistics reports that this census collected data on blancos, negros, indios, and 
amarillos. However, the official census report available through this office does not include data on race or 
color. Frank Moya Pons (2010), citing Vicente Tolentino Rojas (1948), provides data only on these three 
categories.  
 
 
49 While some of this change may be attributable to the entry of Jewish refugees during WWII, only about 
700 reached the settlement established in Sosúa. Additionally, the decrease in the black category can, in 
part, be attributed to the racially and ethnically motivated 1937 border massacre in which up to 17,000 
Haitians and Dominicans perished (Turits 2003). 
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color from race, reporting that “the color, not the race, was determined of registered 
people” (Simmons 2009, 31). However, the report explained that if the enumerator could 
not determine the respondent’s color (either White, Black, Mestizo, or Yellow), he should 
ask (Simmons 2009, 31). These instructions show that color was not exclusively based on 
the enumerator’s evaluation of the person’s phenotype, a situation that would never 
produce the need to ask the respondent. It suggests that although the census purports to 
measure “color, not race” that “color” only served as a proxy, maintaining an attachment 
to social meanings and value. Therefore, although the authorities attempted to emphasize 
the racial homogeneity of Dominicans via mestizaje, their use of color implies that it 
maintained and promoted hierarchichal racial divisions.  
Contrary to efforts to distinguish the Dominican Republic as a colorist and not a 
racial regime, in his analysis of these trends, historian Frank Moya Pons (2010) suggests 
that concerns about the racial profile of the nation abroad influenced the census racial data, 
as was his experience as a student attending the training sessions for 1960 census surveyors. 
He recalls that the trainer instructed the group to register darker-skinned persons as white 
or mulatos: 
recuerdo perfectamente que la profesora nos decía que el gobierno quería que la 
población dominicana se presentara ante el mundo como un país avanzado con 
mucha población blanca. “Después de todo lo que ha hecho el Jefe (Trujillo) por el 
país,” decía la entrenadora censal, “la República Dominicana no puede presentarse 
con una población mayoritariamente negra como si fuera una nación africana.” 
 
I remember perfectly that the instructor told us that the government wanted the 
Dominican population to present itself before the world as an advanced nation with 
a large white population, ‘After everything that the Boss (Trujillo) has done for the 
country,’ the census trainer said, ‘the Dominican Republic cannot present itself with 
a majority black population as if it were an African nation.’ (Moya Pons 2010, 51) 
 
 161 
Moya Pons’ recollection of these events suggests that the national census functioned not 
only as a means of measuring race, but also to make race both domestically and abroad. 
These comments highlight what Mara Loveman identifies as the outwardly directed 
function of censuses, which were initially implemented to demonstrate the equivalency of 
Latin American nations with the “‘civilized nations’ of Western Europe” (2013, 104). The 
instructor’s fear that the Dominican Republic would present itself as an “African nation” 
was an especially relevant concern in 1960, given the continuing struggles of nations on 
the African continent to gain their independence. Therefore, the trainer’s comments 
highlight the racing of modernity on a world scale, where modernity is defined as White. 
This is especially the case on an island vulnerable to foreign intervention, as it was when 
the US occupied the Dominican Republic in 1965.   
 Even with these expressed concerns about the Black population, the mulato 
category represented mixed-race persons in the 1960 census, diverging from the previous 
use of mestizo. Both terms signaled specific racial mixtures in the Spanish colonial period, 
mestizo indexing the offspring of a white-indigenous union and mulato a White-Black 
union. This centering of blackness in the final years of the Trujillo regime, infamous for its 
racist rhetoric and policies, is surprising. However, mulato, as a racially intermediate 
category, may have been a category Dominicans increasingly identified with at the time. 
With mulato as the mixed-race signifier, as indicated by the results in Table 1, one-tenth 
more claimed membership in the intermediate category. The decline in those identified as 
White is proportional to the increase in the intermediate category, implying that the change 
can be primarily attributed to those leaving the White category. Further, the proportional 
share of Black and “yellow” populations remained steady from the previous survey.  
 162 
 Although 1960 was the last year the Dominican state included a racial category, a 
2012 report on racial and ethnic categories in the census includes the year 1981 among 
those that collected racial data. Therefore, 1981 is included in the results reported in Table 
1 despite the exclusion of results for this question on the census reports. The report justifies 
its inclusion because la pregunta está referida al fenotipo (alusión a raza) y el lenguaje 
(alusión a la etnia), aunque las categorías de respuesta corresponden a la nacionalidad 
de la persona censada (“the question refers to phenotype [allusion to race] and to language 
[allusion to ethnicity]”), although the response categories correspond with the nationality 
of the interviewee) (ONE 2012, 17). An excerpt of the question from the original 1981 
Census form (Figure 7) reads, [d]e acuerdo a las caracteristicas fisicas y acento al hablar 
el empadronado es (“according to the physical characteristics and accent when speaking 
the registree is”) and provides Dominican, Haitian, and other nationality as possible 
responses. This treatment of race in the census reveals the central role of the Dominican 
state in the ascription of racial difference onto the Haitian diaspora. Published by the 
agency in charge of collecting and disseminating these data, the report repeats the logic 
that constructs “Haitian” as a distinct racial category. The instructions to enumerators also 
made it possible for them to include naturalized Haitians, as well as native-born 
Dominicans—both those with or without Haitian descent—under the Haitian category. As 
a tool to delimit national boundaries, this census renders Haitians both racially (because of 
their phenotype) and culturally (because of their accent) outside the boundaries of 
dominicanidad. However, this policy is a divergence from the convention established in 
the two preceding censuses, which identifies Haitians according to their nationality.  
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Figure 7 Question No. 40 from the 1981 Census Form
 
 
 
An overview of how race, color, and Haitianess are categorized and enumerated in 
the Dominican censuses from 1920 to 1981, when the census last included any measure of 
race, color, or ethnicity, reveals that these concepts are used in ways that complicate a 
straightforward understanding of their meaning in the Dominican Republic. Not only are 
they used interchangeably and with overlapping meanings, the structure of the questions 
and the responses they generate show significant slippage between race and color. Both the 
1920 and the 1935 censuses use these terms interchangeably and report categories that 
avowedly refer to biological descent. The one exception is the inclusion of amarillo, which, 
although a color, applies exclusively to Asian persons. This use suggests that racial 
understandings correspond with phenotypical ones; that is, color is a proxy for race.  
That enumerators, not the censused individuals, assigned racial and color categories 
increase the likelihood that they are subject to manipulation by state envoys, as in the case 
taken from Moya Pons cited above. However, the taboo that surrounds the discussion of 
racial identity makes this one of the few acceptable methods for collecting such data 
(Duany 1998, 156). The data tell a story that aligns with the impetus of mestizaje, one of 
increasing racial mixture and meeting in the middle in the Dominican Republic. They 
“According to the physical characteristics and accent when speaking the registree is: Dominican 
1; Haitian 2; Other nationality 9. Source: ONE, 2013, “República Dominicana: Boletas utilizadas 
en los censos de población y vivienda 1920-2010,” p. 57.  
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confirm that mestizaje is not synonymous with whitening. Although it aims to gradually 
fold in any distinguishable Black population through the progressive lightening of dark 
skin tones and increasing the prominence of European phenotypical features, the end goal 
is not a population indistinguishable from colonial Whites, but, as Candelario (2007) 
argues, is distinct from both Black and White identities.  
However, the sudden disappearance of racial and color categories after 1960 aligns 
with an official discourse of racial homogeneity, what Rahier (2008) terms “monocultural 
mestizaje.”  After almost two-thirds of the Dominican population were registered as 
mulatos, if the same pattern of movement into the median category had continued, almost 
every Dominican would be brought into the folds of mestizaje. The state’s decision to 
discontinue the collection of racial data has effects both external and internal to the country. 
First, it aligns with international trends toward publicly disavowing the significance of race 
as a social category. Secondly, it works internally to silence racial protest by delegitimizing 
the articulation of group-based claims.   
 While racism and racial struggle never completely subsided during this period of a 
region-wide turn against racial statistics, race did not again become an important category 
for state analysis until the 1990s. However, the Dominican Republic is an outlier in a trend 
embracing multiculturalism that has swept the region (see Hale 2006; Hooker 2005; Rahier 
2012). While several census bureaus in places such as Mexico and Colombia have moved 
toward a broader recognition of indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples, the Dominican 
Republic has eliminated color categories from national identity cards and has not acted on 
a proposal forwarded by ONE to include a self-reported racial question to conform with 
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international standards. In the following section, I examine the cédula as the most recent 
state-produced document of Dominican color.  
 
Race, Color, and Cédula Categories 
Until 2014 cedúlas, national identity cards, provided four major groupings of skin 
color (piel): white (“b” for blanco), black (“n” for negro), yellow (“a” for amarillo) and 
Indio (“i” for indio).50 However, the Dominican state did not publish data on the frequency 
and method with which enumerators applied these terms to the population. No official 
instructions to the agency’s bureaucrats exist, although ethnographic studies of the process 
confirm that most Dominicans are designated as indio and black is applied almost 
exclusively to Haitians (Howard 2001; Simmons 2009). In addition, ethnographic research 
has found that the folk term indio is often qualified by references to skin shade, such as 
claro (light), or oscuro (dark), and even lavao (washed) and sucio (dirty) (Duany 2002).  
As in the national census, employees determine color classification on the cédula, 
but, as several young activists who had succeeded in securing a black marker, individuals 
could and did shape the process influencing how they are categorized. Of the four persons 
who recounted their experience at the cédula office with me, all had experienced some 
form of resistance when requesting Negro on their cédula. Labeling oneself as black was 
associated with low self-esteem and typically reserved for Haitians. Rosa’s recollection of 
her attempt to have her cédula reflect her Black identity demonstrates that the state’s 
chosen categories and labeling practices do not always align with how Dominicans identify 
                                            
50 See Kimberley Eison Simmons (2008) for an examination of the cedualization process.  
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themselves. After teasing her sister for having a cédula that stated her color as indio, when 
Rosa became eligible to extract her first identity document at 18, she pleaded with the clerk, 
Por favor, no pongan una ‘I’ cuando me vaya. Por favor pon negra. Soy negra, no soy 
india (“Please don’t put an ‘I’ when I go. Please, put black, I’m black, I’m not india.”) To 
her disappointment, Rosa received a document labeling her India.  
Rosa’s narrative substantiates that that cédula categories do not necessarily reflect 
how Dominicans construct their racial identities (see Howard 2004; Roth 2013; Simmons 
2009). While the data gleaned from these documents may not accurately reflect how 
ordinary Dominicans conceive of their racial identity, they indicate the state’s 
preoccupation with defining the “national phenotype.”51 However, unlike the census racial 
categories discussed above, these data are not made public and such classification serves 
primarily as an intimate racial encounter through which the state exercises its classificatory 
authority.  
On one hand, the state’s adoption of a nonracial discourse aligns with the variation 
of “color blindness” found in the US that temporalizes racial inequality in the past. One 
major difference is that while the insistence on racial homogeneity undermines efforts to 
organize as racialized minorities, Dominican society remains highly color-conscious. As 
in other former Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, Cuba and Puerto Rico, Dominicans, 
either strangers or acquaintances, regularly hail each other by skin color.  
Eugenio, a 25-year-old university student of both Haitian and Dominican 
parentage, was uneasy with this practice: Hay un término ahora, muy popular: moreno. No 
                                            
51 David Howard (2001) found that more than half of his interviewees in the upper middle-class 
neighborhood of Gazcue were classified as white on their cédulas, despite only 4 percent describing 
themselves as such in interviews (48).  
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me gusta (“There’s a term now, very popular: moreno. I don’t like it”), he told me. When 
I asked why, he went on:  
No me gusta porque moreno es un apellido. Yo soy negro. Si una persona me dice, 
“¡Ay, negro!” está mejor … No está bien, pero está mejor que moreno. Pero tu color 
no es tu nombre y no debería de ser así. Lamentablemente, lo es y hay que lidiar 
con eso. Por ejemplo, blanquita. Eso es feo. De mí no vas a escuchar eso. Es una 
vaina, es una cosa de educación también, de principio… Yo no te puedo llamar por 
tu color.  
 
I don’t like it because moreno is a surname. I am Black. If a person says to me, 
“Ay, Black!” it’s better… It’s not good, but it’s better than moreno. But your color 
isn’t your name and it shouldn’t be like that. Unfortunately, it is and you have to 
deal with it. For example, blanquita [white girl]. That’s ugly. You’re not going to 
hear that from me. It’s a vaina [thing], it’s a matter of education too, of principle. I 
can’t call you by your color.52  
 
As Eugenio’s discomfort suggests, the practice of referring to someone by his or her color 
is ubiquitous and generally accepted in the Dominican Republic. Where Eugenio sees the 
quotidian practice of addressing someone by their color as an overt machination of racism, 
despite demonstrating a high level of color-consciousness, most Dominicans do not 
understand this practice as racist. Further, like the Dominican women in the previous 
chapter, Eugenio proudly identifies as Black despite dominant portrayals that island-based 
Dominicans rarely do so.  
 
Indio and the Racial Middle  
Scholars have considered this color-based system an obstacle to antiracist efforts. 
Carl Degler (1986[1971]) argues that in the Brazilian case the institution of intermediary 
categories inclines darker-skinned populations to repudiate blackness and utilize a “mulatto 
                                            
52 Interview in Santo Domingo October 15, 2015.  
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escape hatch” to secure improved treatment. Degler also adopted his escape hatch metaphor 
to the possibility of avoiding racial polarization via the inclusion of the median category. 
At the national level, the inclusion of the median category is often linked to the weakening 
of Black oppositional movements by incentivizing investments in Whiteness (Degler 
1986[1971], 276). Candelario (2007) and Duany (2002) have applied this notion to 
describe an “indio escape hatch” in the Dominican Republic (Candelario 2007) and Puerto 
Rico (Duany 2002), where claims to indigeneity (Taíno ancestry) are used for upward 
social mobility.  
As shown in the formatting of the census questions previously considered, in every 
instance, even when the word race was used, what was being measured relied almost 
exclusively on the enumerator’s determinations of skin color. However, most 
contemporary observers argue that skin color and race are not co-extensive and that these 
phenotypical descriptors do not correspond to biological concepts of descent. Since the 
institutionalization of the indio label in the 1930 cédula, it has been the primary official 
skin color category. While literally meaning Indian, or indigenous, contrary to some 
scholars who utilize its literal translation (e.g., Howard 2001; Safa 1998), its usage more 
accurately aligns with that of a brown skin color. Although indio reflects a founding myth 
that Dominicans’ dark skin derives from their indigenous ancestry—an ideological move 
that distances them from blackness—almost no Dominican I encountered traced their 
ancestry to the island’s native inhabitants. Historian Carlos Esteban Deive, who has 
published widely on questions of race and slavery in the Dominican Republic, defines indio 
in his Diccionario de dominicanismos as a euphemism usado para nombrar como mulatas 
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a las personas de color negro (“used to call mulata persons who are black”) (Deive 2006, 
112). In no way does he tie the Dominican usage of indio to indigenous persons.  
Categories, such as indio, moreno, or rubio, are skin color descriptors whose use in 
no way undermines the fundamental societal investment in the mixed-race ideology. On 
the cédula, these categories are clearly marked as skin color, not race. Efforts to treat these, 
especially the indio category, as racial has led to erroneous claims that Dominicans 
construct themselves as primarily descendants of the Taínos, the island’s native inhabitants 
(see Candelario 2007; Simmons 2009). In her study of historical and contemporary racial 
representations among Dominicans, Candelario argues that indio best represents a 
preference for an intermediate racial aesthetic that falls between white and black. She 
writes, “Lo indio” is best conceived as “the middle term, the central point of the racial 
continuum, the ‘native’ alternative to foreign blackness and whiteness alike” (2007, 58).  
While arguing that indio is conceived as a mixed-race identity, both Candelario and 
Simmons maintain that the widespread use of this term minimizes the African diaspora in 
the dominant racial imaginary of the Dominican Republic. However, to interpret indio 
simply as a foil for anti-blackness erases the complexity of Dominican self-construction 
that cannot be captured through the prism of negation alone. A 2011 editorial in the Listín 
Diario by Indhira Suero, author of the blog about race titled Negrita come coco, highlights 
how both dark-skinned and light-skinned Dominicans are regularly subjected to 
disparaging remarks about their color. Kimberly Eison Simmons’ (2009) examination of 
how indio was deployed in the emission of cédulas found that calls to change the category 
proposed to replace it with mulato or mestizo, evidencing that indio indexes a mixed-race 
identity (36-37).  
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Debates leading up to the 2014 cédula reform map out the contemporary landscape 
of race and color in the Dominican Republic. According to Yesenia, these debates had 
become so intense that in the end, they decided to leave color out of the document’s 
redesign. The rationale behind the JCE’s ultimate decision to eliminate the category is 
unclear, as the process was largely opaque except for the leaking of a 2011 proposal to 
change indio to mulato. 
Several published editorials expressed conflicting opinions on what their authors 
considered the most accurate ways of categorizing Dominican identity. A 2011 editorial in 
the Listín Diario begins with the phrase, Aquí nos hemos inventado un color, el “indio,” 
que no suele aparecer en el polícromo universal (“Here we have invented a color, ‘indio’, 
which does not usually appear in the universal polychrome”) (Listín Diario, 11 November 
2011). Arguing that Dominicans adopted the term indio para no creernos negros (“to 
believe we are not black”), the author suggests they use mulato instead so that los negros 
que recelen de su color se esforzaran por lograr que se les categorizara como “indio 
oscuro” o “indio claro” en las cédulas, como la forma de hacer más suave y elegante el 
matiz de su piel (“the Blacks who fear their color strive to accomplish that they are 
categorized as ‘dark indio’ or ‘light indio’ in the cédulas, as the means of making the hue 
of their skin more soft and elegant.”) The author invalidates the use of indio as anything 
but a means to negate blackness in a society that associates dark skin with the antithesis of 
“softness” and “elegance.”  
The effort to institute a more accurate system of categorization is reflected in the 
efforts of the JCE to tie color more closely to ethnicity. A 2011 JCE report, which was 
leaked to the press, found that the changes were necessary given that los colores que se 
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establecen por etnia son el mulato, negro y blanco, entonces el Indio desaparecería (“the 
colors established by ethnicity are mulato, black, and white, thus the Indio would 
disappear.”) The capitalization of Indio alone suggests that the authors of the report 
considered it not only a color, but also a formal group, presumably an ethnic one (Listín 
Diario, 11 November 2011). However, the JCE’s argument for eliminating this category 
hinges on the claims that mulato, black, and white are more aligned with Dominican ethnic 
identity. Given that ethnicity is typically defined by a shared culture and language, the 
inclusion of the European, African, and mixed elements alone is interesting. Furthermore, 
because these are more accurately racial terms, their description as “ethnic” in this 
document suggests that the state presupposes a universal linguistic and cultural identity, 
with color being the primary axis of internal distinction in the Dominican Republic.  
Another editorial applauds the JCE’s decision to excise skin color from the official 
identity document. The author recalls that when requesting the label negro on his 
document, he had to librar una batalla verbal con la joven que me atendía para que 
concediera mi petición de ponerme negro en el color de piel pues ella juraba que yo era 
indio oscuro llegando, inclusive a cuestionar mi autoestima por mi afán de que pusieran 
negro (“wage a verbal battle with the youth attending me so that she would concede my 
petition to put black in the skin color as she swore that I was indio oscuro, going so far as 
to question my self-esteem for my insistence that they put black”) (Alvarez de los Santos 
2016). This reporter’s story echoes many I heard from other racially conscious 
Dominicans, who had similarly insisted that their skin be recorded as black, only to be met 
with the protests of the state employee, who insisted that only Haitians or persons with 
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little self-worth merited the Black label. Others who reported having intervened in the 
process of state racialization expressed a defiant pride in having done so.  
Dominican Studies scholars’ reexamination of the term indio and their attention to 
Dominican blackness in general has put them at the forefront of engagements with the 
inclusionary aspects of mestizaje. The radical elements of the ideology had been dismissed 
in the academic turn against the philosophy which framed any revolutionary impulse as a 
mere façade erected to mask elites’ White supremacist efforts. Some scholars have argued 
that mestizaje should be revisited and identify positive aspects within in (de la Fuente 2001; 
Mayes 2014; Wade 2005). As Alejandro de la Fuente (2001) argues in the Cuban case, 
elites’ influence was not so strong that they were able to employ a discourse of inclusion 
without offering some of the benefits promised to racially marginalized groups. This was 
a lesson learned in the revolutionary period when independence efforts in Cuba (and the 
Dominican Republic) initially failed because of elites’ failure to include abolition among 
their central demands. Instead, de la Fuente argues that mestizaje, like most ideological 
tools, was subject to “disparate interpretations.” Therefore, while it served to “obfuscate” 
the continued persistence of racism, it also supplied the discursive foundations upon which 
anti-racist organizers could pursue progress towards the goals of racial harmony outlined 
in mestizaje.  
 
The Color Continuum 
Jorge Duany (2002) identifies at least 19 skin color terms used in Puerto Rico, many 
which are used in the Dominican Republic (Roth 2012, 19). Thus, unlike the US racial 
model, intermediate groups acquire a distinct status between the poles of black and white. 
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Yet, skin color descriptors are often contingent, and because they are liable to change 
according to context, they often do not result in the formation of self-identified groups. The 
various skin color labels can be mapped along a hierarchy where proximity to blackness is 
devalued and whiteness is desired.  
Dominicans adopt a language of racial homogeneity whereby national identity 
stands in for racial identity, yet color is an important factor in daily social interaction. 
Therefore, when dealing with co-nationals, Dominicans claim to be racially neutral but 
highly color conscious. While these color categories are subjective and a person is often 
not fixed within them, given the maintenance of a political and economic dominance of 
light-skinned persons, they are not entirely free of moral and other valuations.  
Figure 8 Main Dominican Skin Color Classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 above illustrates an excerpt of the skin color terminology most commonly 
utilized in the Dominican Republic. Other scholars have documented additional terms not 
featured here, such as grifo and colorao (Duany 1998, 162) in Puerto Rico. In my 
fieldwork, those most commonly heard in daily practice were negro, rubio, moreno, and 
indio. The variety of categories utilized even exceed those already noted by scholars, 
including indio lavao, indio canelo, negro tinto, negro retinto, jojoto, and blanco jipato 
(Listín Diario, 3 December, 2011). Focus groups conducted by Jim Sidanius et al. (2001) 
identified just six racial classifications commonly used by Dominican participants: blanco, 
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trigueño, indio, mulato, moreno, and negro. The abive chart demonstrates only an 
approximate location of these terms along a black-white continuum, given their imprecise 
definitions and irregular usage. Many scholars condense this typology into three salient 
categories: black, white, and intermediate (Gravlee 2005; Wade 1997). Moreover, these 
terms do not directly correspond to the epidermis alone, but factor in hair texture and other 
physical features. For example, many of the color terms in Deive’s Diccionario de 
dominicanismos include a description of hair texture. The entry for indio canelo describes 
someone with la piel del color del chocolate claro, el pelo lacio y las facciones “regulares” 
(“skin the color of milk chocolate, straight hair and ‘regular’ features”) (2006, 111). While 
“regular” features are not well-defined, their inclusion in Deive’s dictionary indicates that 
color, hair, and other physical characteristics are important to Dominicans’ process of 
racial categorization. Deive’s use of “regular” also implies a hierarchy in what is 
considered a “typical” Dominican look, implying that some phenotypes are “irregular.” 
This statement contrasts sharply with Yesenia’s claims that open this chapter.  
Variation in color is attributed to different degrees and combinations of racial 
mixture and it is entirely acceptable for siblings from the same parentage to be distinctly 
categorized, signaling that color and race are not entirely co-extensive. Both the darkest 
and lightest Dominicans do not claim racial purity under this system, which Gerald Murray 
and Marina Ortiz (2012) describe as operating under a una gota al revés (“reverse one-
drop”) rule, where one drop of white blood constitutes one as non-black and vice versa—
one drop of black blood makes one non-white. Nationality therefore subsumes any 
perceived racial difference by fashioning all nationals as sharing a common ancestry.  
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Colorism and Racism  
 Given that phenotypical diversity is attached to skin pigmentation, not biological 
conceptions of race, some argue that social inequality in Latin America is more accurately 
examined through the analytic of colorism, the assignment of privilege according the shade 
of one’s skin. Colorism is distinguished from racism by two key features: (1) the subjective 
application of categories leads some to argue that racism and colorism are distinct systems 
of discrimination; and (2) its foundation in physical appearance, not descent (Degler 
1986[1971]; Harris 1952; Lovell and Wood 1998). Adopters of this perspective insist that 
colorism, with its nebulous boundaries and indefinite categories, lacks the analytical rigor 
of race. One’s categorization is often relational, dependent on the persons enacting the 
labeling, context, and other cues. Chiefly, these observers claim that class takes primacy 
over color in the determination of status.  
 This first point of differentiation between racism and colorism maintains that social 
cleavages are more accurately determined by class than color. This argument holds that 
one of the primary means for effecting a change in color categorization is the improvement 
in class status through wealth or education. Investments in the racial democracy thesis by 
several scholars prompted them to perceive social inequalities in terms of class rather than 
race (see Harris 1964; Telles 2006; Wade 1993; Wagley 1965; Whitten 1974). Thus, class 
has been the primary lens through which social difference in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region has been examined. Academics have found that class mobility leads to 
figurative whitening, whereby dark-skinned persons are applied different skin-color labels 
when their class position improves or worsens. That is, they move into social positions that 
are otherwise reserved for light-skinned persons. The most cited case of this phenomenon 
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in the Dominican Republic is that of José Francisco Peña Gómez, who, despite being, as 
the title of the 2016 biopic describes him, del color de la noche (“the color of the night”), 
gained immense popularity as the mayor of Santo Domingo and presidential candidate.  
In his Introduction to Dominican Blackness, Silvio Torres-Saillant (2010[1995]) 
argues that Peña Gómez’s victory as mayor, despite the racist and xenophobic campaign 
aimed at undermining his base of popular support, suggests that Dominicans regularly 
challenge exclusionist framings of national identity. Despite the distinctions the Peña 
Gómez case highlights in comparison with the US strict color line, that Blacks (and not 
Whites) must compensate for their complexion by mobilizing educational and financial 
capital suggests that even colorism is guided by a White supremacist logic.  
However, analyses of actual mobility into different racial statuses over time 
(Andrews 2009), and through improvement in class status (Golash-Boza 2010; Flores and 
Telles 2012), reveal that despite some mobility within intermediate groups, achievement 
of white status is very rare. Further, Tanya Golash-Boza’s (2010) research in Perú suggests 
that blackness occupies a unique space in Latin American racial ideologies, whereby 
blackness is understood as both color and race. Therefore, while attribution of blackness 
varies by context, its racial effects are mostly permanent. Moreover, Edward Telles (2012) 
finds that “race” and “color” are “overlapping concepts:” “color and racial identity are 
different ways to capture multiple manifestations of the larger concept of race” (1167). The 
analysis of the census and cédula categories above confirm this finding as color and race 
are often used interchangeably and in contradictory ways in the Dominican Republic. 
Conceptualizing color categories as racial categories has important implications for the 
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study of anti-racist mobilizations in the region as it centers structures of inequality an 
analysis of how these categories are employed.  
 
Unmixing Blackness  
 
The activist movements that originally inspired academic critiques of mestizaje 
through their efforts to render visible the persistence of racism have largely adopted the 
academy’s almost universal distrust of ideologies of mixture. As Ernesto and Eugenio 
quoted earlier in this chapper suggest, the Dominican government’s claim that the 
Dominican Republic is primarily mixed race, the use of the term Indio, and other skin color 
categories are adopted solely to avoid the stigma of blackness. Therefore, anti-racist 
activists have called for the eradication of the racial ideology based on mestizaje as central 
to their movement.   
Yet, a large part of recent Dominican Studies scholarship has challenged the idea 
that racial identity construction on the island is accurately captured through the lens of false 
consciousness. A groundbreaking issue of The Black Scholar on Black Dominican Studies, 
edited by Raj Chetty and Amaury Rodríguez, published in May 2015, as I was beginning 
the fieldwork for this project, represented this trend in the literature. The editors criticized 
the failure of US-based and mainstream scholarship to take Dominican engagements with 
blackness seriously writing, “even when investigators find a recognizable (to them) 
embrace of African origins and black identity there is nevertheless a strange inability to let 
go of narratives emphasizing Dominican self-hatred, negrophobia, and anti-Haitianism” 
(Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 2). This scholarship, they argue, fails to acknowledge not 
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only the complexity of Dominican engagements with blackness, but also the role of 
colonialism and global anti-Black racism in shaping Black identity and its study.  
Considering these critiques, it took me by surprise when, during an August 2015 
panel presentation in Santo Domingo about identity and culture, activists identified 
Dominicans’ rejection of Black racial identity as the primary driver of racism. The most 
recent crop of Dominican Studies scholars has rejected this argument, maintaining that it 
promotes the idea that Dominican racial formations are exceptions to, rather than 
representative of, broader structures of global racial violence. That evening’s presenters, 
along with many in the audience, were among those most imbricated in the island’s 
growing anti-racist movement, including representatives of groups most renowned for this 
work, MUDHA and Acción Afro-Dominicana. With no vocal dissension from the 
audience, the panel discussants framed “Black denial” as a national social pathology that 
prevented most Dominicans from recognizing their “true” racial identity as members of the 
African diaspora.  
As we walked to our respective lodgings, myself and two US academics I 
encountered at the meeting, discussed our shared uneasiness with that night’s event. We 
saw these speakers as advocating an imperialist discourse in which US racial formations, 
particularly the performance and rhetoric of blackness, were constructed as superior to 
those most commonly adopted in the Dominican Republic. We agreed that this narrative 
contributed to the characterization of Dominicans as “backwards,” obscuring how peoples 
of color are incentivized to perpetuate anti-Black racism.  
Scholars of Latin America and anthropologists have been more vocal about their 
concerns over academic imperialism in the region. In their critique of Michael Hanchard’s 
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(1994) analysis of race in Brazil, Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant argue that the 
continuous application of the black-white racial binary on societies outside the US effects 
a “symbolic violence” that restricts the production and dissemination of work diverging 
from the dominant perspective (1999, 46). In their insistence on describing Latin American 
racial formations as systems of White dominance over Blacks, Bourdieu and Wacquant 
find that scholars are failing to be attentive to the cultural and political specificities of the 
contexts they are studying. They contend further that the “globalization”-cum- 
“Americanization” of US cultural and intellectual production is not sufficient to engender 
the parallels found between the US and its southern neighbors.  
 After almost a decade of silence on this debate, a new crop of researchers on Afro-
Latin America has revived this issue. Dominican Studies scholars (see Candelario 2007; 
Roth 2013; Chetty and Rodríguez 2015) have been especially wary of the uncritical 
reproduction of scholarship that “obfuscate[s] rather than illuminate[s] the problematics of 
blackness” in their reliance on worn-out narratives of “Dominican self-hatred, 
negrophobia, and anti-blackness” (Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 2). Echoing Bourdieu and 
Wacquant’s argument, they assert that scholarly production is shaped by the wider context 
of US academic imperialism, directly through their dependency on public and 
philanthropic research foundations and indirectly via their reliance on an established 
scholarly canon that has relied on the “othering” of Latin America and in turn justifying 
US imperialism in the region.  
 Beyond the recent revival of this decades-old argument acknowledges the role of 
cultural imperialism in enabling the dominance of US interpretations, new interventions go 
further to address the role of direct military intervention in the circulation of anti-blackness. 
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Therefore, some scholars depart from the cover image of the special issue of The Black 
Scholar, which depicts an “unarmed black Dominican facing off the white agent of US 
military aggression” (Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 9). They point not only to the “soft” 
power of US academic and cultural dominance, but also to the “hard” power of military 
might as a central element to the globalization of both anti-blackness and academic 
discourses of race. Thus, the cover image references the 1965 US military occupation of 
the Dominican Republic, the most recent of several invasions.  
Considering these debates, I initially understood the panelists to be uncritically 
recycling imperialists’ narratives about Dominican backwardness. Over time, I came to 
understand how anti-racist groups used this discourse to advance their claims. By framing 
Dominican blackness as an uncontestable fact, Dominicans challenge the ways the 
dominant narrative of mestizaje makes blackness invisible by including it only as an 
element in mixture. Doing so, Dominicans like Yesenia point to their bodies as 
incontrovertible material evidence of their African ancestry, A mí se me ve la negritud en 
la nariz porque mi nariz es grande. Se me ven en el grososo de mis labios porque tengo los 
labios grososos, como dicen, carnosos (“You see the blackness in the nose because my 
nose is big. You see it in the thickness of my lips because I have thick lips, as they say, 
meaty.”) On multiple occasions, activists drew on physical features that were regularly 
racialized to distinguish non-Europeans, including noses, lips, hair texture, and body type 
(e.g., hips, buttocks). By reading her body in this way, Yesenia asserts that the body 
constructed as a fact can challenge the practices of erasure aligned with mestizaje.  
Although the manner in which activists understand the relationship between race 
and the body reifies racial difference, phenotype has always been at the center of racial 
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construction and classification. Peter Wade, an eminent scholar of race in Latin America, 
writes that “bodily appearance is often taken to be the raw material on which concepts of 
race are built” (2002, 4). However, he reminds that the body is not pre-discursive and 
therefore cannot be experienced outside racial meaning. Even though racialization is often 
practiced by racially categorizing bodies, especially in Latin America where skin color is 
often the linchpin of racial meaning, most anti-racist scholars argue that tying race to the 
body produces an essentialist conceptualization of race that defines certain qualities as 
inherent to different races. Anti-essentialists find that associating race with such 
unchangeable qualities obscures its historically and culturally variable nature. This view of 
race also precludes efforts of individuals to transform and reshape racial categories and 
meaning.  
For Dominican anti-racist activists, however, this framing of race is particularly 
useful as it directly contradicts how race is understood under mestizaje which, in theory, 
argues that all nationals share a mixed racial identity regardless of phenotype. While 
references to phenotype are a regular part of Dominicans’ daily interactions, phenotype is 
not the basis of social stratification or the formation of social groups. Therefore, in contrast 
to this dominant understanding of mestizaje, the privileging of a set of racialized 
phenotypical markers in the construction of Black identity on the island offers a sense of 
facticity around race that frustrates any effort to disassociate oneself from blackness.  
Alicia, one of the central leaders of Reconoci.do, spoke to me at length about how 
she had developed a positive association with blackness. Like Rosa, who spoke about her 
struggles to wear her hair natural in Chapter 4, Alicia noted that the positive associations 
with blackness she was raised with were an exception to the rule. Growing up, she 
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explained, her father would say, el único blanco que tengo es debajo de los pies (“the only 
white I have is underneath the feet.”) Identifying this as una expresión racista (“a racist 
expression”), she explained that it reversed the prevalent hierarchies of Whiteness and 
Blackness as she and her family experienced them in the Dominican Republic. Moreover, 
they rejected the common practice of Blacks in the Dominican Republic to claim racial 
mixture to improve their social standing.  For Alicia, appeals to racial mixture most often 
minimized one’s blackness, even when blackness was an acknowledged as a constitutive 
element of that mixture. Her experience challenges the idea that all Dominicans are raised 
to denigrate blackness and that mestizaje is not embraced by all Dominicans.  
In another istance, in a two-day workshop titled ¡Yo me parezco! (“I look like!”) 
designed to educate youth ages 9 to 13 about local and global Afrodescendant leaders, 
Lissette, the local artist who organized the event, guided the five girls through the creation 
of self-portrait collages. The aim of the exercise was to provide positive images of 
blackness that can combat both its primarily negative associations and thereby transform 
participants’ self-perception. The first day was primarily dedicated to learning about 
prominent Afro-diasporic figures, including the Obamas, Chimamanda Adichie, and local 
Dominican-Haitian activist Sonia Pierre. At one point in the workshop, Lissette projected 
a photograph of Angela Davis to the group. In the Dominican context, few would consider 
her to be Black, with her highlighted blonde hair and light skin color that would be 
classified as trigueña (wheat-colored). Yet, Lissette posited rhetorically, ¿Ella es 
afrodescendiente, verdad? (“She is an Afrodescendant, right?”) She argued that despite 
Davis’ skin and hair color, the shape of her nose and kink of her hair were sufficient 
evidence that she is Afrodescendant. While within mestizaje Davis’ phenotype signals 
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mixture, in Lissette’s evaluation of Davis’ phenotype, she determines her identity 
exclusively based on those features racialized as Black. In addition, within the dominant 
White/Black binary system in the US, someone like Davis would typically be classified as 
Black.  
For those who have lent their voices to social constructionist arguments, the 
corporeal framings of blackness used by Dominican activists are uncomfortably resonant 
with the essentialist framings of race that have been discredited as exclusionary by the late-
20th century wave of postmodernist critique. Furthermore, the latter intellectual camp finds 
identity politics to be ahistorical and reductive of the complex ways individual and group 
membership evolves over time.     
Most of the contemporary social science literature adopts the social constructionist 
perspective that sees race as the product of context-dependent struggles for power (see Omi 
and Winant 2015[1986]). The social construction perspective on race forwards an anti-
essentialist approach to identity, which often decenters the body as a factor in the 
construction of racial meaning. However, some scholars have argued that the 
overwhelming tendency to displace the body in examinations of racialization obscures 
much of the lived experience of racialized persons and how bodily representation and 
performance are often critical to shaping racial discourse and practices. “Strategic 
essentialism” illuminates how provisional identities can serve as tools for coalition building 
and consciousness raising, without precluding internal critique and future remodeling of a 
group’s identity (see Spivak 1988). While cementing the grounds for collective struggle, 
strategic essentialism avoids the pitfalls of ahistorical and universalist coalitions that 
silence internal differences and debates.  
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To be sure, Lissette’s and Yesenia’s location of blackness within the body is a 
narrative capable of countering mestizaje, which functions to eliminate phenotype from 
considerations of race. Under mestizaje, race is tied to nationality and the nation is 
imagined as a family that shares a singular racial composition. Lissette’s and Yesenia’s 
emphasis on the physicality of racial difference also points to the particularity and 
inevitability of their lived experience as racialized persons. This is a powerful argument 
within a state and societal milieu that is highly conscious of color variation, while 
maintaining that racial difference and racism are anomalies.  
 
Transnational Blackness in Rap  
Locating blackness in phenotypical features builds on the existing practice of 
reading color and phenotype to categorize individuals under the color continuum model 
and provides a facticity to racial identity that supports the creation of an activist movement 
organized around blackness. By pushing an alternative reading of a person’s phenotype 
that sees Black features as leading not to a mixed-race, but a Black identity, activists work 
toward broadening the base of their movement beyond the Dominico-Haitian population 
and the limited cadre of Dominicans without Haitian descent who have taken up this cause. 
Although blackness offers fewer opportunities for the expression of a variety of social 
positions and experiences through the proliferation of color categories, to date, the color 
system has not been indicative of a collective social consciousness or shared experience. 
By contrast, blackness provides a discourse that allows Dominico-Haitian activists to 
translate their social experience to their own communities, dark-skinned Dominicans who 
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they argue share their social experience, and international communities that have provided 
indispensable financial and intellectual resources.  
As Eugenio’s reflections on being called moreno summarized above indicate, 
claiming blackness is a choice rather than an obligation for these activists and many, like 
Eugenio, frame this choice as a political one, situating their own coming-to-consciousness 
within transnational histories of anti-racist struggle and resistance that transcend national 
boundaries. Locating blackness in their bodies also counters state-sponsored narratives 
around blackness that most often confine blackness within the past. They are most seen in 
the presentation of colonial-era presentations where costumed dancers perform traditional 
choreography attributed to Afro-diasporic populations. Beyond those practices preserved 
from the distant past, state-sponsored public events rarely embrace contemporary cultural 
practices associated with the African diaspora, such as rap and dembow.  
 One source of criticism of the rise of these musical genres is that they are often 
associated with Dominican transnational migration, particularly to the United States. 
Whereas these connections abroad are recognized as important to social mobility, 
Dominicans abroad are simultaneously associated with drug trafficking, urban violence, 
and blackness, given their racialized status (see Itzigsohn 1999) and social anxiety over the 
growing popularity of African cultural musical genres such as reggaeton, rap, and dembow. 
In 2012, an article in the Listín Diario posed the question of whether dembow, the popular 
musical style traced to Jamaica with roots in reggaeton, could even be considered music. 
Citing a musician of merengue, a traditional musical genre that is championed for its 
national patrimony (see Austerlitz 1997), the article relays social perceptions of dembow 
as peligroso para la salud, “a danger to one’s health.” As with Dominican rap, this 
 186 
emergent style of music is criticized as being violent, vulgar, and devoid of artistic merit. 
As many of its artists descend from the island’s urban and poor sectors, these critiques are 
fueled by racist and classist prejudices regarding the popular cultural productions generated 
from these communities.   
 While the appeal of rap and other urban genres of music was mixed among anti-
racist activists, founding members of Reconoci.do utilized the genre to disseminate their 
message and to engage members in activities that were not overtly political. Recreational 
activities that included rap and other musical performances, dance, food, and other forms 
of entertainment were key elements in efforts to maintain and grow the organization. 
However, members’ composition and performance of rap often interlaced political themes 
within more popular messages of love, sex, and money.   
 To ensure the success of the musical group associated with the movement, members 
were selected via a 2012 competition in which the social content and performance style of 
activists were evaluated by the Reconoci.do membership. The musical group was an 
extension of the organization, performing under the same name. These performances took 
place not only at events specifically organized around themes of anti-racism and human 
rights but also festivals throughout the eastern district of La Romana. During one regional 
meeting in the area, I visited the makeshift recording studio where members of the 
organization hoped to record an album of their more socially conscious music and use the 
proceeds to support future organizing efforts. Although the capital for this initiative was 
never realized, this group and others continue to perform a repertoire of songs relating 
experiences of discrimination as a racialized and undocumented group.  
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One such song, Junta ven y dime ¿Cuál es mi nombre? (“Junta Come Tell Me, 
What Is My Name?”), articulates a demand that the state admit its culpability in 
engendering the suffering of Dominicans of Haitian descent vis-à-vis the institution of the 
JCE. The second verse recounts the effects of these measures:  
Esta historia es de una chamaca nacida en la Romana,  
que tiene cédula y pasaporte, pero ya no es dominicana. 
Porque la Junta y el estado quieren limpiar la raza, 
eliminando un grupo de negros de ascendencia haitiana.  
Yo también soy dominicano, pero me siento discriminado, 
porque el estado me ha dejado con el corazón destrozado, 
por decir que soy extranjero en la tierra que murió mi abuelo.  
 
[This is the story of a girl born in the Romana,  
who has an ID and passport but is no longer Dominican,  
Because the Junta and the state want to purify the race,  
eliminating a group of Blacks of Haitian descent.  
I too am Dominican, but I feel discriminated  
because the state has left me with a broken heart, 
by saying that I’m a foreigner in the land where my grandfather died.]  
 
Diverging from other songs, such as Sueño con eso (“I Dream of It”), which is performed 
in the fast-paced style characteristic of rap, the lyrics excerpted above are sung in a slower 
R&B style overlaid with a twangy guitar track, the signature of the Dominican genre of 
bachata. This music contributes to the emotional story of many of the movement’s 
members who have their citizenship revoked. While situating their critique in local 
dynamics, the group draws on rap’s themes of expressing lived realities of discrimination 
and loss, including death of close ones. Although, the death referenced here is not one 
caused by the overt police or gang violence that is predominantly referenced in many rap 
songs, but presumably that of the exploited Haitian cane cutter.  
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When I asked one of the group’s members, Carlos, why he thought music was an 
integral strategy of furthering the social goals of the organization, he responded that beyond 
music being an important outlet for his feelings, success in the music industry allows him 
to “convert” a large population both nationally and internationally more easily than 
traditional methods of activism. Music was ubiquitous during the group’s public protests, 
helping to animate the crowd and fostering a sense of shared group identity through the 
memorization and performance of lyrics, many created by the group itself. Activists built 
upon both the popularity of rap among youth, but also its prevailing reputation as a socially 
conscious genre employed by African Americans to articulate and protest their 
marginalized social condition.   
 In the song Sueño con eso, Delma, the artistic name of the Reconoci.do activist who 
performs the song, expresses his desire to engage in the tradition of rap as protest music. 
He raps:  
 Sueño que el pólice no mata a la gente,  
cuando sospecha que es delincuente  
Quiero que el mundo pare de girar,  
que se detenga y se ponga a pensar,  
que cada humano es muy especial.  
En esta tierra nadie es ilegal.  
 
I dream that the police don’t kill people 
when they suspect they are delinquents. 
I want the world to stop spinning,  
for it to halt and begin to think 
That every person is very special.  
In this land no one is illegal.  
  
Delma’s use of pólice, the Hispanicized pronunciation of the English word police in lieu 
of policía, intimates his engagement with conversations about police brutality that have 
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been the focus of US-based anti-racist movements in recent years and the performer’s 
desire to connect social issues in the Dominican Republic with broader anti-racist struggles. 
This desire is further intimated in the song’s title and chorus, “I Dream of It,” which alludes 
to Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. Whereas King’s speech calls for 
freedom in New York, Mississippi, Georgia, and Tennessee, this song calls for equality 
among different nationalities, including Iraqis, Colombians, and Venezuelans.  
 Activists’ use of rap contrasted with state-sanctioned images of Black cultural 
expression, which most often take the form of folkloric dances. Such dances were often 
performed at the weekly concerts sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, attended by locals 
and tourists alike. A popular variation of the costumes typically worn in these performances 
is a wide ankle-length skirt for the female dancers that they fan in the air throughout the 
performance. Male dancers typically wear crisp-cotton guayaberas accented with a bright 
handkerchief and/or a straw hat. By contrast, by embracing the urban cool aesthetic 
associated with rap and expressed in their self-styling in the baggy pants, chains, and 
straight-brimmed caps associated with US urban culture, Dominicans construct a more 
modern image of blackness. This assertion of modernity contrasts with the narrative of 
mestizaje which figures blackness as amodern. Several scholars have recently written on 
the folklorization of blackness, contesting earlier claims that failed to acknowledge the 
existence of any images of Black culture. Rather, they show that blackness often exists at 
a safe distance—in the past (see Thomas 2004; Godreau 2015; Perry 2016).  
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Films and Funding  
The shelf in Alicia’s office where she stored the DVDs she used for these activities 
only held films produced in the US. Many of the titles, mostly unauthorized copies bought 
on the tables set up outside La Sirena on Avenida Mella, were about US civil rights 
struggles. In one gathering in a community center in the eastern municipality of Guaymate, 
Alicia referenced Selma to argue for the importance of the Dominico-Haitian voting bloc. 
Although the film’s narrative centering on the 1965 march for Black voting rights in the 
US south is both geographically and historically removed from the contemporary struggles 
of Dominicans of Haitian descent, Alicia insisted on the film’s relevance to the youths’ 
own struggles against codified practices of discrimination.  
Moreover, the organization’s ability to purchase these films is to a certain degree 
made possible by funding raised by the US-based Dominican diaspora groups such as 
Border of Lights and We Are All Dominican and other US-based organizations such as the 
American Jewish World Service. Often, these funds supported specific areas of action and 
thus had a role in shaping the organization’s agenda. Maintaining visibility to an audience 
abroad was a main concern of the group’s leaders. At a May 2014 meeting to discuss recent 
state efforts to address the crisis of documentation, the head of Reconoci.do opened the 
dialogue emphasizing that the Dominican Republic had become as renowned for its human 
rights abuses as it was for its tourism. After the meeting, when I asked how I could 
contribute to the organization, she emphasized that maintaining interest in the US was how 
I could make the biggest contribution. Her statements to me and the majority Dominican 
audience emphasized the international arena as among the most important focuses of 
organizing.  
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Rather than support the various calls for a tourism boycott, activists have instead 
encouraged visitors to come to the island. In a letter drafted by public university students 
and a retired professor that gained several supporters, the Colectivo Isleño (Island 
Collective) argues that the boycott would disproportionately impact Dominicans of Haitian 
descent who frequently work in tourism and “would be first to be fired by the bosses if the 
number of tourists were to decline.” Alicia, a high-ranking member of Reconoci.do, 
seconded this stance when a US-based academic and activist consulted her as to whether a 
conference should be held on the island. Rather than cancel, she told him, they should 
incorporate a space for dialogue with those affected, whose lack of legal documentation 
makes it difficult to travel outside the country.  
While activists on the island were grateful for the support of diaspora communities 
and organizations abroad, at times, this resource disparity became frustrating. During the 
planning for a demonstration marking the second anniversary of the passage of the TC 168-
13, Alicia was concerned about the limited availability of funds to support the attendance 
of the majority of those affected who live in rural batey communities outside the capital 
area. Comparing the difficulties she had accessing funding with the relative privilege of 
the Dominican diaspora, she lamented a situation where Dominican New Yorkers would 
possibly have a larger turnout than those affected by the ruling. Her feelings expressed a 
sense of disempowerment around the fact that those who have the most at stake in the 
future of Dominican documentation policies were less equipped to publicly voice their 
complaints.    
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Conclusion 
Contemporary struggles over the representation of blackness indicates the 
complexity of meanings tied to blackness. Latin America, where, as Peter Wade (1993) 
puts it, the boundaries of Black identity are disagreed upon, is fertile ground for examining 
how struggles over racial identity unfold. To be sure, the scarcity of racial mobilizing under 
the rubric of blackness furnishes ample opportunity to shape the construction of an image 
of blackness on the national stage. However, this same void provides little precedent for 
activists. Faced with a national ideology that often undermines racial difference, the 
analysis of census and cédula categories presented here provides important insight into 
how the state has defined and shaped these categories. Importantly, it shows that color and 
race overlap in Dominican constructions, challenging claims that colorism can be 
distinguished from racism.  
 Further, in the absence of a well-formed and didactic history of organizing around 
either race or ethnicity, Reconoci.do’s deployment of rap forms part of a broader trend of 
turning to the US for cultural and material resources in this and other anti-racist struggles. 
While the US is only one of the national contexts activists draw on in forming their 
representation of blackness, the ubiquity of US cultural imports such as music, movies, and 
print media earned it significant influence among the youth who form this movement. This 
market dominance, paired with the fact that the US receives most of the country’s 
emigrants ensures, that the US has a significant influence over the ways blackness is 
represented in the Dominican context. The available materials with which to organize the 
regular cineforos, screenings of films and their discussion, reflected this dynamic. These 
struggles unfold as the state has increasingly adopted a color-blind position that furthers 
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mestizaje’s “silencing” of race (Rodríguez-Silva 2012) through attempts to eliminate the 
visibility of both race and color in the census and cédula. These documents communicate 
powerful messages to the public about racial identities and hierarchies that, in turn, lay the 
ground for anti-racist claims.   
While the activists I worked with in the Dominican Republic employed discourses 
and representations of blackness that originate in the US, activists and other adopters of 
Black identity drew from a broader range of influences. Genres such as dembow mentioned 
above and reggae were frequently promoted by racially progressive sectors. Moreover, the 
power of US representations of blackness is directly connected to the prevalence of popular 
and academic resources on the island. As Steven Gregory (2014) argues, globalization has 
opened opportunities for Dominicans and Haitians in the Dominican Republic. He finds 
that Dominicans and Haitians alike utilize a “sampling of African American, Rastafarian, 
and other cultural practices and identities as both an exercise of a diasporic imaginary and 
a modality of practice through which they subverted, complicated, and contested the 
conflation of Haitian identity with stigmatized blackness” (262). His larger examination of 
reveals globalization as an uneven process which unfolds according to historically 
produced political and economic inequalities. This line of argument can be extended to 
Dominicans’ unequal access to US material and intangible culture.  
In Latin American Studies, the question of how to translate and deconstruct 
alternative forms of racialization has been a subject of considerable interest. In the 
Dominican Republic, these questions have led to uncertainties about whether emerging 
narratives of Dominican blackness evidence neo-imperialist interventions that 
“universalize” the racial formations found in the West, mainly the US (Bourdieu and 
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Wacquant 1999). However, as Chetty and Rodríguez have argued, the power relations that 
engender the supremacy of the US academy and its broader cultural productions transcend 
any individual researcher, university, academic association, or discipline. Furthermore, it 
is not only the seduction of the West’s resource-laden publishing houses and movie studios, 
but also its military might that transmit its image across the globe. Still, missing from this 
dynamic is the ways that those caught in these crosshairs maneuver within broader fields 
of power toward more liberatory ends. Clearly, as Edward Bonilla-Silva (2004), Nancy 
López (2013), and others have argued, even though exchanges of meaning-making are not 
inextricable from the broader contexts of power in which they take place, they are not 
unidirectional. To be sure, the Dominicans who decry their society’s racial dysmorphia are 
gesturing toward the globality of racism and anti-blackness, toward which scholars have 
been pointing. The contours of their contestation, dominated by US contributions to the 
global African diaspora, mirror the asymmetries of power pinpointed by Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1999) and Chetty and Rodríguez (2015). Despite their limitations, activists are 
attached to these narratives of blackness precisely because of their alignments with power, 
as they attempt to gain visibility under state-sponsored discourses of mestizaje and its 
attendant politics of non-racialism. As their efforts have shown, blackness provides an 
already-formed language through which activists may articulate experiences of racial 
marginalization when the framework of mestizaje only offers invisibility.   
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[L]os años pasarán y las oportunidades que perdemos, no las vamos 
a recuperar. Si bien es cierto, podemos decir que un documento no 
tiene ningún valor en sí mismo, sino el valor que le damos como 
sociedad. Pero [en] una sociedad donde el acceso a todos los 
derechos pasa por la vía de un documento se convierte 
imprescindible para el desarrollo de una persona. 
 
[Y]ears pass and the opportunities that we lose, we won’t recover. 
Although it is true, we can say that a document has no value in itself, 
but the value that we give it as a society. But, [in] a society where 
access to all rights is via a document, it becomes indispensable for 
the development of a person.  
 
—Franklin Dinol, Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 
February 26, 201853 
 
The Continued Fight for Citizenship 
Regardless of whether Haitians possess official Dominican documents, as 
suggested by Dinol’s words the impact of the denationalization policies on Dominico-
Haitians will follow them for the rest of their lives. As highlighted in the analysis presented 
here, many faced obstacles in accessing their documentation as early as 2005, meaning that 
by the 2014 reform, their lives and dreams had been deferred for almost a decade. For 
many, the policy came at a turning point in their lives as their appearance at the Junta to 
request the copy of their acta was precipitated by a job offer, pending marriage to a foreign 
spouse, a scholarship to study abroad, their recruitment on a baseball team, or registration 
in a university. They are persons whose social and economic mobility was hard-won from 
                                            
53 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, February 27, 2018. “República Dominicana 
Cumplimiento decisiones SIDH” https://youtu.be/VSLk8F0M_34.  
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the destitution and social isolation of the bateyes. Afectados (those affected by the 
sentencia) use many phrases to describe their precarious juridical condition: muerte civil 
(civil death), genocidio civil (civil genocide), and vidas suspendidas (suspended lives). The 
Reconoci.do movement became a place where those affected could redirect their energies 
and find employment by becoming professional research assistants, promotores, and social 
workers, but this is the story of only a fraction of the more than 200,000 impacted by the 
ruling. Instead of going to college or technical school, some, artesanía (arts and crafts), or 
food in their homes or in the streets. Some followed in their parents’ steps and worked 
cutting caña under someone else’s name; some women sought the protection of a partner 
or resorted to sex work; and still others found no alternative to their broken dreams. Stories 
of persons contemplating or attempting suicide, like the one discussed in Chapter 3, were 
common among those living the consequences of this policy. I sometimes refer to this 
group as the generación perdida, the lost generation, given the enormous amount of 
promise and grand plans stalled by the sentencia. Their collective movement gives me hope 
that they will be able to create the society that they envision.  
However, the way the state has fulfilled this process, through the creation of the 
double registry, remains an obstacle to Dominicans of Haitian descent’s full exercise of 
citizenship. As alluded to in Chapter 3, the documents of Group A are relocated to a 
separate book in the national registry (birth certificates are referenced by a series of 
numbers indicating the book and folder where the original is located). To “transcribe” this 
document, the JCE petitions the civil court to nullify the original birth certificate before 
creating a new one in the Libro de Transcripción. The new document is accorded a new 
location ID, referencing the year the new acta was emitted. This process generates several 
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issues. First, when one tries to use this new document, it appears as if one was recently 
born and given the new registry. Second, this change in registry requires changes in one’s 
national ID and any property or vehicle registered under the previous number must be re-
registered under the new number. Third, as previously discussed, the law governing the 
return of these documents dictates, a las que en el pasado se les haya expedido cédulas de 
identidad y electoral sean dotadas del mismo documento con su numeración anterior (“to 
those that in the past have been issued identity and electoral certificates are endowed with 
the same document with its previous numeration”) (Ley No. 169–14). Finally, the creation 
of this new registry is one of many extralegal mechanisms the government has employed 
to infringe on the rights of Dominicans of Haitian descent even if the scope of its impact is 
unclear.   
 By comparison, however, those in Group A are the fortunate ones. Since 2014, 
legislation that offered temporary residency to both Haitian immigrants and unregistered 
Dominicans of Haitian descent (Group B) through the PNRE has left them in limbo. The 
current procedure to apply for permanent residency, designed for immigrants, is 
impractical for those born in the Dominican Republic, who lack the necessary foreign 
citizenship documents to complete the process. This group, lacking both Dominican and 
Haitian citizenship, is stateless. When I visited the Dominican Republic in October 2016, 
a leader of Reconoci.do informed me that the government was discussing ways to address 
these issues but had once again failed to consult the affected communities. During the 
February 2018 meetings of the International Court of Human Rights, petitioners 
representing denationalized groups asked that they be consulted in future measures, 
indicating that they had not been invited to join conversations. In these same meetings, the 
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Dominican delegation complained that many who entered the plan had not picked up their 
documentation, suggesting either its lack of value, mistrust of the state, or, as I heard from 
many activists, the refusal of Dominicans of Haitian descent to carry a document that 
designates them as Haitian nationals. Beneco Enecia, representing a group of Dominican 
civil society, proclaimed that at that time, 133,760 persons in Group A or B had not 
received their documents and remained stateless. At the time of the publication of this 
document, this rumored plan has yet to be unveiled. Equally troubling is the lack of an 
adequate challenge to the wholesale elimination of birthright citizenship for those born 
after the implementation of the 2010 constitution, which changed citizenship from jus soli 
to jus sanguinis. Therefore, the children of non-citizens remain blocked from obtaining 
Dominican citizenship. Now, this generation is less than eight years of age and the effects 
of these policies will become more visible when its members reach eighth grade and will 
need documentation to continue their studies. In the meantime, the Ministry of Education 
may change the current regulations and require documentation earlier. It appears that 
citizenship has been permanently transformed in the Dominican Republic.  
 
Citizenship and Race in the Dominican Republic and Beyond  
Franklin Dinol, a member of Reconoci.do offered the comments above at the 167th 
session of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in Bogotá, Colombia. This 
statement reflects the current status of citizenship for Dominicans of Haitian descent in the 
Dominican Republic. At the time of completing this manuscript, most of the estimated 
55,000 persons designated as Group A by law 169–14 (those previously registered) have 
received their documents reinstating their rights. However, as Dinol’s statement above 
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illustrates, although access to documentation has been a central demand of the Reconoci.do 
movement, its concerns exceed the desire for documentation alone.  
To that end, Dinol’s comments highlight a fundamental tenet of the scholarship on 
citizenship—that citizenship exceeds its formal dimensions to include cultural and social 
dimensions which reflect the race, gender, and class dynamics of a given society.  Dinol 
seems to argue that in many senses, these more informal dimensions are more important. 
This project has examined how these racial, gendered, and classed and citizenship 
dynamics unfold in the Dominican Republic within a unique racial and national history 
that has led to the exclusion of Haitians as both racial and national others. Through 
ethnographic fieldwork with Dominico-Haitian activists, those most embroiled in 
contemporary debates about race and dominicanidad, this dissertation has found that the 
overlapping of race and nation vis-à-vis mestizaje engenders the exclusion of racial others 
as national others that is at the root of the recent citizenship crisis. In addition, this project 
offers several contributions to the Dominican, Latin American, and citizenship studies.  
Since its conception, this project emerged in response to the recent call by 
Dominican Studies scholars to reinterpret Dominican blackness (see Mayes et al. 2013; 
Chetty and Rodríguez 2015; García Peña 2016). The scholarship that has formed part of 
this new wave has almost exclusively drawn on literary and ethnic studies with little 
ethnographic documentation of how Dominicans on the ground are working toward and 
envisioning antiracist futures. This study not only serves to close the scholarly gap in this 
field by focusing on how contemporary Dominicans outside the literary canon center 
blackness within their collective organizing, but also sheds light on the experiences of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent, addressing a significant blind spot in our knowledge. The 
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lack of scholarship in this vein is especially troubling given the centrality of Haiti in 
analyses of race in the Dominican Republic. This oversight is reinforced by what Nina 
Glick Schiller and Ulrike Meinhof (2011) identify as methodological nationalism, or the 
tendency of researchers to reify nation-state boundaries in their research. Unwittingly, it 
may also reinforce stereotypical images of Haitians as passive victims of racial exclusion. 
 By centering the experiences of Dominicans of Haitian descent, this research 
applies a new perspective to the project of untangling the perennially knotted threads 
linking dominicanidad, anti-haitianismo, and anti-blackness. Much of the existing 
scholarship contends that dominant framings of dominicanidad are founded on anti-
blackness and anti-Haitianism (see Wucker 1999; Sagás 2000). Further, they find that 
Dominican understandings of blackness and Haitianess overlap in ways that preclude any 
meaningful engagement with blackness not made vis-à-vis Haiti.  
To that end, Chapter 2 of this dissertation provided a historical accounting of how 
Haitian immigrants and their descendants have accessed citizenship. It found that the sugar 
industry was the key factor in questions of Haitian integration and access to formal 
citizenship in the Dominican Republic. For much of the 20th century, Haitians’ labor on 
sugar plantations determined their ability to work, reside, and raise families in the 
Dominican Republic. Eruptions of racial and xenophobic violence in the 1937 border 
massacre and later in the Balaguer government’s deportations targeting non-cane workers 
in the 1990s solidified the social and economic marginalization of Haitians. These actions 
made it clear that bateyes were the only places where Haitians would be protected in the 
Dominican Republic.  
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 The sugar industry was also charged with enforcing the bilateral accords that 
regulated Haitian labor migration, often violating these agreements by refusing to return 
migrants after the harvest. Sugar and the state were so closely entwined that during much 
of Trujillo’s rule they were one and the same. According to written and oral histories, cane 
worker identity cards, or fichas, were often the only documentation provided to the largely 
Haitian labor population. Because of the longstanding relationship between the state and 
sugar, the crisis in the sugar industry in the 1980s and 90s. generated the current citizenship 
crisis. This historical overview exhibits how the prevailing construction of haitianidad, and 
Haitians’ access to citizenship in the Dominican Republic, have been overdetermined by 
the country’s reliance on the monocrop sugar economy. This analysis helps situate the 
recent citizenship crisis within the broader field of vision offering a more complex reading 
than that possible from the perspective of anti-Haitianism alone.  
 The new techniques for Haitian incorporation necessitated by the collapse of the 
sugar industry were the focus of Chapter 3. An examination of the Plan Nacional de 
Regularización de Extranjero, aimed at integrating the previously undocumented 
population, and the shift from jus soli to jus sanguinis shows how they failed to meet their 
purported aims of radically transforming Dominican citizenship into a more streamlined, 
modernized, fair, and just system. Rather, these reforms exacerbate the racial and gender 
inequalities outlined in Chapter 2. Additionally, this chapter offered an alternative reading 
of contemporary citizenship practices in the Dominican Republic, arguing that they are 
centered in inclusion rather than exclusion. Utilizing Nicholas De Genova’s concept of the 
“spectacle of illegality,” I show how the processes around these new subjectivities serve as 
“spectacles,” drawing attention away from the law as the “site of exclusion” and thereby 
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rendering the migrant/seeker of citizenship “underserving” and ultimately, illegal (De 
Genova 2013). These spectacles thereby legitimate the protracted history of irregular and 
inconsistent citizenship policies that have a discriminatory impact on Dominico-Haitians.  
Moreover, this research has shown that citizenship and documentation have 
become more important in the Dominican Republic. An overview of the treatment of 
Dominican citizenship from the beginning of the 20th century to today shows an opposite 
trend from that identified by scholars of globalization and transnationalism, including those 
who applauded the Dominican Republic’s early efforts to extend rights of citizenship to 
the Dominican diaspora. To that end, this project calls for a reevaluation of the significance 
of transnational citizenship (see Duany 2008[1994], 2011; Glick Schiller 1999; Itzigsohn 
et al. 1999; Levitt 2001; Sagás and Molina 2004; Sørensen 1996). Rather than 
understanding the integration of the Dominican diaspora as portending the decline of 
citizenship or even as an expanded citizenship philosophy, this work suggests that 
transnational citizenship is consistent with the racialization and gendering of citizenship 
under mestizaje. Alongside the previous chapter, this section of the dissertation addressed 
the development of anti-Haitianism, dominicanidad vis-à-vis access to citizenship, and 
racialization.  
Chapter 4 mapped out the relationship between Haitianess and blackness. This 
chapter asked, what, if any, are the possibilities of articulating blackness beyond or outside 
Haitianess in the Dominican Republic? To that end, it centered the nation’s growing natural 
hair movement as an increasingly organized and visible sector organizing to create a space 
of Black aesthetics and subjectivities within Dominican popular culture. None of the most 
prominent leaders of the natural hair movement identify as having Haitian descent. 
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However, their experiences show that blackness and Haitianess are both signified in natural 
hair. Although many of those I interviewed and engaged with at natural hair events framed 
their decision to wear their hair natural as resistance, others identified a trend towards the 
commercialization of natural hair that may dilute its radical potential. Some, such as Afro-
Dominican activist Carmen and Dominican of Haitian descent organizer Alicia, found that 
natural hair was more easily accepted when aligned with middle-class and patriarchal 
aesthetics that demand that one be “worked on and worked up” (Tate 2009, 25). Thus, those 
who cared for their natural hair outside of these spaces of consumption enjoyed both less 
acceptance and less access to the language of resistance.  This chapter also confirmed that 
blackness is often signified as Haitianess in the Dominican Republic. However, it pointed 
to fissures and disruptions within the overlapping layers of Haitianess and blackness, 
particularly as some middle-class sectors lay claim to Black identities. As such, they draw 
on transnational natural hair fashions and move away from associations from blackness 
with Haitianess.  
Focusing more closely on the work of Dominicans of Haitian descent who organize 
as Reconoci.do, Chapter 5 examined how these activists articulate their identities in their 
anti-racist and anti-xenophobic organizing. This final chapter centered state-based racial 
narratives as promoted by the Dominican census from 1920-1981 and the cédula skin color 
category until its elimination in 2014. I argue that the census serves as an example of “state 
speech” (Goldberg 2001) through which the state not only articulates but promotes racial 
knowledge (Loveman 2014). Census results reveal several aspects of official racial 
narratives. First, they show that race and color are often used interchangeably in the 
Dominican Republic, suggesting that color and racial systems are not distinct concepts, but 
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that color maps onto race. This finding challenges the tendency of scholars to frame racism 
and colorism as distinct social phenomena that allow for greater social mobility (Hernández 
2013). Moreover, it undermines the tendency to idealize Latin American racial formations 
as benign, when compared to the United States. Second, these census results confirm 
Ginetta Candelario’s (2007) finding that the Dominican racial ideal is best captured by the 
indio, an intermediary mixed-race category between Black and White. Finally, the census 
belies a deeply engrained racialization of Haitians at the national level through the 
association of Haitians with “physical difference” in the 1981 census question.  
However, Reconoci.do’s activism reflects a more critical approach to mestizaje 
than that advanced by state-based narratives. Instead, the latter promote accusations of 
Dominicans’ anti-blackness and Black denial that much of the recent Dominican Studies 
scholarship has challenged. To that end, activists portrayed Dominicans as not being able 
to see that they are, in fact, Black. In Chapter 5, I asked why Dominican activists have 
chosen to advance these narratives that many scholars (see Chetty and Rodríguez 2015; 
Torres-Saillant 2001; Ramírez 2018; García Peña 2016) have found counterproductive to 
challenging racism in the Dominican Republic as they “obfuscate rather than illuminate” 
racial dynamics in the country (Chetty and Rodríguez 2015, 2). Moreover, activists 
reproduce these narratives of Black denial despite their very being evidencing that not all 
Dominicans reject blackness. Therefore, while some scholars like Peter Wade (2005) have 
called for a “rethinking” of mestizaje as a potentially progressive racial ideology, the 
historical coupling of racial and national identity through mestizaje has significantly 
contributed to the inability of Dominicans of Haitian descent to claim belonging after 
several generations.  
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 Many members of Reconoci.do reverse the practices of racial interpretation that 
often ascribe mixed-race identity to anyone deemed to exhibit one drop of whiteness. 
Rather, they rely on an interpretation of racialized bodily features that ascribe blackness to 
the person in question. Though potentially essentialist, this method lends corporeal weight 
to racial identification that is lost within the dominant mixed-race system, in which 
individuals fall within multiple and sometimes contradictory categories. While this 
approach to race is potentially essentialist in that it locates racial identity within a set of 
stereotypical physical features, attribution of blackness is not the endpoint of racialization 
for activists, but the starting point. According to the activists I interviewed, one’s blackness 
is developed and fulfilled through a process of consciousness-building that involves 
commitment to social action, the pursuit of alternative social histories, and the forging of 
diasporic links. Much of Reconoci.do’s work outside of the public forum involves the 
development of this consciousness. To that end, activists employ not only the narratives of 
blackness outlined above, but diasporic resources that provide the materials to challenge 
and supersede statist racial scripts.  
However, the resources available to activists are governed by both migration and 
funding circuits. Access to US cultural materials, due to (1) a long history of US 
involvement in the Dominican Republic, (2) the attendant migration to the US, and (3) the 
proximity of the territories, and (4) the general unevenness of globalization, has resulted in 
the predominance of US influence in the organization. Further, much of the funding derives 
from US and European-based religious organizations. In their pursuit of this funding, the 
leaders of the organization must frame their problematic in terms intelligible to 
international audiences. To that end, their racial discourse often reflects understandings 
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more traditionally attributed to the US context. Therefore, the cultural materials employed 
in their struggle are inherently shaped by these dynamics.  
In the end, this analysis set out to map the relationship between dominicanidad, 
haitianismo, and negritud in the context of the recent citizenship crisis in the Dominican 
Republic. It has done so through the experiences of those who are paving the way toward 
anti-racist futures. Their experiences show that the co-articulation of race and nation in 
mestizaje remains a primary challenge to citizenship for racialized persons. However, 
emerging efforts to challenge anti-blackness from a wide array of Dominicans have the 
potential to exclude Haitians who have been economically and socially marginalized by 
adopting a politics of Black respectability, especially a middle-class aesthetic. The natural 
hair movement’s rise may result from the disentangling of blackness from Haitianess, an 
effort that Dominicans of Haitian descent have supported through the Reconoci.do 
movement. However, divorcing blackness from Haitianess decenters Haiti’s revolutionary 
legacy in the history of diasporic blackness and through uneven transnational circuits turns 
toward articulations of blackness often derived from the US.  
This research has broad implications beyond the Dominican context. Much of the 
research on citizenship and illegality has focused on the Global North with scant attention 
to the ways migrant-sending countries traditionally integrate immigrants and their 
descendants. Much of the academic literature on Latin America has recently begun to turn 
to race as a major axis of organization, but few have  looked at race as articulated alongside 
citizenship despite rich histories of migration to places like the Dominican Republic. At 
the urging of illegality theorist Nicolas De Genova, this work shifts its focus from the 
individuals rendered “illegal” to the processes that produce the condition of illegality (De 
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Genova 2002, 423). Centering the citizenship projects of the Dominican Republic adds to 
this growing scholarship on illegality, showing how colonial racial projects are reproduced 
as citizenship projects.  
To be sure, the development of alternative citizenship projects in the Dominican 
Republic proves the necessity of such an examination of how illegality is being produced 
outside of US and European contexts. While this analysis also contributes to the mapping 
of how illegality is racialized, it shows how its articulation is governed by the local and 
regional context, including histories of migration, modes of migrant incorporation, and 
racial scripts. By suggesting that the expansion of research on citizenship outside the 
Global North must be attentive to these dynamics, this research suggests that in the Latin 
American region, the ideology mestizaje still plays a central role in determinations of 
belonging. Conceived by prominent Latin American intellectuals in the early 20th century 
as a national and racial philosophy, mestizaje lays the ground for the overlapping exclusion 
of racial others as national others and vice versa through the racialization of national 
difference. Given that the Dominican Republic is just one of many nations organized 
around mestizaje, this project’s findings suggest that mestizaje may pose similar obstacles 
to foreign-origin groups throughout the Latin American and Caribbean region. As the 
activists in this project suggest, the persistence of mestizaje as the dominant racial narrative 
presents a fundamental obstacle to the ability of foreign-origin groups to access citizenship 
rights. Beyond the Latin American context, this project documents the reversal of birthright 
citizenship as several political actors in the US and elsewhere have considered similar 
measures. As such, it serves as a testament to the human toll of these policies.   
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Areas for Future Research 
The present dissertation focused on how Dominicans of Haitian descent navigate 
their double exclusion as racial and national others in the Dominican Republic. Doing so, 
it raised important questions about how mestizaje structures citizenship in the Dominican 
Republic and beyond. Participant observation on the contemporary situation has been the 
primary method of this study, leaving aside the earlier migration of cocolos and US Blacks 
to the island as areas for future research. In addition, this dissertation has dwelt on 
blackness, but Latin America, including the Dominican Republic, has been and continues 
to be a site of indigenous movements, as well as Asian and Middle Eastern, and more 
recently, Venezuelan migrations, which remain beyond the scope of this project. Moreover, 
our understanding of the effect of transnational funding agencies and activist networks 
would be enriched via a multi-sited approach. Given the targeting of Haitian in public anti-
immigration campaigns around the world, researchers should continue to examine why 
Haitian immigrants have become the face of anti-immigrant campaigns in the Americas. 
Finally, 133,760 persons remain stateless in the Dominican Republic, not including the 
countless others whose lives were derailed by la sentencia. I end with a call to readers, and 
a promise to myself, to continue to support the efforts of the Dominican-Haitian grassroots 
movement to restore their rights as citizens and human beings. 
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